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ABSTRACT 
Despite the enormous risk associated with the development of a large indigenous 
airliner, China after a failed attempt in the mid-1980s, since 2003 has decided once again 
to embark on a journey toward the development of a 190 seat commercial airliner.  
Nations are typically interested in the development of indigenous airliners because of the 
potential spillover effects that years of research and development have on the economy 
and the military. Equally important is that China no longer wants to relinquish its large 
commercial airplane market to foreign companies such as Boeing and Airbus with their 
market expected to constitute nearly 25% percent of the world’s demand worth $340 
billion.  
With the aviation industry naturally driven toward a natural monopoly, the 
Chinese government has agreed to not only subsidize the C919’s development, removing 
the potential risk associated with launching a technologically advanced aircraft, but upon 
the aircraft’s arrival, which is expected in 2016, but also guarantee sales of the plane by 
forcing its State-owned airlines to purchase it. This could potentially be harmful to 
current commercial aircraft producers Airbus and Boeing. If the three manufacturers: 
Boeing, Airbus and COMAC split the market in three ways, it will dig deep into the 
profits of all three manufacturers. This may force Boeing to contract the size of their 




innovation and product efficiency and the ability of the military and the economy reaping 
such benefits.  
This dissertation weaves the work of Peter’s Evans’s “Embedded Autonomy and 
Michael Porter’s “Determinant Model” to determine that given the current nature of the 
Chinese state, it possess an adequate level of embedded autonomy to implement 
favorable policy for constructing an internationally competitive airliner, which consists of 
both creating an innovative airliner and selling enough of them to develop scale 
economies.  A state’s institutional configurations whether it possess a high level of 
autonomy, high level of embeddedness, or a balance between the two, influence the 
essential society variables in Porter’s Determinant model for developing industry 
differently. 
Using a combination of primary source and secondary data from China, the 
United States and France, which include conducting interviews with key officials and 
experts in the aviation field from those countries, this research project compares and 
contrasts the institutional arrangements of China in the 1980’s during its failed attempt at 
commercial aircraft development with today and concludes that different internal 
structures lead to different levels of effectiveness and success with respect to 
implementing policy choices favorable to the development of the commercial aviation 
industry.  
 Secondly, this Dissertation looks at the potential implications the success of the 
C919 may have on the United States and Boeing and the ways in which Boeing might 
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 Only a few countries have successfully developed a commercial aviation 
industry. Most that have tried have failed:  The size of the investment is usually 
greater than a firm’s worth. Therefore, any country seeking to develop an indigenous 
aircraft must be willing to provide subsidies or other forms of assistance to its airplane 
manufacturer in order to minimize the risk of monetary losses that could potentially 
bankrupt it. As a result, only Europe’s Airbus has thus far been able to successfully 
pose a direct challenge to American dominance in the large passenger airplane market.  
With the massive amounts of money channeled by the members of the European 
Consortium (France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, etc.) over the last twenty years 
toward developing, producing, and marketing large passenger aircraft, Airbus has 
managed to capture about 50 percent of the market in an industry that has traditionally 
been driven toward a natural monopoly.  
Now, with demand for commercial aircraft in China over the next 20 years 
expected to constitute nearly 25 percent of the world market, and to exceed over $340 




journey to produce a 190-seat passenger aircraft (COMAC 919) within the next five 
years.
1
 Like Airbus, the support of a government will make entry possible for China,  
whose emergence into the industry is expected to have major implications for both the 
United States and Europe. 
 
 The Uniqueness of the Aviation Industry 
Nations typically attempt to develop an indigenous airliner because of the 
potential benefits to its economy and military. The level of a country’s indigenous 
aircraft is usually indicative of the level of scientific and technological development in 
both sectors, advances in one of which will spill over into the other. However, for a 
state to successfully break into the aviation business, it must understand the industry’s 
unique economics and competitive nature,
2
 which, as is true of other high-technology 
industries, demands above average spending on research and development, and greater 
employment of scientists and engineers, so the university system must provide modern 
facilities and skilled faculty. 
            The aviation industry differs from most other high-tech industries because the 
huge up-front development costs and immense technological risk associated with the 
launch of an aircraft create a natural monopoly protected by barriers that defeat typical 
market forces. It takes years of losses for a new firm to develop a family of aircraft 
and produce it on a scale large enough to benefit from economies of scale.  Therefore, 
                                                          
1
 “China to Deliver a Fleet of ARJs by 2012”, Industry Research Solutions, 
www.rncos.com/Blog/2009/02/China-to-Deliver-a-Fleet-of-30-Homemade-ARJs-by-2012.html.(accessed 
July 1, 2009). 
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 Ibid., p156. 




states are inclined to offer aircraft-manufacturing firms assistance in the form of 
subsidies to offset the risk associated with their development. 
A state wishing to develop an indigenous airliner must be aware of the huge 
price tag associated with integrating numerous technologies and systems originating in 
unrelated industries and fields, the cost of which lies somewhere in the ballpark of $4 
to 6 billion in up-front expenditure and materials.
3
 Even if a firm has the capital to 
meet these costs, there is no guarantee it will earn enough revenue to realize a profit.  
Even when a state issues subsidies to aircraft manufacturing firms, they still 
face immense risks associated with the launching of a new aircraft. Industry leaders 
will, if possible, choose to remain competitive by making slight modifications to 
already proven models and delay innovation because the costs remain enormous, and 
to draw on their economies of scale to maintain a competitive advantage over start-ups 
producing similar aircraft.  
By comparison, airline manufacturers new to the industry must look to find a 
niche in the market through product innovation and differentiation, which can be 
ruinously risky because of technological uncertainties. Government intervention 
reduces the risk by issuing subsidies and protection to its indigenous firms, which also 
prevents a natural monopoly from occurring.  In short, developing or sustaining an 
advantage in the industry requires the state successfully manipulate all the resources 
associated with developing a high-tech industry, including financial and human 
capital, in order to produce an innovative and technologically advanced aircraft 
cheaper than, or as cheap as, the competition’s. 
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Success in the aircraft industry is thus defined in terms of the start-up 
producer’s ability to secure a niche in the market and produce enough aircraft to 
develop economies of scale that bring down the cost of the product. Finding the niche 
is no easy task, for it often involves producing a technologically innovative aircraft, 
which entails working with unproven technologies, thus greatly increasing the chances 
of manufacturing and design flaws that will delay the aircraft’s launch date for months 
or even years. This is troubling, because even if the airplane manufacturer believes 
when production commences that it has found its niche, no one can be certain what the 
market will demand several years hence when the aircraft is ready to debut. Therefore, 
it is imperative to roll the aircraft off the assembly line as soon as possible.  
In order to profit, a manufacturer must also produce enough aircraft to bring 
down per-unit costs. There is an initial learning curve associated with workers being 
able to do their jobs efficiently.  As they begin to repeat the same job, they can 
produce the same number of products in less time. Doubling of the number of 
airplanes produced achieves a 20- percent reduction in direct labor costs.
4
  Great 
pressure exists for a company to move down the learning curve, because, when a new 
plane hits the market, it is priced on the per-unit cost of producing 400 to 600 units.
5
 
In order for a firm to break even, it must in fact be able to sell roughly 600 
units, which in the past constituted half of the large airplane market. This can take at 
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 John Newhouse, The Sporty Game (New York: Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1982), p19. 
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least 8 years and as long as 12 if the time it takes to develop the aircraft is factored in.
6
 
There remains a high possibility a firm may never sell enough of its aircraft to break 
even,  never recover from the huge losses it has incurred, and be forced to leave the 
industry. 
 
Implications for the Aviation Industry 
The arrival of a viable third competitor whose home demand will constitute 
approximately one-fourth of the large passenger aircraft market will make it even 
more difficult for existing companies like Airbus or Boeing to profit when either is 
producing a derivative of an existing model or an entirely new aircraft to compete with 
the Chinese airplane in the 190- seat range. Furthermore, it is likely that the Chinese 
government will force domestic airlines to purchase indigenous aircraft regardless of 
whether or not they are comparable to rival products, which might result in splitting 
that market three ways. If each company is able to acquire an adequate market share, it 
will dig deep into the profits of all three.  
With these risks in view, if other firms seek to enter the fray with government 
subsidies, as did Airbus, they may further disadvantage competitors who are not 
receiving as much help from their governments.  
These heavily subsidized firms who are looking to gain greater market share at 
the expense of their rivals may, as a form of predatory behavior, sell their product at 
below cost to entice customers, especially if not much difference in quality or style 
exists among the products on the market; the strategy of a firm that sells its product 
                                                          
6





below cost is to drive competitors out of the market: The firm will take a hit now and 
reap the benefits of less competition later. 
Yet, despite the fierce competition that will ensue as a result of China’s entry 
into the large passenger aircraft industry, both airlines and passengers will reap the 
benefits. Increased competition improves the airline business because more products 
appear on the market among which customers can choose. Also, greater competition 
will force airplane makers to seek out more efficient ways to keep their production 
costs down while adopting the latest technologies.  If airlines are cheaper to buy, air 
travelers will pay lower plane fares. 
 
Implications for the United States and Europe 
If China’s COMAC 919 succeeds, it will cause concern in the United States 
and Europe. Boeing and Airbus would lose market share, and without greater help 
from their respective governments to cover their losses, they could be forced to 
contract, resulting in less money channeled toward research and development and, 
therefore, a slowing down in innovation and product efficiency that will make their 
products less competitive internationally and, in turn, affect the overall health of their 
respective economies because innovation generates important spillovers in the private 
sector and the military.
7
  As companies begin to contract, the downsizing includes a 
reduction in the number of its scientists and engineers, who are needed to create, 
innovate, and thereby add value to the broader economy. There is already growing 
concern in the United States over decreasing numbers of engineers and scientists 
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completing their higher education compared to their Chinese and Indian counterparts. 
Such contractions further discourage students from entering the engineering field, 
which will hinder a country’s ability to make substantial contributions to its economy 
in the future. 
In an attempt to offset these potential losses, Airbus and Boeing have reached 
out to China to probe the possibility of working together on the project with COMAC. 
A joint venture would almost guarantee one or both of the current aerospace leaders a 
degree of the market from which they could profit immensely.  
Both aircraft manufacturers have also decided to create derivatives of their 
existing models to satisfy the growing demand for aircraft in the 190 seat large 
passenger aircraft range and for competing with the C919. Boeing at first, committed 
to developing an entirely new technologically advanced aircraft, but has recently 
decided against it as its market research determined that many airlines over the next 
several years would be looking to retire their less fuel efficient planes for new cost-
efficient models. Boeing understands there are a lot of uncertainties with producing a 
new aircraft from scratch and would not want to forfeit large chunks of the market to 
Airbus if its plane’s debut date is delayed.  
Airbus on the other hand, never believed that current technology is mature 
enough to warrant the building of a new aircraft. Both manufacturers, whose primary 
concern at this point is competing with one another for market share, still see a lot of 
potential for their aircraft in the Chinese market even after the government has 




aircraft will be attractive to Chinese airlines because they will contain newly 
innovative and cost-saving features.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is widely acknowledged among scholars that the state plays an important 
role in promoting technology. That role has been widely debated by two primary 
schools of thought: the Developmental State and the Dirigiste. The Developmental 
State approach looks at the developing of the state’s capacity and ability to create, 
guide, protect, and nurture key industries they deem important for greater economic 
development and growth until they have developed well enough to compete with and 
possibly surpass their foreign rivals.  
The Dirigiste school looks at how industrialized nations assist and guide 
faltering or less competitive industries that are considered important for the country’s 
economy and national security. This is done, not by enforcing an economic direction, 
but by encouraging firms through various incentives, such as subsidies and 
government procurement, to follow the desired path. This literature review will cover 
the major works of each school in chronological, order beginning with the State 
Developmental approach. Lastly, I will devote a section to covering literature on the 
aviation industry. 
 
State Developmental Approach  
The State Developmental approach was pioneered by Chalmers Johnson with 




Japan’s modern industrial policy and how it achieved great economic growth and 
success in a relatively short period of time. He attributed Japan’s economic success to 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) ability to meet state 
objectives by nurturing strategic key industries such as steel, chemical fertilizers and 
ship building. 
Johnson’s perspective has been reinforced by many scholars who have applied 
his findings to other societies. Alice Amsden’s Asia’s Next Giant, for example, 
attributes South Korea’s unprecedented economic growth over the past century to the 
government’s intervention in the economy. Amsden argues that all successful late-
industrializing countries must have a strong centralized government capable of 
directing the pace and direction of growth in the economy. Her main thesis is that 
Korea’s success rests heavily on a strong state and its ability to implement sound 
policies that promote the development of indigenous industry.
8
 South Korea has 




Robert Wade’s Governing the Market builds on the work of Johnson and 
Amsden by advancing his “governed market” theory, which emphasizes the 
government’s role in the promotion of high levels of direct investment in key 
industries with the intent of competing internationally.    
For the purposes of my analysis, the most significant work of this school is 
Peter Evans’s Embedded Autonomy, which extracts and generalizes from those 
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already mentioned.  Evans examines the role of the state in both fostering and 
hindering economic development. While Johnson, Amsden, and Wade offer a detailed 
empirical analysis of the economic success of East Asian countries that exhibit state 
intervention in the economy, Evans takes the state developmental approach a step 
further by considering which configurations and arrangements between state and 
industry are best suited to international competitiveness and economic success. 
Evans’s book starts with the assumption that states best play the role as agents 
of economic transformation when they exhibit characteristics of what he labels 
“embedded autonomy,” that is, when they best approximate the Weberian ideal type, 
which allots the state a degree of autonomy but enables it to maintain good working 
relationships with other sectors of society. When both variables are met, a state is 
considered developmental. Evans’s book argues persuasively that such a state plays a 
major role in the economic development of a nation.  
Institutions meet the Weberian ideal type when they are highly selective, are 
based on a meritocracy, and offer long-term career rewards for their employees, which 
in turn creates a sense of corporate coherence and a loyalty to the institution’s long-
term goals and principles.
10
 When institutions meet these conditions, individuals see 
pursuing corporate goals as the best way to maximize their self-interest. Additionally, 
corporate coherence gives the members working in the institution a sense of autonomy 
along with access to institutionalized, rule-based channels for dealing and negotiating 
with societal groups. These dense networks and deep social ties and contacts with 
society are known as “embeddedness.” Having either autonomy or embeddeness alone 
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will not suffice; only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a 





 The solely autonomous predatory state employs state resources for its own 
personal gain, in total disregard of the welfare of its people, thus impeding economic 
transformation and development. Several characteristics define the predatory state. 
Firstly, control of state apparatus is vested within a tight-knit, closely connected 
group.  An absence further exists of rule-governed behavior: officials are not bound by 
rule of law, therefore leaving the door open for corrupt practices and self-
aggrandizement, which include the pursuit of individual interests at the expense of the 
public good. When such behavior dominates and predictable, rule-governed norms no 
longer guide bureaucratic behavior, the development of an entrepreneurial class 
interested in pursuing long-term productive investment is virtually impossible.  
Without protection by and from the government through the implementation 
and the execution of laws including the protection and preservation of both individual 
property rights, anyone seeking long-term investment would be naïve and ignorant 
rather than a true entrepreneur.  
In the predatory state, limited institutional ties exist between state and society; 
state officials interact with citizens mainly for the purposes of maximizing their utility. 
“Personalism and plunder at the top destroys any opportunity for rule governed 
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  In order to remain in power, for example, an incumbent who needs 
monetary support from members of a society may provide lucrative jobs or contracts 
in exchange for that support. They may implement favorable policies benefitting those 
who make monetary contributions, usually at the expense of society as a whole. 
Officials however, may be united, and act as a cohesive unit when using their 
repressive capacity to silence its opposition or anyone who poses a direct challenge to 




The developmental state, as defined by Evans, maintains the ability to preside 
over markets and capital accumulation, which is necessary for strong economic 
growth. This can be accomplished if state bureaucratic institutions are motivated and 
united around corporate ideals and goals. The institutions that make up the 
developmental state possess a deeper sense of corporate coherence because they 
develop a highly selective and rigorous recruitment process, and offer promotions, 
high wages and life-long career opportunities for worthy employees, all of which 
occur in accordance with established rules and norms. This creates a sense of honor, 
respect, and prestige associated with work. Individuals will therefore see pursuing 
corporate goals as the most effective way for maximizing their self-interest: an 
employee’s interest and success are tied to the success of the company.  
                                                          
12





 If a nation recruits government officials from its elite universities, a deeper 
sense of pride, prestige, and loyalty become associated with such employment, thus 
further establishing corporate coherence. In fact, if a country also recruits its 
government officials from top companies who negotiate with such officials, 
negotiations will run smoothly, as many will be alumni of the same universities, or 
even former classmates.  
The state’s relation with society is bounded by a concrete set of laws, rules, 
and norms that provides formal channels for the negotiation of goals and policies as 
well.
13
 As long as the state can provide an environment where rules and laws, 
including those affecting private and intellectual property rights, are enforced and 
respected, returns on investment become predictable, thus providing incentives for 
entrepreneurs to invest money in the economy. In a state that is solely autonomous, in 
which only limited institutionalized channels bind it to society, levels of suspicion and 
distrust arise between the state and societal actors, and the former is unable to count 
on society for sources of information or the implementation of important initiatives.  
If the state is not strong enough, on the other hand, the private sector may be 
able to unduly influence government policies, as the incumbent interested in 
remaining in power may enact policies favorable to powerful and wealthy societal 
agents to ensure that they do not throw their support behind the opposition.“Dense 
connecting networks without a robust internal structure would leave the state 
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incapable of resolving collective action problems of transcending the individual 
interests of its private counterparts.”
14
  
When the state is both embedded and autonomous, it can therefore be truly 
developmental. Evans considers Japan a developmental state, because it possesses the 
characteristics of embedded autonomy. 
 
Intermediate States 
An "intermediate state" can be described as one that maintains a degree of both 
autonomy and embeddedness but at times often falls prey to imbalances that can take 
the form of excessive clientelism or isolated autonomy.
15
 In other words, from the 
onset the state exhibits a tendency to disrupt the balance between autonomy and 
embeddness, thus complicating the developmental process as neither quality has been 
fully legitimized by the state or society. This balancing always presents a challenge.  
Such a state is plagued by inconsistencies often reverting to solving problems in ways 
that are most familiar and that can be traced back in its history. Both Brazil and India 
in the 1980s were classified by Evans as intermediate states.  The Brazilian state 
suffered from low levels of autonomy, which stem from the absence of a meritocratic 
system of hiring and promotion in its bureaucracies. India, on the other hand, suffered 
from a lack of “embeddedness” between its extremely autonomous and corrupt 
bureaucracy and its business classes.
16
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The intermediate state may at times display only pockets of efficiency. In some 
cases it will implement meritocratic recruitment of bureaucratic officials, and in others 
rely on political appointments. State-society relations differ across industries as well. 
In some cases, negotiations take place through rule-based channels, at other times 
through informal channels in disregard of law. Companies willing to invest in such a 
country are always taking a risk and often make their decisions on a cost-benefit 
analysis.  
 
State Policy and Roles 
The ability a state has to develop a given industry depends to a large degree on 
its institutional structures. Certain institutional configurations lend to choosing or 
favoring certain policy roles over others. Therefore, states possess different levels of 
effectiveness as agents of industrial development and transformations. Of four 
possible roles (custodial, demiurge, midwife, and husbandry), a state will choose one 
role, or a combination of roles, that fit its style of governance for managing or 
developing an industrial sector. There is an element of predictability in predicting the 
course a state will pursue and how successful its implementation will be based on an 
understanding of its internal structure.  However, it is also possible that certain roles 
will be assumed by elites who don’t fit the state's style of governance, thus further 






Custodian and Demiurge 
Both custodian and demiurge roles grow out of mistrust of the motives of the 
private entrepreneurial class; the intent of the custodial role is to protect an infant 
industry by making it difficult or virtually impossible for greedy entrepreneurs to enter 
a promising industry; it seeks to restrict or police investment efforts, domestic or 
foreign, by imposing high tariffs, import prohibitions, and other investment 
restrictions.
17
 The state is concerned with anyone seeking to exploit the nation’s scarce 
resources and markets for individual gain.  The custodial role is often implemented 
when a state enterprise or firm is not capable of developing the industry according to 
world standard. When the state takes on the custodial role, it’s primarily concerned 
with policing rather than the development of rules that can facilitate industrial 
transformation. 
When the state decides to assume the responsibility for developing an industry 
or producing a good, it is playing the producer role. All states at one time or another 
have played the demiurge, especially when delivering collective goods for society, 
such as bridges, roads, water supplies, and communications that would have been 
undersupplied if left to private producers.
18
 Governments usually takes on the role of 
producer when they recognize the limitations of capitalism or do not believe local 
capital can do as good as job as the state itself. However, the demiurge takes the 
producer role to a whole other level, for it harbors great mistrust of private firms and 
therefore assumes the responsibility for producing goods in important industrial 
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sectors of the economy that would have otherwise been left to the private sector to 
supply. In this account, the state establishes enterprises that produce goods for society.   
 
Midwifery and Husbandry 
The role of "midwife" is an optimistic view the state adopts of entrepreneurs 
and private firms as it wishes to draw them into new and promising industrial sectors 
through the implementation of promotion policies designed to offset the risks and 
uncertainties associated with the development of industry.  Through a variety of 
promotion policies, including the issuing of subsidies, the state will encourage and 
nurture chosen firms to develop an industry that is technologically challenging, 
making it otherwise unattractive to the private sector to enter. Another promotion 
technique may be to “help local entrepreneurs bargain with transnational capital or 
even just signaling that a particular sector is considered important are other 
possibilities.”
19
 The more risky the venture, the more reluctant private firms on their 
own would be to enter the industry; with promotional policies that offset risk and 
uncertainty, the firm will be more willing to enter the industry. Promotion policies are 
not limited to domestic firms or local entrepreneurs; states may induce or encourage 
multinational corporations to develop an industry, thus passing along advanced 
technology with linkage effects that stimulate all facets of the economy. It is also 
possible the state will help facilitate a joint venture between transnational capital and 
local firms to take on the task of developing a particular industry. 
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"Husbandry" can be as basic as offering monetary or financial support to firms 
that are willing to take on risky ventures that include the production of advanced and 
complex technologies, though the state may also be inclined to take over some 
arduous and risky complementary tasks, such as research and development.
20
 In short, 
husbandry offers assistance and support to a firm in challenging sector of the 
economy. “In some respects it is less demanding than midwifery because there are 




Evans notes that different institutional arrangements are advantageous to 
implementing policy roles in different industries.  The policy choices of a particular 
state are usually determined by the organizational characteristics of the state. The 
demiurge role is the preferred policy choice when barriers to entry in an industry are 
high and when technology is not carefully guarded and held by a few global firms, as 
in the steel industry.  However, when barriers to entry are low, as in the textile 
industry, midwifery is the best course of action as it encourages local firms to enter a 
given industry. When advanced and sophisticated technology is tightly guarded, as is 
the case in the aerospace industry, the development of joint ventures with large 
international firms (midwifery), and independent research (husbandry), provide to be 
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Critics of Evans's Theory 
Michael Bollom’s challenges Evans’s theory by arguing that it does not take 
into account the need for the state to develop the necessary infrastructure for the 
development of new industries such as informatics. This is important in countries 
where infrastructure is not well developed and cannot support the demands of high 
technology. 
23
  For example, the Indian software industry has been successful in that 
its average growth is over 30 percent.
24
 During this period, the most significant 
government contribution was its promotion of the industry through the development of 
its infrastructure. 
Philippe Faucher criticizes Evans for creating descriptive categories that lack 
any essential analytical capability. According to Faucher, Evans explains how a state 
is sufficiently embedded at a certain point in its history, and how, when this level of 
embeddedness is combined with the right amount of state capacity, growth-generating 
policies will soon emerge.
25
  The hard questions concern how much autonomy and 
embeddedness is needed, and in what situations. The term "embedded autonomy" 
usefully directs us to look at both terms separately, but how much of each is needed 
for the term to apply?   
Despite the criticisms that have been leveled at this theoretical framework, 
they are not sufficiently powerful enough to suggest that the framework is not useful. I 
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will deal with these criticisms in the conclusion of this project. In this study, I will 
analyze China and pay particular attention to the institutional arrangements of the 
1980s, and the role it played in its unsuccessful bid to create an indigenous airliner 
then, with the situation today. We will then be able to determine what China is getting 
right, wrong, and where it needs to improve. Specifically, I will examine how different 
levels of autonomy and embeddedness play an important role in the state’s ability to 
influence various social elements enough to create an indigenous airline. 
 Evans’s theory has in fact been very influential, and many scholars have 
applied his model to other settings. Bruno Treszzini’s article “Embedded state 
autonomy and legitimacy: Piecing together the Malaysian development puzzle,” for 
example, analyzes Malaysia’s unique and impressive development through a 
theoretical framework centering on the concepts of embedded state autonomy and 
sociological legitimacy.  The article notes that Malaysia’s social, economic, and 
political features, including its abundance of natural resources, developed economic 
infrastructure, absence of dominant social groups opposed to industrialization, and 
democratic political system all evolved into a self-reinforcing social system conducive 
to fostering economic development. 
26
 
Other scholars, notably Habibul Haque Khondker in his article “Globalization 
and State Autonomy in Singapore,” have broadened the concept of embedded 
autonomy to include local and global institutions and norms in the definition of 
embeddedness to better explain the positive effects globalization has on economic 
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development in Singapore. This paper also examines the potential problems that 
Singapore may face now that its society encompasses global institutions and norms; in 
other words, as the state still wishes to maintain a degree of its autonomy, will it 
undermine the possible formation of a democratic culture. Also, how will state 




The Dirigiste School 
There is a second relevant body of scholarship that attributes a different role to 
the state. The position of this school is well summarized and articulated in the book 
Manufacturing Matters, the thesis of which is that the United States continues to send 
its manufacturing overseas in the mistaken belief that our nation will be better off if 
our economy moves more toward providing services. Our economic decline is the 
result of our inability to find a niche in the market; therefore, we attempt to remain 
competitive by exploiting cheap labor abroad. We can only begin to become more 
competitive if our government helps in making it possible for our manufacturing 
facilities to remain at home; they must play a role in helping firms to automate their 
production facilities. Relying more on automation rather than unskilled human labor 
would bring down production costs and facilitate the rapid diffusion of new 
technology to other sectors of the economy, making our products more competitive. 
This perspective is echoed by Laura Tyson in her book Who’s Bashing Whom, 
which argues that the poor state of the U.S. economy emanates from the unfair and 
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manipulative state- interventionist polices of our Japanese and European trading 
partners. In attempt to combat these disadvantages, Tyson devises a “cautious 
activism” strategy calling for the United States to do its best to open foreign markets 
to American products, and suggest that, if they are unsuccessful, policymakers ought 
to threaten the closure of U.S. markets and subsidize selective high-tech industries.  
Adherents of this school differ, however, on the appropriate policy responses. 
Gene Grossman takes issue with Tyson’s assertions that we ought to subsidize 
selective high- tech industries, should our trading partners engage in unfair trading 
practices despite our best efforts, in his article “Strategic Export Promotion: A 
Critique.” Although he acknowledges the advantages a nation might gain should it 
choose the correct industry to target, he also claims that policymakers don’t have, and 
may never have, sufficient and reliable information that would warrant the targeting of 
such industries.
28
 Instead, U.S. policy should seek to create an environment conducive 
to innovation and entrepreneurship, as well as to prevent market failings. Government 
should therefore support education and industrial R&D, which would help to improve 
its international competitiveness. 
This school of thought has gained wide recognition as a result of Porter’s well-
known book The Competitive Advantage of Nations, which explains why some 
nations’ industries prosper more than others.  According to Porter, industries are likely 
to succeed when the determinants in his national diamond model as a system are 
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favorable. His model contains four determinants:  factor conditions, demand 
conditions, related supporting industry, and firm strategy and rivalry.  
 
PORTER’S DIAMOND OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
Factors of Production 
 In order for nations to successfully compete in a given industry, they must be 
able develop their factors of production, which are the necessary skilled labor and the 
















comparable to those of their competitors. Nations succeed and sustain competitive 
advantages when they continuously upgrade these necessary factors. The most 
essential factors for developing a competitive advantage in most industries have little 
to do with the nation’s natural endowments and more to do with how creative it is at 
getting around the resources that it doesn’t have in abundance or is lacking. It may be 
the case that nations possessing an abundance of natural resources are unable to 
efficiently or effectively deploy them to selective industries. “This reflects the choices 
made by a nation’s firms about how to mobilize factors as well as the technology used 
to do so.”
29
   
On the other hand, a nation that possesses limited natural resources is more 
prone to rely on its highly skilled labor force, if available, to invent ways in which it 
can reduce production costs, create new products, or add new features to existing 
product. For example, Japan faced a clear disadvantage because many of its firms 
faced extremely high land costs and had limited factory space. To redress these 
difficulties, they created the just-in-time and other space- saving production 
techniques, which reduced inventory immensely.
30
  
Nowadays, most international trade takes place among industrialized nations 
that have comparable endowments and infrastructure; these nations share similar 
stocks of both high school- and university-educated workers needed to develop and 
maintain a competitive advantage. The U.S. no longer maintains its unique 
competitive advantage in possessing the skilled labor that it once did. Many other 
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industrial nations now possess an abundance of skilled labor as well as infrastructure, 
such as telecommunications, road systems, and ports crucial for competition in 
manufacturing industries. However, the U.S. does maintain an advantage with respect 
to having an education system that specializes in training students in specified 
scientific areas important for creating and sustaining competitive advantage in 
industry. 
Michael Porter identifies two factors that he deems most important for creating 
an enduring competitive advantage: "basic" and "advanced" ("general" and 
"specialized"). Basic factors predominantly consist of a nation’s unskilled and 
semiskilled labor. Advanced factors constitute the general college-educated population 
and specialized personnel consisting of scientists, engineers, and research institutes in 
advanced disciplines that yield advantages in the development of modern 
infrastructure and innovative products in industry and production.
31
  In order to sustain 
advantages, nations must be able to develop their factors through long-term 
investment over a period of time, which can be difficult.  
Basic factors tend to be inherited or, if there is a degree of creation involved, it 
requires little to no social investment.
32
 These factors are unimportant to a nation’s 
competitive advantage, or, if they do provide advantages, it is not sustainable over 
time. For example, 20 to 30 years ago, Korea had an abundance of unskilled labor, 
which translated into a high degree of success producing goods for the international 
community because it could make them far more cheaply than most industrialized 
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countries. However, firms from nations such as Thailand and Malaysia started to offer 
their unskilled workers even lower wages, thereby canceling out Korea’s competitive 
advantage. Competitive advantage based on generalized factors is unsophisticated and 
often short lived.  It lasts only until some new nation is able to replace them.  
Advanced specialized factors are now the most significant for developing or 
maintaining a competitive advantage within most industries; they are the engines 
driving the creation of differentiated or new products, new features on existing 
products, and proprietary production technology. These specialized factors have a 
narrowly specific skill set for a particular field of industry. For example, the United 
States has unique expertise in computer software, which has given it a significant 
advantage in the computer industry and other related industries such as medical 
electronics and financial services.  It requires, however, a huge commitment on the 
part of any nation to develop its specialized advanced factors. 
Advanced factors are difficult to develop because they require a huge amount 
of human and physical capital: modern institutions and facilities, along with a pool of 
educated personnel capable of developing, training, and educating and upgrading 
advanced and specialized factors; the institutions, technology and personnel must 
moreover be committed to constant improvement in order to compete with other 
countries in selective fields. “Competitive advantage doesn’t come from just one time 
investment but continual reinvestment to upgrade their quality not to mention keeping 
the current pool of factors from depreciating.”
33
 
                                                          
33




With respect to advanced factors, there is a clear distinction between 
generalized and specialized factors.  "Generalized factors" consist of a pool of well-
motivated employees who are college educated and can be used in a wide range of 
industries precisely because they are not narrowly specialized. Most nations have an 
abundance of generalized factors.   
"Specialized factors" are more useful for sustaining or developing a 
competitive advantage than generalized factors, which support only rudimentary 
advantages during the early stages of development, which, over time, can be nullified 
or sourced through global corporate networks available in many nations.
34
  Industries 
that depend on generalized factors for labor-intensive operations require workers with 
a low skill set, managerial positions, all of which are still valued within a nation; 
however, they could easily be outsourced to other countries.  
Advanced specialized factors are key for developing and sustaining a 
competitive advantage and are hard to acquire and maintain because of the technology 
and financial capital needed to invest in education programs to create and sustain.  
 
Demand 
 The second determinant in Porter’s model is “demand.” Most firms are most 
sensitive to the needs of their home market. Nations gain a competitive advantage in 
industries when the home demand gives them an early indication of the needs of 
buyers. The design of a product always mirrors the needs of the home market.  A 
nation’s firm is able to gain competitive advantage internationally if its domestic 
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buyer demands either reflect or are a future indication of international need. However, 
the reverse is also true. If home demand is slow to reflect new needs of the 
international markets, it will translate into a competitive disadvantage. For example, 
the recent financial crisis created a demand for small, compact cars worldwide; 
however, in the United States, Americans have long preferred larger-sized 
automobiles, so car manufacturers satisfied the home demand. 
If a firm’s home market is significantly large and is able to satisfy its home 
demand, it may gain a competitive advantage over its competitors by achieving 
economies of scale. The firm would, further, get down the learning curve, devising 
ways in which a product can be developed more cheaply, thus allowing it to compete 
successfully with its competitors. On the other hand, if the home market is small and a 
firm can only satisfy its home demand, it is unlikely it will see a great return on its 
investment. Scale economies, in this case, could only be achieved by successfully 
competing against foreign rivals for a share of the international market.   
In order to stay ahead of the competition, not only must firms develop a 
competitive advantage, they must sustain it over time. In order to do so, they must be 
motivated to continuously upgrade existing products, produce current products more 
cheaply than their competitors, or develop new products that command premium 
prices. A lot of products are created or upgraded because there is a growing demand, 
which usually begins when a nation experiences rapid economic growth. As income 
increases and more of the buyer’s salary can be used for entertainment and leisure 
activities, the populace begins to demand specific and higher-quality items or goods. 




particular about buying high-quality electronics and audio equipment.  Such 
equipment nowadays is considered a status symbol for them.  Their desire for quality 
leads to rapid improvements by manufacturers for they want to meet the demand. 
 
Related and Supporting Industries  
Firms can gain a competitive advantage when internationally competitive 
suppliers or related industries are based on their home soil.
35
 The main benefit to firms 
from working closely with such suppliers and related industries is that the firms find 
new methods and uncover opportunities for the use of new technologies to make their 
products more cheaply and efficiently. Home-based suppliers and related industries, in 
order to stay competitive worldwide, must continue to innovate and upgrade by 
devising new strategies or technologies for improving production and showing firms 
how their cost-effective inputs will help them to create a better product.  
 
Suppliers  
Suppliers help firms find new ways to incorporate existing and new 
technologies into the production line of a product. A competitive advantage accrues 
from the close working relationship with their suppliers that enables firms to gain 
“preferential treatment and early access to new ideas, insights and supplier 
innovation.”
36
  Suppliers and firms, if close enough, can in fact work together, 
bouncing new ideas off one another, engaging in joint problem solving, and 
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exchanging R&D, thus insuring that solutions to the most pressing issues can be 
solved faster and more efficiently:
37
 shortened lines of communication become 
important to the process as a whole.  
Having a competitive domestic supplier industry is, thus, far better than having 
to rely on qualified foreign suppliers. The cultural affinities between them offer both 
parties an instant bond and similar understanding of the ways in which the industry 
operates.  These cultural similarities make the sharing of information more likely, 
since both parties have a vested interest in improving the country’s economic well-
being. It becomes a matter of pride, and transaction costs can be kept to a minimum. 
Foreign suppliers may also be under pressure from their home governments not to pass 
along sensitive technology that could spill over into strategic areas such as the 
military, especially if the nations are rivals or competitors. If a nation doesn’t possess 
a strong industrial base, naturally a firm is left with no choice but to rely on foreign 
suppliers for the materials they need. 
 
Related Industries 
 “Related industries” are those that that do not create the same products but do 
share similar production channels, which are extremely beneficial because they can 
learn each other’s cost-saving strategies, which could help them make their products 
more cheaply or efficiently. Such sharing of activities can occur in technology 
development, manufacturing, and so on. Additionally, new technologies or product 
methods may in fact inspire the creation of entirely new product using the same 
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production channels and methods. For example, fax machines were created from the 
already-established distribution channels and similar technological inputs of copy 
machines.
38
   
The benefits of both home-based suppliers and related industries, however, can 
only be reaped if other variables within Porter’s diamond are strong. For example, if a 
nation contains a shortage of advanced factors, it will become difficult to satisfy 
domestic demand, which often alert firms to choose a new direction for product 
change. If such factors are unavailable, then proximity to internationally successful 




Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
The fourth determinant mentioned in Porter’s model for gaining a competitive 
advantage in industry involves the context in which firms are organized, managed, and 
in which they compete with one another (rivalry).
40
 A firm’s competition or rivals play 
a large role in influencing and motivating it to innovate or offer products with new 
features in order to satisfy a market demand, or to produce existing products more 
cheaply by developing scale economies.  How efficient a firm will be at gaining an 
advantage over its competitors is largely determined by how suited its organizational 
structure and strategy are to competing and adapting to market demands in a given 
environment. 
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 Different organizational structures and management systems lead to different 
methods for competing and different levels for success. “No managerial system is 
universally appropriate.”
 41
 For example, a family-owned business will compete 
differently than would a publicly owned company; each will be advantaged and 
disadvantaged in a variety of ways.  Success emanates from having an organizational 
structure and management practices that are favorable or more conducive to 
competition within a given environment. Moreover, a given institutional structure can 
benefit from a competitive advantage in some industries and impede it in others. 
However, a firm’s ability to compete may in fact have less to do with its 
organizational structures and practices if its national government plays an active role 
in manipulating competitive outcomes through enacting policies that advantage certain 
firms over others.  The enacting of such policy tools as foreign exchange controls may 
not be favorable or in fact limit or ease the difficulty of domestic firms selling their 
products abroad. Italy has had difficulty competing in industries where FDI is essential 
for success because of government restrictions on foreign exchange.
42
 Additionally, a 
country’s political views or actions are likely to some degree to affect how well its 
companies will do when trying to sell their products abroad.  Switzerland’s and 
Sweden’s position of neutrality have helped them to establish international networks 
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 Company Strategy and Goals 
A company’s strategy and goals are often determined by its ownership 
structure and the motivation of its shareholders. However, if the firm is publicly 
owned, its goals will reflect the interest of the state. Vast differences exist among 
nations with respect to goals of firms as well as the motivations of their employees and 
managers. “Nations will succeed in industries where the goals of owners and managers 
match the requirements of the industry.”
44
  Different managerial and organizational 
structures are more conducive to competing in certain industries and environments 
than others. 
Management can be highly influential in motivating its employees. In other 
words, it is important that not only management have a vested interest in meeting 
company goals but that its employees do as well. Management can enhance its 
probability of success in an industry by setting up a reward system to motivate its 
employees through financial incentives to perform their tasks at the highest level. If a 
firm is lacking such a system, there is always concern about how much effort 
employees will expend to perform their job well, and much of an incentive exists for 
them to learn new skills that will help the firm to maintain or develop a competitive 
advantage.  Promotions, bonuses, and pay raises remain a big motivator in the U.S. 
and many other Western countries, helping companies align their interests with those 
of their employees. 
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Domestic Rivalry  
Strong empirical research exists that highlights the relationship between 
domestic rivalry and the creation and sustenance of competitive advantage in a given 
industry. Some scholars have argued that direct competition between firms is not as 
beneficial as it seems, for it leads to duplication. Also, the presence of many firms in 
an industry makes it difficult to achieve scale economies. This group of scholars sees 
domestic rivalry as a hindrance and therefore argues that nations ought to nurture one 
or two firms to become national industry leaders, and that, when they become strong 
enough to stand on their own two feet, these firms should compete internationally.
45
 
Despite this view, evidence points to the contrary, because nations that have 
firms that are national leaders tend to have several local rivals, even in small countries 
such as Switzerland and Sweden.
46
   Absent domestic competition, few national 
industry leaders have become internationally competitive. These rivals firms push one 
another, not only to improve the quality of their products and to create new ones, but 
also to lower the prices of their products.  Still, improving technology will always lead 
to a sustainable advantage. In the face of such competition, companies will often look 
to sell their products abroad so they can achieve greater profit once economies of scale 
have been achieved at home, which will help make their products more competitive.   
It is thus extremely rare that a firm can compete with other leading companies 
in the industry when it doesn’t have adequate competition at home.  In such cases, 
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industries are heavily subsidized and protected by their home countries. In fact, in 
such industries as aerospace and telecommunications, where there is only one national 
rival if any, the government plays a major role in influencing the competition through 
protection and nurturing.   
Porter’s work has been highly criticized for being more empirical than it sets 
out to be, which is to formulate a theory on measuring a nation’s international 
competitiveness that is explanatory and possesses predictive power.
47
 This criticism 
will not apply to this dissertation, which employs  Porter’s work, not for its elegance 
and precision, but only for its analysis of how state institutions put decision-makers in 
a position to enact policy that will influence the four major variables in the Porter 
model that are necessary for enhancing international competitiveness in the aviation 
industry.  Porter’s diamond actually groups the work of some of the most prominent 
scholars in the field of economics and development, including Adam Smith, Ricardo, 
and Schumpeter, into a diamond.  
Scholars have also criticized Porter for choosing the firm as his unit of analysis 
rather than the state. As a result of this, his assumptions and conclusions have been 
questioned.  Critics are quick to point out that Porter’s analysis is far from sufficient at 
answering the broad and difficult questions related to the competitive advantages of 
nations.
48
  This criticism will not apply to this project because my research builds on 
Porter’s firm level variables by explicitly analyzing the role of the state and how 
                                                          
47










successful it is likely to be at influencing those elements of society necessary for the 
building of a successful airliner.   
Despite these criticisms, Porter’s model has been widely applied, though many 
scholars have limited their analysis specifically to the firm level, with little to no 
mention of the government at all. They have neglected to recognize that the state is an 
important actor in influencing the variables of Porter’s model.  For example, Eoin 
O’Malley’s article “Competitive Advantage in the Irish Indigenous Software Industry 
and the Role of Inward Foreign Direct Investment” looks at why that industry has 
grown at such an accelerated pace and has become internationally competitive. His 
research finds that the there is no single one reason for its success, which can be 
nonetheless be attributed to all four determinants in model.
49
 
Similarly, Paul Curran’s article “Competition in UK Higher Education: 
Competitive Advantage in the Research Assessment Exercise and Porter’s Diamond 
Model” primarily focuses on the firm level as he examines why some institutions of 
Higher Education contain a large number of successful departments and others do 
not?
50
 Curran’s research has found that those institutions which house a large number 
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Civil Aviation Literature 
There is a vast amount of literature dealing with various aspects of competition 
in the civil aviation industry. For example, John Newhouse’s book The Sporty Game 
is widely regarded as the best work to date portraying the fierce competition that has 
existed among American commercial jet manufacturers, airlines, and engine 
manufacturers in the aviation industry. Newhouse’s research primarily focuses on the 
risks that commercial airplane manufacturers and designers take when building a new 
commercial jet. 
Matthew Lynn’s Birds of Prey Boeing vs. Airbus: A Battle for the Skies builds 
on the work of Newhouse by offering a historical account of how Airbus mounted a 
successful challenge to Boeing’s dominance in the commercial aircraft industry. The 
book highlights how the arrival of Airbus turned an industry driven towards a 
monopoly into a duopoly. 
While many scholars have covered the competition between American and 
European airplane manufacturers, very little has been written about China’s airplane 
industry. To date, there has been one scholarly account, A Political Economy Analysis 
of China’s Civil Aviation Industry, by Mark Dougan, who examines the changes that 
China’s civil aviation industry has gone through since undergoing reform since the 
late 1970s.  His main thesis is that this new environment can be explained with 
reference to four variables: marketization, destatization, decentralization, and 
globalization. The state now must be aware how the industry has changed, so it can 




This dissertation will attempt to fill two gaps in the literature. First, my 
intention is to examine China’s civilian industry, an area in which little scholarship 
exists. Second, little work has been done on what a nation must do to successfully 
build an indigenous airliner. This research will be the first of its kind to examine 
international competitiveness in the aviation industry through a theoretical lens that 
combines the work of Peter Evans’s “Embedded Autonomy” and Michael Porter’s 
“Determinant Model”; it meshes two theories from two unrelated fields to better 
understand and explain this phenomenon. 
 
DISSERTATION RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation will look at whether or not China has the capability, given the 
nature of the state, to develop the firm level variables that are essential for success in 
the aviation industry, more specifically with respect to the construction of large-scale 
aircraft. Does China possess a reasonable degree of embedded autonomy sufficient to 
meet the special challenges of the aviation industry?  Applying China’s level of 
embedded autonomy to Porter’s Determinant model will be particularly useful because 
the model has captured the various societal elements essential for success in the 
aviation industry. It lays out important variables that must be manipulated for 
continuously producing innovative aircraft that airlines want, need and desire.  
This dissertation has two primary objectives. First, it will evaluate how 
competitive China’s indigenous large passenger aircraft can be, which will be 
determined by the criterion for success mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. A 




them as to develop economies of scale. Second, the author will evaluate how Boeing is 
planning to meet the potential challenge it will face from the arrival of China’s large 
passenger aircraft.    
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The author will modify Evans’s theory so that it goes beyond the institutional 
level and takes the organization and firm into account.  Each state, whether it contains 
a higher level of autonomy or a higher level of embeddedness, or has the right balance 
of the two, influences the variables in Porter’s model differently from other states. In 
other words, states possessing different institutional arrangements can influence to a 
greater or lesser degree the categories of Porter’s diamond.  The author will 
categorize, and compare and contrast, the institutional arrangements that existed in 
China in the 1980s with those that exist today, and consider how they influence the 
variables in Porter’s model differently. Different levels of effectiveness with respect to 
developing a particular industry can be tied to differences in state internal structures. 
Second, this project will modify one of the determinants in Porter’s model 
dealing with domestic rivalry. Instead of focusing on rivalry among firms within 
states, which Porter emphasizes, this project will focus on competition among firms on 
the international level, because, when dealing with the aviation industry, it is safe to 
say that nations have one airliner company, if any, competing for international market 
share.  Porter’s determinant model focuses on how a firm can create a new and 




there is no limit to how many firms could profit, however, when dealing with the 
aviation industries: only a few firms can survive. 
 
SOURCES OF DATA 
To conduct this study, the researcher has used both primary and secondary 
source data.  Primary source data were obtained through conducting interviews and 
corresponding with professors, professionals, key figures, and scholars in the aviation 
industry in China, France and the United States. I am truly grateful for the help of my 
Chinese colleagues and mentors, Ming Xia and Danian Hu of the City University of 
New York (CUNY), for guiding and helping me set up interviews with key 
professionals and personnel in the aviation field, such as Professor Chengzhi Li, the 
Dean of Management and Humanities at the Institute of Beijing University’s 
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Professor Baichun Zhan of the 
Chinese Academy of Natural Sciences. Both introduced me to their former students 
who are now working as scientists, as engineers, or in managerial and government 
jobs related to the aviation industry.  I truly understand the sensitivity involved in 
sharing information with a foreigner on information related to China’s past and 
present national secrets, and was lucky enough to be treated kindly and with respect by 
the interviewees. They were very happy to share information, especially if it could 
help with China’s overall development.  
I conducted open-ended interviews with some of the key figures in the industry, 
which allowed me to develop, adapt, and generate questions, and ask follow-up 




failed in its attempt to develop an indigenous airliner in the 1980s, and what they are 
doing differently today.
51
  A questionnaire in the Appendix A section lists a set of 
preliminary questions that I asked my interviewees in order to open the dialogue. 
Conducting field research on China’s aviation industry was no easy task. For 
example, the building of the Y-10 was a highly secretive project, and even today very 
few publications are available for the public to research this topic. I was, however, 
fortunate enough to see the limited published material on the story of the Y-10 soon 
before it became unavailable in China, quickly removed from circulation and no 
longer available in China’s collegiate, national, or local libraries. Many Chinese 
scholars and students alike believe that, as China moves closer the building of its C919 
aircraft, which is part of China’s national strategy and plan, any books revealing 
sensitive information about its prior shortcomings (which may in fact have never been 
resolved) have been sequestered. All of the open sources that I have consulted are 
listed in the bibliography. 
            For this study, the researcher also obtain secondary source data published 
daily, containing the most up-to-date information regarding the building of China’s 
large passenger C919 aircraft, in newspapers and on Chinese websites.  I also visited 
Beijing University’s Aeronautics and Astronautics library to sample the vast array of 
resources available in books, government publications, scholarly articles and statistical 
data on China’s aviation industry.  
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Through my contacts, I have also been able to obtain an important primary 
source that is listed as classified. My source elaborates on the failures of China’s 
strategy in the 1980s and what changes the Chinese government has made, and ought 
to make, to become more competitive in today’s aviation industry.  The source 
outlines the economic and military reasons why China decided to manufacture its 
aircraft, and what incentives it ought to award domestic airlines for purchasing 
Chinese-manufactured airplanes.  
I spoke, and corresponded with, representatives from Boeing and Airbus as well, 
in order to better understand each company’s relationship with China and its strategies 
for competing with the C919. My research also took me to Toulouse, France, to meet 
with representatives from Airbus in order to get a better idea of how Airbus was 




Chapter 2 will analyze the evolution of the large passenger aircraft industry in 
chronological order. The history will be analyzed in order to explain how the industry 
acquired the special characteristics that shape its behavior today. It will elucidate how 
both Airbus and Boeing, each of whom occupies about 50 percent of the market, 
continue to compete with one another over market share as they have, over time, 
changed their strategies to adapt to the changes, demands, and challenges of 




Chapter 3 will apply the theoretical framework to China’s first attempt at 
developing an indigenous large passenger aircraft (Y-10) in the 1980s. According to 
the criteria laid out by Evans, I will show how Mao’s China could be categorized as a 
predatory state.  The limitations of the policy choices available hindered the Chinese 
state’s ability to satisfy Porter’s model. Meeting the requirements of Porter’s model is 
essential for developing the Aviation industry.  
Chapter 4 applies the theoretical framework to China’s development of its 
C919 aircraft. It classifies the Chinese state beginning under Deng as Intermediate. 
The intermediate state, according to Evans, oscillates between rule of law and rule of 
man. At times the state shows signs of being developmental, and, other times, 
predatory. An intermediate state has four different policy choices at its disposal to 
influence Porter’s model, two of which, according to Evans, are important for the 
development of high-tech industries: midwifery and husbandry. Conversely, the 
demiurge and custodial roles run counter to the development of an industry. China has 
come a long way since its failed attempt at developing the Y-10, and it is likely to 
succeed in its initial development of the C919. It still, however, remains quite a long 
way from successfully competing with industry giants Boeing and Airbus because it 
has not been able to fully satisfy the requirements of Porter’s model. 
 Chapter 6 will begin by discussing the strengths of the framework and how it 
has helped us to understand the remarkable strides China has made over the last three 
decades with respect to aircraft development. In the 1950s it relied solely on the Soviet 
Union for aircraft.  China today--in part because of the reforms implemented under 




passenger aircraft industry. This chapter will also examine the potential implications 
the C-919 will have on Boeing and Airbus and offer a viable strategy for competing 
against the heavily subsidized and protected aircraft. 
 The framework used in this project makes very clear that there are different 
levels of effectiveness with respect to the development of the commercial aviation 
industry that are tied to differences in the internal structures of states and their 
relationship to society.    
The framework however, is not without weaknesses. This study will highlight 
important variables that were left out and that have clouded or impeded our 
understanding of why China was not successful at developing the Y-10 and may not be 
able to produce an internationally competitive aircraft in the future either. Lastly, this 
study, after refining the theoretical framework to account for its shortcomings, will 
consider how it can be applied in other areas of future research, such as the automobile 















EVOLUTION OF THE LARGE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
 
Given the nature of the commercial aviation industry and its strategic importance 
to both the military and the overall health of the economy, the United States has over the 
years adopted an aviation policy that has ensured the survival and the success of its 
indigenous aerospace manufacturers. American aerospace firms provided aircraft for both 
the military and the commercial side of the industry. Understanding their importance to 
national security, the government has implemented policies to prevent the bankruptcy of 
these firms through various means, such as guaranteed military hardware contracts, 
capital for both civilian and defense research and development, bailouts when needed, 
and airline regulation. It was understood from the outset that technological developments 
on one side of the industry would certainly spill over to the other. Most innovative 
technologies over the last fifty years that have appeared on the commercial side of the 
industry, such as the jet-engine and the Internet were created through military-funded 
contracts.   
Through regulation, the government still maintained an environment designed to 
stimulate innovation on the commercial side of the industry by rewarding aerospace 




aircraft based on comfort and service to attract customers, and not price, since plane 
ticket prices were set by the government. 
 The American government’s aviation policy has structured aircraft manufacturer 
competition in a way that has determined who the major players are, what their strategies 
must consist of to successfully compete with one another, and who the likely winners 
have been. Government policy, that is, has influenced outcomes. The free market played 
a reduced role in determining who the winners and losers in the industry would be as the 
government assumed a greater role in deciding how the competition functioned, forcing 
manufacturers to organize around competitive conditions created by it and not by the free 
market. This resulted in aircraft that were in demand by airlines that would not be 
satisfied by American aerospace manufacturers. American aviation policy tampered with 
the nature of free market, leaving market demands unsatisfied.  These gaps in demand, 
largely unsatisfied by American aerospace manufacturers, created space for another 
aircraft manufacture to occupy. The European Consortium, Airbus, answered the call and 
developed the A300B. It did rely on the subsidization of its member governments to build 
such a plane.  The U.S. government’s tampering with the nature of the way 
manufacturers compete thus proved to be very costly, creating a viable competitor in an 
industry that was naturally driven toward a monopoly.  
Past shortcomings and successes shape the future of this industry.  The visible 
hand of government influencing how American manufacturers would compete lagged 
behind the new European entrant, as it will behind any potential new entrant, for two 




newcomer will learn from the successes and failures of the prior industrial policy of its 
predecessors. 
 
GOVERNMENT AIRLINE REGULATION 
In 1938, the United States government declared the civil aviation industry a 
public utility, thus granting it the autonomy to exercise complete control over the 
industry. The United States government’s policy of regulation shaped how the industry 
functioned for the first 40 years of its existence. The government saw the need to regulate 
because airlines would otherwise be solely interested in serving highly popular and 
profitable routes, leaving the less popular ones underserved. Moreover, if most airlines 
flocked to what they perceived as the most profitable routes, the industry would evolve 
into a monopoly, since the market was not large enough for more than one firm to profit 
in unrestricted competitive zone. The formation of a monopoly would also stymie the 
further development of a fledging industry, because, without competition, there is little 
incentive to create, innovate, or upgrade existing products. To prevent this problem, the 
government in 1958 placed the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in charge of exercising a 
custodial role in which it determined routes flown by carriers, flight schedules, and the 
price of airline tickets.   
To ensure the continuation of underserved routes, the government raised the ticket 
prices of the popularly traveled ones above market while keeping fares of the less 
profitable routes low. The busier routes thus made up for the losses sustained by the less 




have been discontinued if airlines have been left to compete through the invisible hand of 
the free market. 
The government also set ticket prices across the board to prevent destructive 
competition from taking place in which bigger airlines could price their tickets below 
cost in order to gain a greater share of the market at the expense of smaller carriers who 
could not offered to take such a loss and would therefore have to leave the industry. 
Therefore, airlines were forced to compete with one another on the services and amenities 
they offered to passengers. Government- structured competition thus had a positive effect 
on technological development, because aircraft manufacturers were motivated to develop 
new planes based on improvements in speed and comfort.  
Regulation of the airline industry through the 1980s thereby proved to be an 
indirect, unintentional, but significant source of public support for the post-war 
development of the civilian aircraft industry. The large regulated domestic market 
provided a strong base of demand for technological innovation by the aircraft producers. 
They knew that, if they came up with a highly innovative product that an airline 
purchased because it conferred an advantage over others in attracting new customers, 
those competing airlines would follow suit.  None would dare to fall behind with respect 
to aircraft acquisition because of the potential loss in customer base.  
On the other hand, this government-controlled competition proved a detriment to 
smaller airlines. Airlines with larger budgets were able to attract customers by offering 






 This was beyond the reach of smaller carriers, which complained 
bitterly for regulation to be abandoned.  
 
JET ENGINE TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTIONIZES THE INDUSTRY 
 The commercial aviation industry grew at a pace that it had never witnessed 
before in the years 1958-1968, largely due to Britain’s introduction of the jet engine to 
the world. This technology was particular appealing to the airlines, because it meant that 
passengers would be able to reach their destinations in half the time that it took propeller 
driven engines; airlines possessing such technology would certainly be able to attract 
many new passengers, considering that the price of airline tickets would remain the same, 
which would create a potent advantage over the competition. The airlines also knew that, 
with the speed of the jet engine approximating 500 miles per hour, they could offer more 
flights per day with flexible scheduling, further expanding their customer base. 
 Airline manufacturers wanted to be the first one to introduce this jet-engine 
technology on their planes. If an airplane manufacturer is able to produce a 
technologically advanced plane faster than its competitors, it will seize a larger share of 
initial orders, which will bring it closer to developing scale economies and moving 
further down the learning curve, as a result of which it can produce its aircraft more 
cheaply and efficiently. Since the market for any type of aircraft is limited, such a first-
mover advantage can make the difference between success and failure. 
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Britain introduced the de Havilland Comet, the first commercial jet airplane, to the 
world in 1952; it was powered by the pioneer of jet engine technology, Rolls Royce.
53
  
Orders for this plane were heavy among airlines, largely for two reasons: firstly, it was 
the most technologically advanced aircraft in the market, offering superior efficiency and 
passenger comfort; secondly, if one airline purchased the airplane, all of its competitors 
would be obliged do so, because they did not want to cede any advantages to their 
competitors.  
  Despite such high demand for the plane, the Comet fell short of gaining a strong 
foothold in the market due a series of fatal crashes in 1953 and 1954. The plane suffered 
from structural fatigue, which caused it to rip apart in midair.
54
  Airlines canceled their 
orders, and the first long-range transport was seen as unreliable. The Comet’s severely 
damaged reputation paved the way, however, for the safer and more efficient aircraft that 
Boeing would provide.  
  
COMPETITION AMONG AMERICAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS 
American aircraft manufacturers profited immensely from the military’s 
voracious appetite for buying new aircraft during the Second World War. The military 
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requested over 304,139 planes; money was pouring into the industry at the time.
55
 
However, after the war, demand for aircraft plummeted, and along with Allied Victory in 
1945 came a major round of cutbacks in military orders, forcing aircraft manufacturers to 
scale back their production and workforce. Boeing, for example, closed a secondary plant 
in Wichita, and Seattle plant production was to be cut from 122 to just 22 planes a month. 
The workforce went from a peak of 45,000 to 15,000 in November 1945.
56
  Boeing soon 
realized that it would have to explore other opportunities during peacetime should it want 
to sustain itself as a profit-making aerospace manufacturer. Many pioneering 
technologies had been developed by American aircraft manufacturers during their 
wartime effort for the United States military, which they would try to successfully exploit 
on the commercial side. 
In 1952, Boeing decided it would attempt to develop a commercial jet air 
transport superior to, and more reliable than, the Comet.  Boeing had acquired the skill 
and the technological know-how to develop a large jet engine transport with its work on 
two long-range bombers, the B47 and the B52, for the military when the government 
grew interested in containing the Soviet Union by acquiring bombers capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.
57
 With government funding and 
access to German military technologies (Germany still claims today that it was the actual 
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pioneer of jet engine technology) that the U.S. military had confiscated after the war, 
Boeing was able to mount a successful challenge to the Comet with its 707 commercial 
jet aircraft, with little of its own money or risk.
58
   
The 707 was judged far superior to the Comet, not only because it possessed a lot 
of pioneering technology from government-supported research, but because it carried 
twice as many passengers as the Comet and traveled at a considerably faster speed.
59
 
Boeing had also intentionally designed the plane so that it could easily be converted into 
a cargo plane for the military. In fact, the United States military did buy several hundred 
of these planes, to be used as airborne fuel tankers. This helped Boeing get a step closer 
to the breakeven point, which takes nearly a decade to achieve; until then, the company 
would report losses. By the end of 1959, Boeing was recording a loss of almost $200 
million on the 707 project. During the many years it wasn’t profiting, the many military 
contracts it acquired provided a much-needed safety net that ensured Boeing would 
survive in the industry. 
 America thus supported its aircraft manufacturers by providing them with 
lucrative military contracts, especially when facing loss on the commercial side. The 
government would not allow a military defense contractor to fail. It was good for the 
development of military hardware to have several contractors to compete with one 
another for lucrative contracts. This would bring out the best in the firms, thus improving 
overall development of military hardware.    
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Boeing was the first American manufacturer to introduce a jetliner, partly because 
then-current market leaders Douglas and Lockheed were skeptical about building a plane 
with the new jet engine technology in its infant stage, believing that suppliers and airlines 
would encounter many problems working with unproven technology. Douglas, also a 
major beneficiary of defense contracts and pioneering technology, was particularly 
hesitant to introduce any risky technology to the commercial side of the industry.  First 
and foremost, its interest was to exploit the advantages it had over other firms with its 
existing aircraft. Douglas wanted to maintain and not jeopardize in any way its position 
as the leading company in commercial aviation production. Launching into the expensive 
and uncertain field of jet technology was extremely risky and could potentially damage 
its position in the market in relation to other companies if unsuccessful. In fact, both 
Douglas and Lockheed believed that the turbo-propeller and piston engines would prove 
to be more feasible and economical for airline carriers than jet-engine transports because 
of the high price tag associated with building and running such a technologically 
sophisticated piece of machinery: that is, the purchase price of the aircraft, along with the 
cost of the fuel, would make it unprofitable for airlines, considering that ticket prices 
were controlled.  They assumed instead that many airlines would prefer the next 
generation of propeller engines, known as “turboprops,” in which a more fuel-efficient 
gas turbine engine drives the propeller.
60
 Both companies decided they would enter the 
fray only after jet-engine technology matured and proved reliable.  
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 Both firms were incorrect in believing that most airlines would not buy jet-engine 
transports. Their analysis failed to take into consideration the fact that the American 
market was regulated, and that airlines therefore were competing with one another on 
product efficiency and passenger comfort. No airline that wanted to remain in business 
would want to surrender a service advantage to one of its competitors and so would 
therefore be drawn to jetliners at whatever cost. For example, in 1955 even though 
American Airlines was interested in turboprop planes, it decided to borrow heavily from 
the bank and purchase 30 Boeing 707s because its arch-rival, Pan American World 
Airways, had purchased 20 707s.
61
 Jet-engine technology was certainly more appealing 
to customers than turboprop engines.  
The loss of American Airlines as a loyal Douglas customer propelled Douglas 
into building its jet transport, the DC-8. Since World War II, Douglas held the dominant 
position as the leading aircraft manufacturer in the American market with its very 
successful propeller-driven plane, the DC-3. Because of the company’s highly regarded 
reputation, when it decided to build a jet transport, 10 major airlines placed initial orders 
for it.
62
  The jet-powered airplane known as the DC-8 was very expensive for Douglas to 
build; however, it managed to cover the costs through the profits it earned from the 
success of its older aircraft, its contracts with the military, and through borrowing money 
from banks and customer-advanced payments 
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In an attempt to lure customers away from Boeing, which was already further 
down the learning curve by having introduced its plane first, Douglas decided to price its 
aircraft below cost to promote the sale of the DC-8 and its smaller derivative, the DC-9. 
This strategy was a dismal failure, for such price cutting overstretched the company 
financially; in 1967, in order to stave off a Douglas bankruptcy, the government 
facilitated through federal loan guarantees a merger between Douglas, which specialized 
in civilian aircraft, and McDonnell, a major military contractor.
63
   
Even though U.S. government policy isn’t designed to ensure that American 
manufacturers succeed in the commercial sector, regardless of misdeeds they have 
committed and risky ventures they have taken on, if a firm is threatened with the 
possibility of bankruptcy, the government, unwilling to let a major defense contractor 
fail, will step in with a rescue option.
64
 This was evident in the 1967 McDonnell Douglas 
merger.  The makeshift strategy of shoring up a company too big and too important to fail 
emboldened American firms to partake in risky ventures that had the potential to yield 
large dividends. They would no longer be daunted by the fear of going out of business, at 
least as defense contractors.  Not allowing firms to fail also rewards companies that have 
not adapted well to the demands of the market, in essence robbing market share from 
those firms that have adapted well to the market and met its demands.
65
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Wide-Body Aircraft Competition  
 More than 10 years after the original turbojet engine was built, its successor, the 
more powerful turbofan engine,
66
 revolutionized the aviation industry, because it could 
power large wide-body jumbo aircraft capable of carrying hundreds of people at a time 
when passenger traffic was on the rise. This technological breakthrough was timely, 
because airlines, as a result of increased traffic, began competing with one another for 
limited runway space at airports--a problem that could easily be solved by increasing the 
size of the aircraft.    
 Though the turbofan was considered a British invention, its many deficiencies, 
such as fan overheating, excess weight, and aerodynamics limited the engine’s use in the 
commercial industry. It wasn’t until the Pentagon began looking for a new large jet 
transport that it recruited General Electric (GE) to remedy the deficiencies associated 
with the turbofan engine. With substantial monetary support from the government, 




In the early 1960s, with reliable turbofan engine technology available, the 
Pentagon invited aircraft manufacturers to submit proposals for a large jet transport 
capable of rapidly deploying military personnel anywhere in the world during times of 
crisis. It sought a piece of machinery that could ship several hundred military men, and 
equipment, faster than any previous form of transportation. American aircraft 
                                                          
66
 The Turbofan, created by Rolls Royce, was an engine capable of both pushing as well as pulling air with 








manufacturers Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas, with government financial 
support, would submit proposals for the C-5A project. 
Though all manufacturers were bent on producing the best airframe for the 
military’s jet transport, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose the winner on the 
basis of cost-efficiency. Although Boeing’s design was judged the best, Lockheed’s 
proposal won out because it cost the Department of Defense the least amount of money to 
build while meeting the military’s simple carrying-load and speed objectives.  
Lockheed’s aircraft design was actually ranked last of the three proposals submitted.  
  Despite losing the C-5A bid, which eventually ended up being a big failure,
68
 all 
three American manufacturers gained immensely from their work on the government-
funded proposals. Several key inventions came out of that research, including the wide-
body design that all three manufacturers attempted to exploit on the commercial side of 
the business. Another key innovation, incorporated into the Boeing 747, was having the 
“pod sprout from the top of the machine like a bruise on the head of a cartoon 
character.”
69
 This made it easier to load cargo on the plane if the front of the aircraft 
could be swung open. 
As new technologies became available as a result of military research and 
hardware contracts it had funded, the government set its sights higher; it became 
interested in pursuing a jet capable of traveling at the speed of sound, the Supersonic Jet 
Transport (SST), believing this was the wave of the future. 
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The Supersonic Jet-Transport 
“American industrial policy was clearly motivated by military objectives, which 
often had unintended spillovers to the commercial side of the industry.”
70
 It was clear that 
the government wanted to ensure that its aerospace manufacturers remained in business at 
least as defense contractors. However, that did not prevent the exit of military suppliers 
from the commercial side of the industry. The only time the American government 
showed support on the commercial side of the industry was when President Kennedy 
publicly announced that the government would issue funding in support of the 
development of a supersonic jet transport, in direct response to the cooperative 
arrangement formed between Britain and France in the early 1960s to build such an 
advanced plane. Kennedy wanted to make sure that American manufacturers maintained 
their competitive edge against their Europeans and remained the commercial-technology 
leader of the world.  
The United States did, however, terminate funding for the supersonic jet transport 
program in 1971, largely due to environmental issues that limited the plane to serving 
only overwater routes, thereby substantially shrinking the market demand for it. The 
government also realized that it wasn’t economical for airlines to purchase the aircraft: 
The plane consumed an enormous amount of fuel,
71
 especially in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, when the price of oil soared.  
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Until the point of cancellation, the government spent more than $1 billion on the 
project. It left behind 13,000 pieces of hardware and 2,000 boxes of engineering data.
72
  
It wasn’t a complete loss because the technologies and production skills derived from 
R&D in the project, and the C-5A competition, which consisted of 4,000 pages, 
containing engineering data and airframe designs with a price tag worth over $10 million, 




The Boeing 747 
Boeing was the first to capitalize on what it had learned from these government 
projects and produced a large jumbo aircraft plane, the 747.  This plane happened to be 
one of the riskiest ventures in the history of aviation. Boeing decided to build it without 
conducting a detailed market analysis. If it had done so, it would have reached the 
conclusion that developing a plane that was too big for must commercial routes was a big 
mistake. However, Boeing was emboldened to take on the risk because it knew that the 
bulk of its business was with the military, and that, if the 747 project failed, the company 
would probably opt out only of the commercial side of the business. If the plane was 
successful, the company could grow to become a market leader. It knew that if Pan Am, 
its launch customer, took a chance on the plane and was successful, others would, for 
reasons already explained, follow suit. 
Even though the U.S. government absorbed much of the Research and 
Development costs for this plane from the work Boeing had done previously in its pursuit 
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of the CA-5 contract, much of Boeing’s own money was spent when the design of the 
plane changed while it was being built at the request of Pan- Am.
74
  
The plane grew to be nearly three times its original size because Boeing agreed to 
meet Juan Trippe, the president of PanAm’s, request for the design of the interior of the 
plane, which included a double-decker configuration, with larger seats and cargo 
containers lying side by side, with a hump-like upper deck that could be used either as 
first-class lounge or for additional seating. The plane was designed so that it could also be 
easily converted into a cargo plane as well, because there was still a fear that the plane 
might be rendered obsolete by the SST. Consequently, “these requests resulted in the 
plane growing to be more than 310,000 lbs, forty tons more than anticipated.  As a result, 
Boeing needed an engine with 43,500 lbs of thrust.”
75
  
 The increase in the size of the plane meant that Pratt and Whitney’s engine (the 
JTD-9) lacked sufficient thrust to power the plane, which led to delays in the plane’s 
delivery. Originally, Boeing had put itself in a tough position by agreeing to deliver the 
first 747 to Pan Am by November 1969. The delivery date left only 28 months to design 
the aircraft and a workable engine in two-thirds of the traditional time, which wasn’t 
nearly enough.
76
 Delays in deliveries of innovative aircraft translate into heavy losses for 
the airlines. They expect a certain amount of business at the time they acquire the aircraft. 
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If they don’t receive it on time, they count it as a loss of money. Also, some older aircraft 
that would have been retired have to be expensively maintained. 
  Things got even worse for Boeing when a recession hit the country in 1968 
during the Vietnam War and excessive government spending triggered inflation, resulting 
in a cancelation of a significant number of B747 orders. “At the beginning of 1968, the 
company had 328 aircraft orders worth $2.6 billion, and twelve months later the cushion 
was thinning as the number of orders receded to 164 aircraft.”
77
 Boeing feared that all 
ongoing orders would eventually be canceled. 
With the 747 already costing Boeing an estimated $1.2 billion, three times more 
than Boeing’s actual net worth, it was forced to lay off more than 64,000 people, from 
vice-presidents to unskilled laborers.
78
  This helped it cut nearly $100 million from its 
payroll.
79
 Boeing decided to make up for the reduced workforce by automating its 
production facilities, so that it could produce aircraft more quickly and efficiently.     
Due to these changes Boeing had implemented, in 1970 Boeing was able to 
weather the storm and deliver its 747 plane to Pan Am. Boeing did however, have to pay 
late fees because it was not able to meet the agreed-upon date.  Despite the twists and 
turns the plane has faced over the years, it has grown to be a safe, efficient, and reliable 
transport and has become the most profitable commercial aircraft ever made, largely due 
to it being a symbol of status and having been unrivaled for nearly 40 years. 
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Lockheed versus Douglas 
Despite Boeing’s achievement, what the market actually demanded at that time 
was best articulated by Frank Kolk, the Technical Director of American Airlines in 1966, 
when he sent a message to all three American airplane manufacturers laying out the 
details of what he felt would best satisfy passenger growth then and in the future: a wide-
body, double-aisle aircraft capable of carrying as many as 250 passengers a distance of 
2,100 miles at subsonic speed.
80
  The plane would have two large bypass engines, which 
would make the plane more fuel-efficient than any other in addition to carrying a lot of 
passengers, all of which would generate greater profit. Kolk understood that increasing 
the size of the plane would lower operating costs because, as the number of passengers a 
plane can carry rises, the cost to the airline for transporting each of them individually, 
which is known as the “passenger seat-mile cost,” goes down.
81
 This however, could be 
not marketed to attract more passengers in a regulated market. Comfort, speed, and 
reliability were appealing to the public, not how airlines could save money. Ticket prices 
were still being regulated by the government. 
Both McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed decided in 1967 to build wide-bodied, 
mid-range airplanes although neither of their models resembled Kolk’s airplane. The DC-
10 and the L-1011 had three engines instead of two because many people in the airline 
industry, including pilots and executives, were worried by the idea of a wide-bodied 
airplane dependent on two engines. The two resulting aircraft were virtually 
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indistinguishable from one another, which did not make sense because the market was 
not large enough for two mid-range, wide-bodied planes. However, both manufacturers 
were emboldened to enter this competition head on, without much worry, because they 
were secure in the belief that, if they failed on the commercial side of the industry, they 
would continue to profit from lucrative military defense contracts. 
 Duplication of aircraft would not likely have occurred in a deregulated market, as 
producers would have striven to introduce planes that offered greater benefits with 
respect to price or performance in the industry. Both aircraft manufacturers were able to 
take on such a risk because they were kept in business by massive military contracts. 
 Although Lockheed’s plane was seen as being more aesthetically pleasing, 
McDonnell Douglas had developed a great reputation over the years; many airlines were 
attracted to their reliability and high-quality airplanes, and were aware that if both 
Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas split their orders, both manufacturers would have a 
hard time remaining in the industry. They also feared that, if one manufacturer left the 
industry, prices would be at the mercy of the surviving firm. 
Due to the nature of the regulated market, airline carriers would choose the plane 
that possessed features they believed would inspire greater ticket sales. Orders for 
McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed were therefore split right down the middle and nearly 
bankrupted both firms, in addition to the sole engine producer for Lockheed, Rolls 
Royce. What kept McDonnell Douglas alive was the backlog of government contracts, 
including the 60 KC-10s that the Air force had purchased. “The KC-10 was virtually 




helped McDonnell Douglas keep its production line open until the market rebound in the 
late 1980s, allowing the development of its derivative the MD-11.”
82
 
“The collapse of Lockheed was temporarily averted thanks to the federal loan 
guarantee of $250 million.”
83
 Lockheed faced trouble when Rolls Royce went bankrupt; 
this delayed deliveries of planes--and other potential customers previously interested in 
Lockheed’s L-1011 plane were turned off. The British government later agreed to take 
over Rolls Royce’s aero-engine division and would continue to power the L-1011, but 
only if Lockheed was financially sound and protected by the government from going 
bankrupt. Congress approved a hotly contested $250 million loan guarantee for the 
company.  President Nixon lobbied in favor of the loan because, if the TriStar failed, 
Lockheed would likely have gone out of business, and subcontractors, airlines, and banks 
would have stood to lose close to $1 billion that they had invested in the project. Also, if 
Lockheed had folded, an estimated 60,000 job would have been lost.
84
  
Despite the loan administered by the government being a huge success, in that 
Lockheed was able to repay all it owed to the banks and to the government, it decided in 
December 1981 to exit the commercial industry and stop producing the unprofitable L-
1011, since it had lost nearly $2.5 billion since it entered service in 1968.
85
 The company 
                                                          
82
 Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1992), p170. 
 
83
 Ibid., p187. 
 
84
 Time, Lockheed Bailout Battle, August 1971, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,903076,00.html (accessed August 1, 2009). 
 
85
 John Greenwald and Jerry Hannifin, “Catching a Falling Tri-Star”, Time, December 21, 1981, page nr. 





decided to channel all of its energies to defense production, which was far more 
profitable and reliable. 
 
THE EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM: AIRBUS FILLS A NICHE IN THE MARKET 
  All three American aircraft manufacturers tried to capitalize on what they had 
learned from their contracts with and proposals to the U.S. military rather than strive to 
satisfy what the market demanded. Knowing that the government would guarantee their 
company’s survival at least on the military side of the industry through the continuous 
and steady flow of military contracts, the aircraft manufacturers hardly thought twice 
about risking their commercial business, mainly because military contracts were so much 
more lucrative.  
 Companies competing in an unregulated market and according to free market 
principles would look to introduce aircraft to either satisfy a niche in the market not well 
served by existing firms, or produce an aircraft comparable to the most advanced of its 
kind, but to sell it more cheaply than the competition. Duplicating an already existing 
model aircraft, or producing an aircraft indistinguishable from a competitor’s, would be 
ruinously risky--and an unlikely occurrence, because a free market is not large enough to 
support two planes of similar kind. Given the nature of government-structured 
competition, American aerospace companies looked to exploit advantages and new 
technologies developed from their extensive military contracts, and to introduce them to 
the commercial side of industry whether a demand for them existed or not.  
 Lockheed and Douglas both therefore developed a three-engine, mid-range, wide-




maximum profits. On the other hand, Boeing’s 747, though a success, was judged too big 
for most routes. This left a huge hole in the market for a wide-bodied, two-engine 
aircraft, which was filled by a new entrant--Airbus, with its A300B model.   
  The Airbus Consortium was founded approximately 1 year after the British 
government formed a committee headed by Lord Plowden
86
 to study why Britain had 
suffered grave setbacks and frustrations and continued to lag behind American suppliers 
despite having pioneered key technologies, such as the jet engine.  The Plowden Report, 
as came to be known, appeared in December 1965 and revealed that the costs of making 
airplanes were 10 to 20 percent lower in the U.S. than in Britain because longer 
production runs allowed American companies to absorb the learning curve more 
rapidly.”
87
  Plowden recommended that, in order to meet this challenge successfully, 
European countries ought to seek greater collaboration with one another. Europe should 
pool all of its resources together and form a consortium of nations.   
  Though experience has proven that a multinational consortium consisting of 
several different countries with very different cultures and styles usually encounters great 
difficulty in reaching decisions, whether they are technical or marketing in nature, Airbus 
created a management scheme that worked. The consortium established a division of 
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labor among the member countries; in other words, each country would be responsible 
for building a specific part of the plane and then ship it in huge freighters to Toulouse, 
France, where the final assembly of the plane would take place.  The French partner, 
Aerospatiale, was responsible for assembling the various parts into a completed airplane. 
“The wings were flown from England to Bremen for flaps and other accessories and then 
on to Toulouse.  Eventually the airplane was flown to Hamburg to have the interior 
installed; it then returns to Toulouse where the customer test flies it and takes delivery.”
88
 
  “Airbus would not have stood a chance against American producers without 
massive development and production support from its member nations,”
89
 since a new 
firm in the industry is burdened with much higher production costs than incumbent firms, 
for it has not come down the learning curve; therefore, its products tend to be more 
expensive and  less efficient. It is known throughout the industry that labor costs decline 
with the increase in the number of aircraft produced because workers learn as they work; 
they will make the product more efficiently and less costly. “There emerged the rule that 
with every doubling of the number of airplanes produced, a 20 percent reduction of direct 
labor is achieved.”
90
   
 In order to offset the advantages of industry incumbents, the members of the 
European Consortium used taxpayer money to pay for the production and development 
costs associated with building their twin-jet aircraft, the A300, and its smaller derivative, 
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the A300B. The expenses amounted to over $1 billion, which was originally divided 
among Britain, Germany, France, and other smaller countries in Europe; however, Britain 
opted out after it was offered an exclusive deal to power the L-1011.
91
 
 The Airbus 300B came out at the right time, because in the years following the 
Yom Kippur War (the mid-1970s), the world was experiencing a spike in fuel prices, 
which created a demand in the market for a fuel-efficient plane with substantial seating 
capacity. In actuality, the A300B, a twin-engine, wide- bodied airplane that resembled the 
plane Frank Kolk had requested several years before, was created to fill the market void. 
It would take several years for the A300B to gain the confidence and the respect 
of American airlines before it became a success; it had to surmount a lot of obstacles 
along the way. Problems first began to surface when Airbus enlisted Rolls Royce to 
design an engine for the A300B airplane. Although Rolls committed to the Airbus 
project, it was offered a contract of exclusivity with Lockheed to design an engine for the 
wide-bodied TriStar, the L-1011. It had always been one of Rolls Royce’s goals to secure 
a contract with an American airplane manufacturer, so it could gain a foothold in the 
American market.  
In April 1969 Rolls Royce officially opted out of powering the A300B, which left 
Airbus with no other choice than to seek out a replacement engine. After temporarily 
suspending the program, it decided that the development of a new engine was not needed 
and that it would instead choose the GE CF6-50 engine (this engine also powered the 
DC-10), which reduced the plane’s developmental costs and, it was believed, would 
                                                          
91
 Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington D.C.: 





attract U.S. customers, for the plane now contained American components.   The plane 
made its debut when Air France flew the A300B on May 24, 1974, in the midst of a 
recession.
92
  Things began to look bleak for Airbus between the years 1975-1977, when 
the company failed to secure a single order for the A300B. However, during this 
economic downturn, Airbus did not lose sight of its goal of becoming a major player in 
the aviation industry and decided to work on new versions of the A300B, such as the 
smaller A310 derivative. It had confidence in its products and believed that airlines 
would soon take notice. 
Airbus understood that it could only achieve great success if it could find a way to 
penetrate the large, seemingly impenetrable American market. After much effort, Airbus 
was only able to do so by offering the near-bankrupt Eastern Airlines an extremely 
attractive offer that no other aircraft manufacturer could match. The lucrative deal 
included a 6-month free trial period, operating cost guarantee, and favorable export credit 
terms.
93
 The deal was very risky for Airbus because if the A300B failed to satisfy Eastern 
Airlines, the airline could return the aircraft, which could have caused severe damage to 
Airbus’s reputation as a player in the commercial airline industry. However, the benefit 
of a successful deal was gaining entry and the respect of the American market.  
After a successful 4-month trial, Eastern Airlines agreed to buy 23 planes from 
Airbus, with an option for 8 others, on April 6, 1978. Airbus was accused by American 
airplane manufacturers and members of the U.S. government of giving the plane away 
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and employing predatory policies just to be able to gain a foothold in the American 
market, as well as providing $96 million of its own money to secure the Eastern Airlines 




DEREGULATION OF THE AMERICAN MARKET 
 
At the time of the Eastern Airlines purchase, the United States passed the Airline 
Deregulation act, which changed the way both aircraft manufacturers and airlines would 
compete with one another. “The act renounced the conventional view that the airline 
industry was a public utility,” thereby removing governmental control over the industry 
except for safety-related issues.
95
 The industry would henceforth function in accordance 
with free market economics, under which airlines can decide what routes to fly and at 
what price to offer tickets. Regulation was believed to be the main reason why much of 
the industry was operating at a loss. “By 1978 six of the original 16 trunkliners were 
history and no new trunkliners had been allowed to come into existence.”  The 10 that 
survived accounted for 90 percent of the air carrier market, mainly because they had been 
awarded busier and more lucrative routes than their competitors, who went bankrupt. 
However, regulation was ill-equipped to handle the energy crisis of 1974, which further 
exacerbated conditions in an airline industry operating $100 million in the red.
96
 
“Between 1969 and 1978, the price of jet fuel increased by 222 percent amounting to 
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This forced the CAB to raise air ticket prices across the board. Due to high ticket 
prices set by the government because of the increased price of oil, airlines were operating 
their routes at less than 40 percent of capacity.
98
  Even during the crisis in the absence of 
pricing flexibility, airlines competed with one another on service rather operating cost 
reductions. Planes were not purchased because they were fuel efficient or had low 
operating costs, but by their attractiveness to passengers.   The CAB regulation forced 
airlines to compete on service rather than reductions in operating costs, which alone 
would not attract a greater amount of passengers 
Deregulation changed the nature of competition at a time when fuel prices were 
uncontrollably high and so were air ticket prices. Airlines themselves were operating at 
loss because their acquisition of aircraft was based on pleasing the public. Deregulation 
was expected to lead airlines to purchase aircraft that were both fuel efficient and had low 
operating costs, thus allowing them to offer lower ticket prices to customers.  Between 
1976 and 1990, fares paid by passengers if adjusted for inflation decreased by 30 
percent.
99
 From 1974 to 2010, passenger growth has increased to 721.1 million. In 1974, 
the cheapest round-trip New York to Los Angeles flight, adjusted for inflation, was 
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 Competition based on price and efficiency has increased the number of ticket 
sales across the board. Today one can fly the same route for approximately $268.
101
 A 
deregulated market puts American aircraft manufacturers in a better position to compete 
with Airbus, because it forces them to refocus their attention on satisfying the actual 
demands of the market rather than what was rewarded in the structured competition by 
the American government.  
 
DIFFERENCES IN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF BOEING AND AIRBUS 
Airbus has become relevant in the aviation industry largely as a consequence of the 
failure of American firms to meet market demands largely because of regulation and the 
financial life preservers the American government provided to its aerospace 
manufacturers in the form of military contracts. The aviation industry, since the arrival of 
Airbus, has become more of a competition between industrial policies and government 
support measures that further the positions of their indigenous firms. The competition has 
now become international. 
 The differences in policy intervention between the United States and the 
European consortium reflect their different objectives. United States industrial policy 
with respect to the aviation industry has been traditionally designed first and foremost to 
meet its military objectives, with important spillovers trickling down to the commercial 
side of the industry. All of the nation’s commercial aircraft producers have been major 
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recipients of defense contracts that have yielded enormous profits and in turn animated 
the commercial side of the industry. On the other hand, the European consortium has 
designed its industrial policy mainly for reaching its commercial objectives, with 
potential spillovers going to their militaries. “Direct financial support in the form of 
subsidies has been the principal mechanism for which the European consortium has 
helped its Airbus program.”
102
 A major advantage Airbus had over Boeing was that 
military aircraft were built based, not on cost efficiency, but on performance, which was 
a competitive disadvantage with the spike in oil prices the industry faced in the ‘70s and 
‘80s.  
  
Airbus Expands Policy to Include Commercial Diplomacy 
Boeing and Airbus were competing, not only for markets within Europe and the 
United States, but for small third-world markets as well, which were usually government 
owned; the stakes for these orders were especially high, because with only 100 or so 
customers worldwide, each order can make the difference between profiting or failing in 
the industry.
103
  Securing orders for aircraft, even if these airlines only purchase a few, 
also brings a manufacturer further down the learning curve because costs fall and product 
quality improves with increased sales.   
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Knowing the importance of the third-world market, Airbus introduced a new 
marketing strategy known as “commercial diplomacy” in order to entice buyers to 
purchase the A310 over its competitor, the Boeing 767.  This strategy required the 
consortium to send political figures from its member countries to visit potential Airbus 
customers and attempt to get them to purchase aircraft by offering favorable foreign 
policy initiatives, inducements, and deal sweeteners.
 
 
  This strategy was particularly successfully in 1980, when Boeing and Airbus 
were competing fiercely over sales of their wide-bodied twin-engine planes to countries 
in the Middle East.  In order to tilt the playing field in Airbus’s favor, President Giscard 
of France visited Kuwait on behalf of the consortium in 1980 to encourage his hosts to 
buy the A310.  Giscard introduced a number of mutually beneficial business 
arrangements that the Kuwaitis were very interested in, including a French investment in 
a petrochemical plant in Kuwait. He also encouraged Kuwaiti investment in some real 
estate in Paris.  
 Even more influential in getting Middle Eastern countries to buy Airbus aircraft 
than tempting hosts with commercial ventures was what Giscard said in the Arab 
countries that he visited (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia).  
He told audiences what they wanted to hear, which was that Israel ought to withdraw 
from the Arab territories occupied since 1967; he was, he averred, a strong advocate of 
the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. Never had the chief of state of a 






 What the Arab world finds troubling about U.S. policy is its unwavering 
commitment and support for Israel and its people. The United States is viewed as being 
unsympathetic to the Palestinian cause. This was the game changer that encouraged 
Middle Eastern countries to purchase Airbus aircraft. It managed to secure 41 orders 




AIRBUS CHALLENGES BOEING IN VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE MARKET 
 Airbus realized that, if it wanted to mount a serious challenge to Boeing, which 
owned 60 percent of the market in late 1980s, it would have to introduce technologically 
innovative aircraft at various ends of the market.
106
 After surveying that market, Airbus 
believed that there was a demand for a 150-seat, narrow-body plane that would replace 
the aging B727.
107
  Airbus saw this as a golden opportunity to introduce a technologically 
advanced aircraft to meet this demand, especially when the competition would produce 
derivatives of their previous narrow-body models.  Boeing was acting with caution and 
would seek to maintain its position as the current industry leader by exploiting its large, 
dynamic scale economies rather than betting the commercial side of the company by 
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producing a technologically innovative aircraft. In its complacency it produced a 
derivative of the 727, the 737-400, in 1984. McDonnell Douglas was in no position to 
build a new aircraft because it had lost more than $1 billion and was now struggling to 
survive as a result of its competition with Lockheed. It would introduce a spinoff of the 
DC-9, the MD 80.
108
   
 Airbus capitalized on the financial advantages it had over its competitors to in fact 
produce the most technologically innovative aircraft of its time. Consortium members 
channeled nearly $2 billion toward the A320 and produced an aircraft that was 
considered generations ahead of both the MD 80 and the B737. A portion of the aircraft 
was built out of composite materials, which drastically reduced its weight, so that it 
would burn considerably less fuel than its competition; this was appealing to airlines at a 
time when oil prices had soared. Direct subsidies on the commercial side of the industry 
proved to be invaluable when the market demands cost-efficient aircraft. Aircraft 
designed for the military is primarily based on durability and performance rather than 
cost efficiency. 
 Some of the other never-seen-before technologies that the plane possessed 
included the fly-by-wire system. “The fly by wire system featured 5 main computers 
which operated the hydraulic jacks and all the primary and secondary flight controls. The 
system was so advanced that it would not permit the pilot to exceed the aircraft’s 
limitations.”
109
 It was going to take some time before airlines and manufacturers would 
                                                          
108
 Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Institute for 
International Economics: Washington DC, 1992), p190. 
 
109
 Kenny Kemp, Flight of the Titans. Boeing, Airbus and the battle for the future of air travel” (London: 




be able to convince pilots to give up full control of the cockpit. The pilots argued that, 
with the new fly-by-wire system, they would no longer be in full control of the aircraft, 
but mere servants of a computer. However, airlines became strong advocates of this 
technology because the computers could maneuver the aircraft in such a way that it 
would burn even less fuel.
110
  
 Airbus was able to score points over Boeing, not only because the A320 was more 
environmentally friendly, but because all of its planes shared commonality: They had 
similar flight decks and would require only limited additional training for pilots should 
they want to switch between operating an A300B to an A320.  Since pilots earned over 
$130,000 a year, much of their time would be spent learning how to fly new planes, and 
with their salaries being an extremely expensive asset, airlines believed more of their 
time should be spent flying passengers from one destination to another. It would normally 
take a pilot as long as 25 days to learn about another aircraft.
111
 Airbus had planned to 
build at least ten planes, consisting of different ranges, but they would share a high 
degree of commonality, which would save airlines a significant amount of money when it 
came to pilot training. Airbus calculated that the commonality that its family of aircraft 
possessed would save an airline approximately $1 million a year per aircraft.
112
 
  The A320 sold very well in the United States and around the world even before 
the plane debuted in the late 1980s, because Airbus was able to sell planes far more 
cheaply than its competitors, and because the price of oil skyrocketed in the mid-1970s; 
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the airlines were interested in energy- efficient planes. With the funding that it received, 
Airbus was able to leapfrog both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in technology, thereby 
controlling the pace of what new technologies would be introduced in the 1980s.
113
 The 
success of the A320 gave Airbus the confidence and the momentum it needed to mount a 
formable challenge to Boeing’s throne. 
 
The Battle for new Mid-Sized Aircraft 
 Throughout the 1980s, Boeing largely had the middle market to itself with its 757, 
a long, single-aisle plane able to seat between 218 and 304 passengers, along with its 
double-aisle 767 seating 181 passengers.
114
 However, a new round of competition was 
sparked in the early 1990s when all three aircraft suppliers attempted to meet the new 
demand for replacing older wide-bodied aircraft (DC-10s and L-1011s). 
 In 1987, the European consortium decided that it would introduce two state-of-
the-art medium-sized planes: the A330, which had two engines and was capable of 
carrying 335 passengers a distance of 4,800 miles; and the four-engine A340, which was 
capable of carrying 295 passengers over 7,000 miles.
115
 However, due to the financial 
pressures felt by the consortium members with the introduction of the A320 only a year 
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before the launch of the A330/340, they tightened the purse strings and agreed to cover 
65 percent of the start-up costs, which amounted to $3 billion.
116
 
 The A330 and A340 become an instant hit with the airlines as they trounced the 
older Boeing 767 because they were 38 percent more fuel efficient than the wide-bodied 
Boeing airplane and possessed many of the A320’s pioneering technologies, including 
the fly-by-wire system and the state-of-the-art flight deck.
117
  Common features among 
the planes reduced design and engineering costs for the manufacturer, therefore making 
them cheaper for airlines to purchase. The launch of the A330/340 showed that Airbus 
could compete with Boeing in nearly every major sector of the market. By the end of the 
decade its market share had grown to around 20 percent. 
 McDonnell Douglas set out to compete against the A330/340 and strengthen its 
position in the market with the introduction of its MD-11, a three-engine wide-body 
derivative of the DC-10, which was composed of composite materials along with a 
stretched fuselage.
118
 With demand for world aircraft in this range very high, McDonnell 
Douglas had accumulated enough orders to sell out the company’s production capabilities 
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 Because of these problems, the plane failed to meet its expected maximum flight 
range, thus resulting in American Airlines and other carriers canceling their orders. 
McDonnell Douglas was not able to solve its financial problems, especially after feeling 
the effects of huge cutbacks in military contracts; it was barely able to survive. The only 
alternative to going out of business was to merge with Boeing, a move orchestrated by 
the government in 1996. 
 Boeing entered the middle-market competition 2 years later with its new 777 
model, a technologically advanced twin-engine airplane that can seat between 300 to 370 
passengers. Boeing knew that, in competing for the narrow-body market, it had exerted 
too much caution by not introducing a technologically advanced model, thereby 
surrendering a good portion of the market to Airbus. Before building this aircraft, Boeing 
broke with its strategy of the past and solicited the advice of eight airlines, along with 




  Boeing, faced with competing against Airbus subsidies in the commercial market 
and the shortcomings of building domestic versions of military planes with respect to cost 
efficiency, discovered another way to compete with Airbus. Risk was minimized in 
building innovative technologies associated with 777 by enlisting three major Japanese 
companies, Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji, to build 20 percent of the airframe and fund a 
portion of the development costs.
121
  This agreement was made to help offset the 
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development-subsidy advantages provided to Airbus, and to strengthen Boeing’s position 
as the main aircraft supplier to Japan. The company could now take on risk without the 
fear that, if unsuccessful, it would have to exit the commercial-side of the industry. 
Boeing was also quick to make this deal with Japanese firms because they feared that a 
potential alliance might emerge between either McDonnell Douglas (prior to the merger) 
or Airbus and those firms. At the time the aircraft was ready to debut, American Airlines 
ordered the 777 as part of a $22 billion deal that included other Boeing aircraft as well.
122
 
 The plane made its debut in 1995, nearly 3 years after the A330/340; this worked 
to the advantage of Boeing, for it was then able to build a more advanced plane that could 
fly similar routes while carrying more passengers than the A330 and with two fewer 
engines than the A340. The plane possessed more computer technology and next-
generation composite material than any other plane on the market. It adopted Airbus’s 
computerized fly-by- wire system, but with a mechanical backup, so that the pilot could 
have the last say and directly take over the plane during an emergency.
123
  
 This plane that mainly competed with the A340, was judged more comfortable, 
and cost less to operate. By industry standards, the 777 was considered a much better 
airplane; it has outsold the A340 by a large margin. 
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Forecasting the Future 
 By early in the 21st century, Boeing and Airbus had both introduced new aircraft 
that they believed would satisfy market demand over the next two decades. Airbus sought 
to challenge Boeing’s unrivaled dominance in the large aircraft market by introducing its 
own behemoth the A380 to rival the 747.  It believed that its jumbo transport, the A380, 
would satisfy the demand, expected to reach around 500 new aircraft, within the next 20 
years. According to Airbus, this aircraft will be the choice of airlines all over the world 
because its operating costs would be 20 percent lower than those of the Boeing 747-400, 
and it will provide greater comfort for its passengers.
124
 This is appealing to airlines 
because with lower operating and seat- mile costs, airlines will be able to lure customers 
their way by lowering ticket prices as much as 25 percent.
125
  
  Airbus believes that the A380 is timely because air traffic has been over saturated 
in most of large airports in the United States and around the world.  Despite the growth in 
air traffic, there are still no plans in the works for expanding airport facilities anytime 
soon to meet the demand. Because airports can only absorb a certain number of take offs 
and landings in one day, they could not handle more flights than they already have. In 
order to circumvent this problem and still meet the growing demands of air travel, Airbus 
believes the only sensible thing to do is to build a large aircraft capable of transporting 
between 550 and 850 people to major hub cities.   
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 Currently, more than 10 percent of flights at the world’s busiest airport, England’s 
Heathrow Airport, are Boeing 747 planes.
126
 Since the A380 is 35 percent bigger than the 
747-400, it will have 144 more seats and therefore will allow for 10 million more 
passengers to fly to and from the airport without adding any additional flights.
127
 This 
will also create many jobs. “The Port Authority reports that with the increased traffic of 
the A380, it would bring 1,040 jobs and $82 million in annual economic activity to 
JFK.”
128
 Already, Airbus has spent $18 billion (35 percent of which has been picked up 
by consortium members) developing the 525-seat A380 and has already secured orders 
worth $65 billion at listed price.
129
    
Contrary to Airbus’s belief that the market will require large transport planes over 
the next 20 years to fly passengers to and from major hub cities, Boeing believes that it is 
more responsive to market trends because its 787 plane will fly about 300 passengers 
directly to where they want to go; they will not have to stop off at another city and take a 
connecting flight to their final destination. Passengers will not have to worry about 
missing their connecting flights and being stuck at an airport hub, or about whether their 
luggage makes it onto its connecting flight. Flying from hub to hub also nearly doubles 
the travel time of passengers headed to smaller cities, which is a major inconvenience for 
passengers. Congestion is at the hubs, not elsewhere.   
                                                          
126
 Ibid., p31. 
 
127
 Ibid., p157. 
 
128
 Ibid., p160. 
 
129
 “Airbus A380 Sales Pitch Frays,” Bloomberg, www.gulfnews.com/business/Aviation/10296486.html 





 The Boeing 787, also known as the Dreamliner, intends to regain its position as 
the industry leader in the medium-range market that Airbus now holds with the A330, 
which has helped it to gain 50 percent of the civilian aviation market. The A330 took 
more than three-quarters of the midsize wide-body market, rendering the Boeing 767 
obsolete; this proves that new planes can overtake a successful older model very 
quickly.
130
  Boeing believes that, despite a three-year delay in its launch, when the plane 
debuts it will be competing against a middle-aged A330-200 that does not have the 
technological sweeteners the 787 will possess. 
 Boeing’s new approach to develop new aircraft will help it to create the most 
technologically advanced plane to date. It created a new role for itself as systems 
integrator; Boeing outsources various parts of the plane, including the wings and the 
flight deck, to foreign companies all over the world, and then ships them back to the 
Everett Facility in Seattle for final assembly of the plane. Boeing, as systems integrator, 
shifts financial risk, to a much greater degree than it did when building the 777, to 
suppliers--especially the Japanese and Italians, because they are heavily subsidized by 
their governments. 
  The plane’s price tag is expected to exceed $14 billion; this is much more than 
Boeing’s net worth, but it understands that, in order to compete with Airbus, it must 
produce new and innovative aircraft.
131
 Boeing also knows that it is the only remaining 
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American commercial airplane manufacturer, and that, if it was in financial trouble, it is 
likely that the government would not let it go bankrupt, so it can take on greater risk. 
 Outsourcing has another advantage besides being cheaper and sharing risk; by 
contracting work to foreign companies, it encourages the governments of those nations to 
buy Boeing aircraft, since their indigenous companies are working on the product. This is 
another strategy employed by Boeing to gain greater market share: outsource in exchange 
for gaining market access to the suppliers’ home countries. The problem with outsourcing 
keys parts of the aircraft, such as the wings and the fuselage, is that other countries gain 
the know-how and become familiar with these state-of-the-art technologies, so that 
Boeing can be potentially grooming future competitors. 
  The B-787’s appeal extends beyond contracting foreign companies; it is depicted 
by industry specialists as an engineering marvel. Half of the 787’s primary structure, 
including the entire fuselage, is built with composite materials, which was a first in the 
industry. The composites offer unique advantages in that they are lighter, which will 
lower operating costs by 20 percent over the A330.
132
  Just as important to the aircraft 
carriers, composites are more durable than metal and don’t corrode or fatigue as easily, 
saving a lot of money on maintenance and natural wear-and-tear.  
 Greater use of composites will also save airlines money by extending the time at 
which planes must get inspected from every 5 years to every 10. When planes are 
inspected, they get stripped down, and all of their systems are tested. Planes are as a 
result out of service for lengthy periods of time and not generating money for the carriers. 
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Extending service requirements from every 5 years to every 10 will prove to be very cost-
effective for airlines.  
 The 787 was also designed to appeal to its passengers. Its interior has levels of 
comfort that the industry has never seen before. The cabin has large windows, wider 
seats, and spacious aisles; it also has a new crystal lighting system that changes 
throughout the flight. There are improvements in cabin humidity and air quality, and 
more space is available in the overhead bins.  
 The plane has done remarkably well. It is scheduled to debut at the end of 2011 
and has thus far secured more than 850 orders from over 56 different airlines.
133
 The 
claim that people are more interested in flying directly to their final destinations, rather 
than hub-to-hub, appears accurate, because the 787 has outsold the A380 thus far. Orders, 




Airbus’s 350 to Challenge the B787 
 In October 2005, Airbus made its intentions clear:  It would also begin working 
on its new mid-ranged transport, the A350, which had a price tag of over $5.2 billion.
135
 
This 250- seat passenger plane, which is scheduled to debut in 2013, is intended to 
compete with the B777 and the B787 in the mid-range market. Over the next 20 years, 
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airlines are expected to replace their old A330s and the B767s. Customers purchasing this 
new plane would benefit from an unmatched level of commonality that it will share with 
other members of the Airbus family (the A320, A330, A380, etc). “The A350 will be the 
first Airbus with both fuselage and wing structures that will be made primarily of carbon 
fibre-reinforced polymer.”
136
 This airplane is being touted as more comfortable for 
passengers than the 787, for its seats will be larger and it will have more headroom.   
Airbus’s decision to develop a second plane while it was developing the $16 billion 
A380 outraged Boeing, which knew this would not be possible without massive 
government subsidies that were no longer needed now that Airbus owned 50 percent of 
the market.  
 
U.S. RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN SUBSIDIES 
  The United States largely ignored early European efforts to break into the civil 
aviation industry, through massive levels of financial support issued by the British and 
French and Germany, until Airbus began to make inroads in the U.S. market beginning 
with the deal it offered to Eastern Airlines. Airbus’s selling of its aircraft at heavily 
discounted rates created such a stir among American aircraft manufacturers that President 
Carter sought the help of GATT to address the issue of European subsidies and predatory 
export financing policies. 
 The matter was referred to GATT in 1979, and after much negotiation an 
agreement was reached between the European Commission and the United States. The 
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key section that dealt with government support was in Article 6, which stipulated that the 
signatories in their participation in, or support of, civil aircraft shall seek to avoid adverse 
effects on trade in civil aircraft. It also stated that aircraft should be priced on a 
reasonable expectation of recoupment costs.
137
 Lastly, it liberalized trade, which led to 
cross-national subcontracting and sourcing of components. 
 Despite the vague and ambiguous language, and the fact that the agreement did 
not spell out a ban on government subsidies, the head of the American negotiating team, 
Stephen Piper, reasonably expected the Europeans to terminate subsidizing Airbus. The 
Europeans, however, rejected the view that subsidies were restricted under this agreement 
and pointed to the language of “seek to avoid” and reasonable expectation used in the 
agreement” as a justification for still being able to support Airbus. 
138
 
  The American government remained silent on the issue until the mid-1980s, when 
the consortium made further inroads in the U.S. market by selling its aircraft below cost 
to American airlines such as Pan Am and Northwest, which hurt American aircraft 
manufacturers.  They lost market share as a result of such subsidies. Equally troubling 
was Airbus’s announcement in 1985 that it would develop the A320, the most 
technologically advanced aircraft to date, which would rival the Boeing 727.  
  While the A320 was in its production phase, Airbus managed to secure orders 
around the world for the plane by offering special discounted rates.  For example, in 1985 
it offered to deliver Air India the A320 by 1989 and would lease B737s to Air India in the 
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meantime. Airbus covered 85 percent of the cost of the purchase.
139
 Despite intense 
bickering on the part of American airplane manufacturers, the European Consortium 
remained unconcerned. 
 It wasn’t until Ronald Reagan’s much-publicized speech in 1985, in which he 
accused the European Consortium of unfair trading practices in the form of subsidies that 
had caused harm to American aircraft manufacturers that the Europeans went back to the 
negotiating table. In his speech, Reagan signaled his support for taking action to resolve 
this problem in the form of issuing a 301 suit.
140
 The threat of such retaliation in the eyes 
of the Europeans caused great panic, because if such action were taken, it could severely 
injure the European economy. 
  The Europeans engaged in talks with the United States over the next 5 years 
more as a way to show their willingness to resolve the subsidy issue, so as to prevent any 
American retaliatory measures, than to reach any concrete agreement. In negotiations 
lasting from 1986 to 1991, not much was accomplished other than heated exchanges and 
controversy over one another’s trading practices. Both the Americans and the Europeans 
hired economists and research analysts to highlight their points during bilateral 
negotiations. 
 In September 1990, the U.S. hired the services of Gellman Research Associates to 
bring to light the predatory practices of the European Consortium with respect to the 
                                                          
139
 Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Institute for 
International Economics: Washington DC, 1992), p203. 
 
140
 “A 301 action suit which would enable the United States to take countervailing measures against 
European goods by imposing duties or taxes on other European products…” Stephen Aris, How Airbus 






aviation industry.  Their report showed that, by 1989, Britain, Germany, and France of 
had given Airbus $13.5 billion; the breakdown was 58.9 percent from Germany, 25.1 
percent from France, and 16 percent from Britain.
141
 The study also calculated that the 
funds would have been worth more than $25.8 billion if member countries had borrowed 
the money at normal rates rather than it having it donated to Airbus by consortium 
members.
142
 By the end of 1990, only a total of $500 million had been paid back. In 
short, it was the massive amounts of money ploughed into the making and sales of Airbus 
aircraft that had helped it to enter and remain in the commercial aircraft industry.  
 The report also examined the profitability of aircraft introduced by Airbus since 
its inception and came to the conclusion that there had not yet been a return on 
investment. The report arrived at this conclusion by looking at the prices airlines were 
paying for the planes and adding in estimates of the commercial cost of capital. Even 
with the amount of launch aid channeled toward the A300, A320 and the A330/340, the 
aircraft had sustained negative cash flow. “These losses had been compensated for in part 
by additional government support in the form of production subsidies and equity 
infusions to Airbus member companies.”
143
 It never generated enough returns to repay 
the initial investment fees.   
 The report also addressed the effects of European subsides on the American 
aviation industry and concluded that, if Airbus continued to sell at prices below what 
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were necessary to generate a profit, U.S. firms would have to accept a loss in market 
share or begin to lower the price of their planes to meet the challenge.  In either case, they 
will not only generate less profit but lose the ability to channel adequate funds toward 
R&D for the launching of new aircraft.  This in fact could discourage, or even eliminate, 
the possibility of Boeing introducing technologically advanced aircraft, thus potentially 
robbing the economy of important spillover benefits resulting from the pioneering of key 
technologies that would otherwise be introduced by aircraft suppliers. 
 
AIRBUS ACCUSATION OF U.S. INDIRECT SUBSIDIES 
Airbus countered the Americans with a report of its own, in which its research 
revealed that, between 1978 and 1988, the U.S. government had channeled subsidies to 
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Nearly 65 percent of the $23 billion was allocated to the 
Defense Department to hire American manufacturers to work on research and 
development projects and contracting work related to aviation.
144
 The rest of the money 
was contributed to NASA for research in aircraft development and space technologies. 
The benefits of indirect subsidies are not exact and are a lot harder to trace than those of 
direct subsidies.  
 
FAILURE OF GATT AGREEMENT 
After nearly five years of bilateral negotiations and not much accomplished, the 
issue was referred to the GATT by the United States. In 1992, before President George 
H.W. Bush left office, a bilateral agreement was reached between the European 
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Commission and the U.S. Trade Representative that capped development subsidies issued 
by governments at 33 percent for a new airplane.
145
 Although Boeing wanted the 
government to fight for an outright ban on subsidies, it thought that a lower percentage 
was good first step.  The agreement also did define subsidies as loans that had to be paid 
back with interest, but only if the airplane that was the recipient of the loan would profit.  
 Despite many government officials believing that the 1992 agreement was a step 
in the right direction, it still allowed Airbus to continue to subsidize aircraft, which 
worked to the disadvantage of Boeing. In early 1993 Airbus’s market share was on the 
rise while Boeing’s had plummeted, resulting in a decision to reduce its workforce by 
28,000 people; President Clinton attributed much of the blame to the federal 
government’s previous lack of support for its indigenous airplane manufacturers; in other 
words, how could the U.S. government allow Airbus to channel more than $26 billion 
into Airbus projects and do nothing about it? 
146
  
 Clinton’s willingness and determination to help the aviation industry, by doing 
something other than addressing the issue in GATT, was evident when he secured an 
additional $1 billion per year in NASA spending on research on civil aviation, 
specifically with respect to helping indigenous manufacturers regain their technological 
edge.
147
 He also became the first president to lobby a foreign country (commercial 
diplomacy) for the purpose of securing orders for its indigenous aircraft suppliers. 
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  In 1993, Clinton traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Faud when he was 
made aware that the Saudi Arabian airline, Saudia, was interested in purchasing new 
planes expected to be worth $6 billion.
148
 Clinton felt that the Saudis owed the Americans 
a favor for having liberated Kuwait from Iraq in 1990 and protecting Saudi oil fields; 
therefore, they should purchase American-made aircraft 
 Despite multiple visits from consortium members, including the German Vice-
Chancellor and Foreign Affairs Minister, and even Prince Charles, President Clinton’s 
superb negotiating skills landed the deal for Boeing. While the Europeans continued to 
express their support for the Palestinian cause, Clinton managed to one-up them by 
advocating a Western policy for stopping the war in Bosnia. “The Saudis see themselves 
as defenders of the Muslim faith and the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims in the civil 
war had attracted worldwide attention.”
149
 Clinton advocated a firm Western policy to 
stop the war in Bosnia. The Europeans had remained silent, and their refusal to take 
action against the Bosnian Serbs cinched the aircraft deal for the Americans.  
 Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, did little to follow in his footsteps with 
respect to the aviation industry. Even though he was much consumed by wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration did manage to instruct its U.S. Trade 
Representatives in 2004 to pursue all options to end the Airbus subsidy, including the 
filing of a WTO (the successor to GATT) case. The World Trade Organization handed 
down a ruling on this matter in June 2011 in support of the claim that consortium had 
illegally channeled approximately $18 billion in subsidies, which had caused great harm 
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to Boeing with respect to market share worldwide.
150
 The WTO granted the European 
Union six months to either withdraw the subsidies or remove the effects of those 
subsidies.
151
 Airbus has agreed to comply with the WTO ruling. According to Boeing, the 
WTO ruling has set a precedent on the harmful effects of launch-aid subsidies and should 
prevent Airbus from issuing launch aid for its A350 airplane. Boeing has claimed victory 
and believes that the last 40 years of subsidization of Airbus planes should come to an 
end. The playing field has become closer to level.  
The WTO still has to deliver, in February 2012, its ruling on the Boeing appeal in 
February 2011, in which it will decide whether Boeing has channeled more than $5.3 
billion in subsidies from federal and state governments as suggested by Airbus.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The unique characteristics of the aviation industry have provided a springboard 
for greater government intervention in the industry to ensure its proper functioning. In 
order to maintain some order, structure, and stability in an industry naturally driven 
toward a monopoly, the U.S. government declared aviation a public utility, enabling it to 
exercise control over the way airlines compete with one another for business. It set the 
price of airline tickets, assigned specific routes to airlines, and determined flight 
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schedules and flight frequencies. This type of control set and defined the way airlines 
competed with one another. They acquired and upgraded their fleets based, not on planes 
with low operating costs, but on what services would attract the greatest number of 
passengers. Aircraft manufacturers themselves were encouraged to produce planes that 
provided added comfort and amenities, or build planes that would reduce travel time to 
passenger destinations. 
Due to the nature of defined competition set by the government, American aircraft 
manufacturers converted military aircraft and technologies that were developed from 
lucrative defense contracts into commercial airplanes. The American government did 
sustain aircraft manufacturers’ existence through the extensive and guaranteed military 
contracts they were given. If the industry allowed a monopoly to form, as was believed, 
without regulation, the surviving firm would become complacent, feeling no pressure to 
significantly upgrade its products and develop new ones, the motivation to produce 
without was competition lost.  Having several American firms competing for lucrative 
military contracts would bring out the best in firms, which would directly translate into 
the development of advanced technologies. The military would suffer a huge blow should 
military contractors be allowed to go bankrupt. 
In instances when the price of fuel was low and passenger growth was on the rise, 
aircraft built on performance would be in the interest of airlines. For example, the B707 
was originally a plane built for the military, and because of its improved performance 
compared to its competition, it grew to be a huge success on the commercial side of the 
industry. When fuel prices soared in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the Yom 




hand. The industry experienced a loss of over $100 million in 1974. Even though the 
government raised the price of air tickets in conjunction with the price increase in oil, 
airlines still competed with one another by offering better services to attract more 
passengers. This put American aircraft manufacturer out of touch with what the industry 
actually demanded.  
The government’s structuring of the way airlines and aircraft manufacturers 
competed created a space for an aircraft manufacturer to produce fuel-efficient planes 
capable of carry 250 passengers. This is what the market demanded in the midst of a 
severe oil crisis. Such a plane, it was believed, would bring down costs immensely, so 
that airlines could a generate profit at a time when they were operating in the red.   
The Airbus consortium capitalized on satisfying market demand by developing its 
A300 airplane. Airbus understood the unique economics of the industry and knew that, 
for it to successfully gain a foothold in this market, governments would have to heavily 
subsidize the development of its aircraft. Otherwise the entire company would have to be 
bet on this one aircraft, and the company itself would not have enough capital to fund its 
development. The return on investment for a commercial aircraft, if successful, would not 
be seen until at least a decade later. Therefore, a lot of capital was needed. The plane was 
able to successfully penetrate the market when Eastern Airlines was willing to take a 
chance with its plane. Others followed suit. 
Instead of satisfying market demand, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed 
produced planes that were nearly identical to one another. This would not have happened 
if both companies’ survival had not been guaranteed by their extensive military contracts. 




of their profit was from their vast military contracts. If they had, they wouldn’t have 
risked duplicating an existing aircraft or something that was similar to what its 
competitor would produce:  Firms will rather seek to find a niche in the market 
unsatisfied by the competition. Both companies used technology learned from 
government-funded proposals they had submitted while vying for the CA-5 contract.  
McDonnell Douglass produced the DC-10, and Lockheed the L-1011. They practically 
split the market right down the middle, so neither could generate a profit. The market was 
not big enough for two planes of the same kind to profit. Because of the poor ways in 
which these aircraft manufacturers competed, Lockheed left the commercial industry in 
1981, and MD merged with Boeing in 1997. 
 The American government, because of the vast difficulties airlines had with 
generating profit and the incredibly high ticket prices customers had to pay for air tickets, 
then deregulated the industry. This allowed airlines to compete with one another, not only 
on service, but on routes and ticket prices, and it changed the nature of the game, 
allowing airlines to acquire aircraft that were fuel efficient and had low operating costs. 
The industry was to function to a much greater degree according to free market 
principles. Aircraft manufacturers were now more inclined to produce aircraft that met 
the demands of the changing market. Even though Boeing is the nation’s only 
commercial aircraft producer, it still competes with Lockheed for military defense 
contracts and at times can still capitalize by incorporating technological developments 
originating in the military into the commercial the industry. Since many of these 
technologies hinge on improvements in performance without taking cost efficiency into 




This has put Boeing at a competitive disadvantage with respect to Airbus, whose 
member nations channel money in the form of subsidies directly into producing 
technologies for the commercial side of the industry. Though its primary objective is the 
development of technologies for the commercial side of the industry, the military does 
stand to benefit from its pioneering technologies at times. The competition that has taken 
place between these two aircraft-producing giants has become more of a battle between 
their nations’ industrial policies, and about whose policies are more effective for creating 
aircraft that meet the demand requirements of the airlines.  
Because of the subsidy advantages Airbus has had, Boeing has enlisted foreign 
partners such as Japan to take on a percentage of the risk. In this way, Boeing can 
compete with Airbus by offsetting the potential risk of betting the company on the 
production of new aircraft. 
 On many occasions Boeing has argued that the amount of subsidies offered to 
Airbus vastly exceeds the benefits it itself receives from military contracts and NASA. 
Airbus, however, maintains that its subsidization is a direct reaction to the hidden 
subsidies that the military, government organizations, and state governments have offered 
to Boeing. Both firms, along with their respective countries, have filed suits with the 
WTO in order to organize the competition for market share in a stable, predictable, and 
fair way. Knowing that other aircraft manufacturers from countries, including China, will 
enter the aircraft development market, the creation of clear and well-defined rules about 
what is allowed and how competition ought to take place is in the interest of both Airbus 
and Boeing. The winner of market share competition should not be decided by which 




satisfying a niche in the market. The amount that nations channel toward aircraft 
development should be capped, and what subsidies are actually allowed and not allowed 
should be clearly identified. This ought to define the nature of future competition for 


























THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Y-10 PASSENGER AIRCRAFT 
 
 In 1970, China attempted to restore its dignity at home and internationally, after 
nearly a century of humiliation and embarrassment suffered at the hands of the West, by 
embarking on a strategy to achieve what only four other nations in the world have done: 
build a large state-of-the-art commercial aircraft. China’s leaders desperately sought the 
creation of an indigenous large aircraft chiefly because of what the capability represented 
to the overall economic development of China and potential technological spillover 
benefits it would bring to its military industrial complex.  If China were able to 
successfully develop a large and effective air transport service network, and build it using 
indigenous resources, it would signal to the rest of the world that China was a nation 
possessing great national strength and a well-developed economy capable of competing 
in a wide range of related industries and high technology products. 
 
PREDATORY STATE UNDER MAO 
As noted in Chapter 1, the essential feature of Evans’s predatory state is that its leaders 
are unconstrained by law or regulation.   The predatory state contains a system that 
prioritizes rule of man over rule of law, paving the way for massive amounts of 




institutionalized negotiation with societal members.
152
 Goals are not shaped by society.  
Leaders in the predatory state are not held accountable by the people and therefore 
become more interested in self-aggrandizement, which includes maximizing their power 
by silencing their opposition or enriching themselves by extracting resources for their 
own personal gain at the expense of society. In such a state, the governing elite plunder 
with little regard for the welfare of their people.
153
 In this system, members of the 
governing elite are not chosen through meritocracy but by relations developed and 
solidified over the years with the most powerful person or people in government. Without 
the standardization and the legitimacy of rule of law, it is virtually impossible for 
business to flourish. Capitalism, and the market economy, can only exist with respect for 
private property and with laws dictating and protecting the exchange of goods. China, 
under the leadership of Mao Zedong, clearly met the criteria of a predatory state.  
In 1949, Mao created a government that almost mirrored the governing apparatus 
of the Soviet Union, which favored highly centralized rule. It remains amazing how much 
power Mao was able reserve for himself. He designated himself chairman of the nation 
and could, at his own discretion, implement or repeal any law as he saw fit. “No other 
Communist government had such a position higher than the General Secretary or Chief 
Administrative Officer.”
154
 Basically, his power was unchecked, which invited a high 
degree of distrust among his colleagues and members of society. However, the Chinese 
people were accepting of such a predatory system mainly because of the historical 
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tradition of strong imperial rule; they also yearned for a strong charismatic figure to help 
bring them back from financial ruin and a history of foreign occupation.  
Under the Maoist predatory system, market forces and material incentives were 
nonexistent. It was virtually impossible for an entrepreneurial class to emerge and further 
economic development, because Mao repealed all laws respecting private property or 
private ownership. There was also no international trade and minimal direct foreign 
investment, because contracts were not honored or respected. In a system that did not 
prioritize rule of law, investment in the nation would have been ruinously risky. 
Mao relied on a small decision-making elite within the party to devise an 
economic policy which the government, through its vast bureaucratic institutions, would 
be responsible for carrying out. The party effectively controlled the state. Mao blamed 
China’s backwardness on the greed of capitalism. China prevented the emergence of a 
capitalist class by employing the custodial role, which consists of policing or preventing 
the emergence of an entrepreneurial class. Without an entrepreneurial class, the roles of 
midwife and husbandry could not be played. However, Mao did adopt the demiurge role, 
which is common in a predatory state to rely on State-owned enterprises to carry out 
development of the country. Under predatory rule, people become much less productive 
as the incentive to work hard, create, and innovate was lost without respect for market 
principles and rule of law. 
The ruling elite responsible for creating policy consisted of Mao’s most trusted 
colleagues and advisors, chosen for positions of prominence within the party because of 
the service they had provided to their country in helping to defeat both the Japanese and 




years and developed a personal bond with him on the battlefield.  Positions in the party 
and the government were thus determined more by one’s contacts and connections than 
by rule-based, competitive procedures. The Chinese system lacked a recruitment process 
based on merit where an exam would be administered that was open to all to attract the 
country’s best and brightest people to occupy important positions in government to chart 
a path for development.  
As Chairman, Mao ensured his power was supreme and made all important 
decisions for China. At all Party meetings, he would sum up the main points of the 
discussions, and, more often than not, the summations he arrived at were very different 
from the conclusions that ought to have been reached at the meeting.
155
 He used this 
venue as a platform to get his ideas and important points out to his compatriots. Mao also 
passed a directive order in 1953 stipulating that that no document issued in the name of 
the Communist Party could become a legitimate law unless he approved it.
156
 Mao 
intervened in all matters that dealt with China’s national plan.  
Those who diverted from the Maoist agenda, openly spoke out, or were critical of 
him were jailed or punished in the most severe ways. For example, at the Lushan 
Conference, Peng Duhai, who was Minister of Defense and Vice-Chairman of the 
Military Affairs Commission, took the liberty of severely criticizing the Great Leap 
Forward initiative, stating that such a dismal policy had been launched with a clear and 
total disregard for the consultative decision-making process that the leadership was 
supposed to follow in accordance with the original constitution drafted in the 1954. He, 
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as well many others members of the Party, believed that Mao ignored the Constitution of 
1954 because he wanted to make sure that no document would erode his power.  Peng 
and his supporters believed that the country was facing an impending crisis because of 
the conditions created by the Great Leap Forward.
157
 
Though Mao encouraged his critics to speak out at the Lushan Conference, he 
took these attacks on the Great Leap Forward as a personal attack on him. After they 
spoke, he attacked them and accused them of being antirevolutionary. He demanded that 
all of the other officials attending the conference raise their hands if they agreed and 
supported Peng’s verbiage. “Under this pressure, the party leadership sided 
overwhelmingly with Mao and branded Peng and some others an ‘antiparty group.’ These 
individuals were purged.”
158
 This incident changed the rules with respect to debates 
among leaders.  Prior to the Lushan Conference, debate was allowed and expected at 
high-level meetings before decisions were made. The purge of Peng suggested it was no 
longer possible. 
By the end of the Mao era, China was left in dire straits. All independent media 
sources were suppressed, and people feared expressing thoughts or opinions that differed 
from those of the party. The interests of the people were not well represented because the 
leaders were not held accountable to the people.  There were no laws in place 
constraining Mao from doing virtually what he wanted. The Chinese people, and the 
leaders themselves, saw China’s predicament of millions having died from the Great 
Leap Forward, and millions of intellectuals having been purged--as a system failure. Rule 
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of law did not prevail, thus inviting corruption and disastrous policies as power was 
unchecked and unresponsive to the needs of the people. As in the Cultural Revolution, 
members of society that actively spoke out or were perceived as embracing capitalism 
were deemed enemies of the revolution and were either killed or sent to the countryside 
to be reeducated.  
 
PORTERS DETERMINANT MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE Y-10 
 
DEMAND FOR THE Y-10 
 According to Porter’s Demand variable, a nation’s home market gives local firms 
an early indication of wants and needs.
159
 As noted in the first chapter, in order for a firm 
to stay ahead of its competition, it must be motivated to continuously upgrade existing 
products and make them more cheaply than its competitors can offer.  Products are 
usually upgraded to meet the demands of its home market. When a nation experiences a 
high level of economic growth, consumer salaries increase and create disposable income. 
This leads to such consumer demand for higher-quality products.  
 The decision to the develop China’s Y-10 aircraft was in direct contradiction of 
what Porter’s demand determinant advises. Mao Zedong- along with an upper echelon of 
elites in the party, decided to launch the production of a large indigenous passenger 
aircraft mainly to indulge a sense of pride associated with having a civilian air transport 
system, and so Chinese leaders could travel abroad on a domestically made aircraft. To a 
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much lesser degree they also realized the potential spillover benefits it would bring to the 
military. 
 Both Premier Zhou Enlai and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi believed 
that flying to foreign countries on foreign-brand aircraft showed China’s inferior status 
vis-à-vis developed and industrialized countries. It was incomprehensible that China did 
not have a domestically built commercial jet, considering it was already able to mass-
produce military jet aircraft, including the J-5 in the early 1950s, and built the H-6 
military aircraft in the later 1960s. 
 At the time, still only four nations possessed the technological capacity and 
expertise to manufacturer their own airliner: the United States, the Soviet Union, France, 
and the United Kingdom. China was bent on becoming the fifth
.
   
 
Differences between Civil and Military Aircraft 
 China’s elites failed to realize that there are major differences between developing 
civilian and military aircraft.  Having mass-produced military aircraft doesn’t necessarily 
translate into commercial success. The emphasis in military transport aircraft lies 
predominantly on battle-field requirements, such as take-offs and landings.
160
 Greater 
attention is paid to speed, and there is less concern over fuel consumption, passenger 
comfort, safety, and noise pollution as with commercial aircraft.  Military aircraft are 
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built for warfare, and wear-and-tear is expected. By contrast, civilian aircraft have 
traditionally been built for longevity and for profit.
161
  
 To meet their different objectives, the planes are built very differently. A large 
military transport has a fuselage closer to the ground, so that cargo and troops can easily 
be unloaded even in harsh weather.
162
 The wings cannot be close to the engine, because 
landing the aircraft can damage the aircraft due to the sand and gravel entering the 
engine. On the other hand, passenger aircraft are constructed with the engine beneath the 
wing to achieve a reduction in cabin noise. There is also greater emphasis on passenger 
comfort.
163
 Aircraft safety measures are stricter in civilian planes; the foremost concern is 




 Without prior experience or a niche in the market to satisfy, producing a civilian 
aircraft would prove to be extremely difficult for the Chinese to build. The Chinese did 
not possess the technological capability to produce a fuel efficient airplane or engine and 
lacked the ability to adequate test a commercial aircraft to ensure passenger safety.  
China’s experience with building aircraft was based on reassembling licensed knockdown 
military aircraft provided by the Russians during the mid-twentieth century.  The 
Russians did not teach the Chinese how to design aircraft; the Chinese at best were able 
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to replicate unsophisticated Soviet aircraft with the licensed blueprints provided by the 
Russians.        
  
Top-Down Decision-Making 
 The decision to launch the Y-10’s development did not reflect a growing demand 
by the populace for air travel because the country was not witnessing high economic 
growth and an increase in income. Contrary to what Porter’s model describes as the case 
for development of an industry, at the time of the project’s launch in 1970, the Chinese 
people were still struggling to survive, as the country’s Gross National Income per person 
was only 235 Yuan ($95) per year, as shown in Appendix  B-1.
165
 China’s GDP per 
capita in 1970 was $111.82, ranking 114 out of 128 countries listed and way below the 
world average of $952.13.
166
 People faced harsh living conditions, so travel by air was 
not on the radar for most of the citizens of China; in fact, they were in dire need of basic 
life necessities. Even in 1978, just 2 years before the Yunshi 10 took its maiden flight, the 
average person was only earning 343 Yuan ($204) per year, with living expenses 
hovering around 311 Yuan ($185).
 167
  They still could not afford a plane ticket and, even 
if they could afford airfare, it would not have mattered because flying was a luxury 
reserved for Chinese leaders and officials.  
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 The year before the central government approved the Y-10, demand was very 
low, as only 16,788 flights took off, carrying a total of 26,400 people, mainly consisting 
of party elites and government officials who enjoyed the luxury of traveling by air for 
free. Even by 1978, just 2 years before the plane took its maiden flight, civil aviation only 
accounted for 0.1 percent of total passenger traffic and .001 percent of total freight 
traffic.
168
  The main method of transport was rail, with water playing subsidiary roles, as 
shown in appendix B-2.
169
  Clearly, the decision to launch the Y-10 was made at the 
expense of the people, as massive amounts of money and resource were channeled 
toward this project. 
 
FACTOR CONDITIONS FOR THE Y-10 
  Porter notes that the most important factors for creating and sustaining an 
industry are advanced specialized factors. Advanced specialized factors are the engines 
driving the creation of differentiated or new products, new features on existing products, 
and proprietary production technology. These specialized factors have a narrowly 
specific skill set for a particular field of industry. It is, however, a huge commitment on 
the part of a nation to develop its specialized advanced factors. They require modern 
institutions and facilities, along with a pool of educated personnel capable of developing, 
training, educating, and upgrading their specialized factors. “Competitive advantage 
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doesn’t come from just one time investment but continual reinvestment to upgrade their 
quality not to mention keeping the current pool of factors from depreciating.”
170
  China, 
during the Mao era, was unable do so, thus contributing to its inability to create and 
sustain a modern, large indigenous passenger aircraft. 
  What Porter’s model doesn’t address, though it is not important for this case, is 
what percentage of highly- skilled personnel a nation needs to develop an industry, and 
what specific curriculum or training is most conducive to developing and sustaining a 
competitive advantage. 
 
Education System during the Pre-Reform Era 
 During the Mao era, China embarked on a series of social experiments on a scale 
unmatched in human history, which included the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great 
Leap Forward, and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, which set China back with 
respect to development several decades vis-à-vis Western industrialized nations. The 
implementation of these massive social experiments led to China losing nearly a 
generation of students with specific and highly specialized skills important for the 
development of the country. 
 
Mao’s Revolutionary Ideals 
 Mao strongly believed that it was feasible to achieve rapid economic development 
while creating an egalitarian society, if pursued correctly; he believed that mobilizing the 
masses around his revolutionary ideals would produce greater economic development for 
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the Chinese than training and educating generations of Chinese in highly specialized 
fields. Ideological fervor that could be realized through properly educating the masses 
was more important for industrialization than would be the purchasing, or developing 
large physical assets and training a select few in advanced specialized knowledge.
171
  
 Mao also believed that, if much of China’s population could develop rudimentary 
knowledge in field in demand or an elementary education, the return on investment 
would exceed that  if resources were channeled toward advancing specialized knowledge 
for a few. It is more beneficial to have a large number of industrial workers improve their 
technical skills than for a few laborers to possess a very modern skill set.
172
 
 Mao believed a lot of knowledge could be gained from job experience because, as 
one’s job duties become repetitious, the worker would be able to devise ways in which 
they could produce goods more efficiently. This would basically stimulate worker 
curiosity, making them more innovative, and result in the continual upgrading of skills in 
the workforce. Worker motivation would also be stimulated by the quotas demanded by 
the planners, and these expectations would continue to increase as workers became more 
familiar with their jobs, because they were expected to produce more over a shorter 
amount of time.  This was in direct contradiction of Porter’s diamond model, which 
advocates nations developing their science and technology fields in order to modernize.  
 In order to further carry out its commitment to the Marxist-Leninist experiment, 
China enlisted the help of the Soviet Union, a nation with over 30 years of experience 
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with communist construction and development. Prior to Mao’s mass mobilization 
campaigns it not only copied the Soviet Union’s central planning system, but the 
structure and process of higher education as well. China’s education system practically 
looked more and more like the Soviet’s beginning in the mid-1950s.The Chinese didn’t 
just build new schools but merged similar departments from various schools into mono-
disciplinary colleges as the Soviets had instructed.
173
 For example, the East China 
University of Science and Technology, originally named East China Institute of Chemical 
Technology ( 华东化工学院 ), founded in 1952, was the first single-subject institution 
serving China, after merging the chemistry departments of various schools in China 
including National Chiaotung University, Université d'Aurora, Utopia University, 
Soochow University, and Yangtze University.
174
 Also in 1952, the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics was established by consolidating aviation-related 
departments of Tsinghua University, Peiyang University, and Xiamen University, etc.  
 Not only was this process encouraged by the Russians, but it allowed Chinese 
government to assert greater control over the direction of key industries like chemistry 
and aviation. This would lead to be better coordination and efficiency in the use of state 
resources while resulting in less duplication and waste. 
 The Chinese also followed the footsteps of the Soviet Union by eliminating 
humanities courses and departments from the college curriculum. Many departments, like 
Political Science, were cut because the government didn’t want to teach Western political 
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science and humanities courses, since they was deemed unimportant to the development 
of China. They could also have potentially caused problems for the government by 
opening students’ minds to counter-revolutionary ideas. Students were encouraged to 
study engineering and the natural sciences, which was considered the most effective way 
to contribute to the country’s economic development.   
 While Porter’s factor conditions highlight the importance of continuously 
upgrading and improving knowledge in the engineering and science fields in order to stay 
ahead of the competition, his model does not clearly spell out the importance of 
advanced-degree training, which promotes and triggers creativity and innovation.  The 
Chinese education system under Mao lacked the theoretical and philosophical rigor and 
curriculum that stimulate and trigger creativity. This system was primarily geared toward 
the natural sciences, training experts and not thinkers. The ability to think in the abstract 
was removed. Additionally, without access to interdisciplinary education, graduates 
became more narrow-minded and limited in their focus.  Their knowledge at best would 
be remain at the level of the information they were taught.  
 
Hundred Flowers Campaign 
  In the early 1950s Mao set out to improve agricultural output by creating labor-
intensive water conservation projects, using fertilizers and the close planting of crops, 
etc. Mao believed that best way to achieve optimal results was through collectivization 
and higher levels of indoctrination of the masses. By 1955, nearly 90 percent of the farm 




1956 and 1957 by 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
175
 The state’s plan to increase the 
workforce to meet higher targets did not translate into greater production and 
consumption as Mao predicted. According to Mao, however, the reason why the 
production targets were low was that the state still needed to a better job of raising the 
consciousness of the peasants to match the new social reality; greater indoctrination to 
meet the socialist agenda was needed. 
  Despite the vast economic setbacks and the demoralization of the workers in not 
meeting production targets, the leadership began to understand the importance of not 
alienating the masses and being able to meet the socialist expectations of the people. This 
was especially true in 1956, when thousands of Hungarian students revolted against their 
government and its Soviet- imposed policies. The uprising almost lead to the overthrow 
of the communist system in Hungary until the Soviet Union invaded Budapest and 
crushed the rebellion, resulting in more than 3,000 casualties.
176
 This incident made 
Chinese party members realize that gaps between the party and the masses could be 
catastrophic for the country. In order to bridge them and prevent the possibility of an 
uprising, the Chinese government saw the need to develop better relations with the 
masses. It decided to work on campaigns that would release new energies among the 
intellects and the masses for national construction.
177
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 In 1957, Mao gave a talk entitled, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions 
among the People,” in which he called for a relaxation of constraints on the intellectuals 
in the country.
178
 Mao saw this as a gesture to become closer to intellectuals and experts 
in China. He relaxed restrictions on what intellectuals could say about party policies. This 
campaign, later called “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom and a Hundred Schools of Thought 
Contend,” was designed to call upon the intellectuals to point out the current problems in 
economic development and to help devise new strategies for such development in 
accordance with Mao’s revolutionary ideals. 
  Unexpectedly, most of the intellectuals questioned the achievement of socialist 
construction and called for an end to the political monopoly of the Communist party. 
They also blamed the party for its irresponsible policies that repressed scientific inquiry. 
They argued that the party often made important policy decisions without the necessary 
technical expertise and without asking for input or feedback from the professionals and 
experts who were capable of making well-considered decisions in those areas. The 
criticisms did not address the shortcomings of government policy but were mainly 
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 Intellectuals who spoke out against the party were deemed rightists and quickly 
became enemies of the state.
180
 Party members have traditionally been wary of 
intellectuals, mainly because they are not well understood. The intellectual group 
consisted mainly of university professors, students, and staff members who were believed 
by the party to have strong bourgeoise ties because they were well educated and some 
had received their training in Western nations. Others received their education in China 
under the previous regime, under where education was afforded to those families who 
were born into land-owning or business-working families.
181
 In sum, the intellectual class 
at the time was believed to have been highly influenced by the West or the corrupt 
Nationalist Party.  
 Old cadres knew little about the nature of academic work other than that it was 
often an individual endeavor, undertaken by experts and scholars whose motivations 
might value the pursuit of their own intellectual interest and scholarly accomplishments 
over that of the state. This worked against the teachings of the revolution and the creation 
of an egalitarian society. While communist cadres were working for the common cause of 
the people, they found it difficult to accept, nor did they understand, how intellectuals 
such as scientists, engineers and, scholars could contribute to the overall goals of the 
revolution in the pursuit of their personal achievements.  
 Cadres remained highly suspicious of professors, as they pursued their own 
esoteric knowledge at the expense of focusing their attention on the transition towards 
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communist reconstruction. Professors did not have much use for teaching politics, and 
many favored increasing teaching hours for science and technology courses at the 
expense of political content advocating Marxist Leninist thought.
182
 Intellectuals saw the 
Chinese leadership’s urge to strictly enforce ideological orthodoxy as the main source of 
its conflict with the government.  Professors barely read newspapers, hardly participated 
in Nationalistic parades or events such as May Days, and found it useful to participate in 
political study only when it was pertinent or influenced their research. They played a 
small role in teaching Mao’s revolutionary ideals or ideologically indoctrinating the 
hundreds of students they would see on a daily basis.  
 Communist cadres therefore perceived professors as major obstacles to the 
nation’s social transformation and economic development. After the Hundred Flowers 
Campaigns, the distrust among party members for intellectuals was at an all-time high, 
which led to nearly 800,000 of them being thrown into penal camps or sent to the 
countryside to do forced labor.
183
 This was a great setback to Mao Zedong’s revolution, 
since the country lost a significant number of engineers, professors, economists, and 
scientists who were crucial to the successful development of the country and the further 
implementation of the Socialist model. The persecution of these intellectuals and experts 
robbed the country of its current stock of intellectuals, who could contribute to China’s 
development. Porter would see this as a huge blow to industrial development of a nation. 
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 Porter notes that many of these trained professionals would be needed to educate 
future generations of scientists and engineers; otherwise, there would be a shortage of 
specialized factors in the future.   
 Engineering graduates in China fell from 22,047 in 1956 to 17,162 in 1957.
184
 
There were many engineering students that spoke out against the party and were jailed, 
reducing the overall number of graduates. Students were also discouraged from entering 
such fields because the teachers chosen to replace those jailed intellectuals at schools and 
universities were unqualified, having had merely an elementary education, and had been 
chosen to teach because of their loyalty to the party. Thus, research was halted and future 
generations of students were robbed of a quality education as assistants or less-qualified 
instructors with strong communist-leaning views taught their classes.  
  Intellectuals, who fell under the radar of this movement, would not dare to speak 
out either, or take on any critical research that was deemed unacceptable by the party, 
even though it might be beneficial to the overall economy. This hindered creativity and 
innovative development in China and set it further back. All in all, the attack on 
intellectuals did irreparable damage to the country’s economy.  The Hundred Flowers 
campaign practically eliminated an entire class of intellectuals Mao deemed capitalists 
and opponents of the revolution. “Despite his ambitions for China's development, the 
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Great Leap Forward 
 No longer able to rely on intellectuals for the further development of the country, 
Mao Zedong went completely in the opposite direction from what Porter’s model advises 
by unleashing the masses towards collectively orchestrated social projects that would 
lead to China to surpass Britain, the leading producer of steel, within 15 years. The 1958 
Great Leap Forward was launched on the belief that manual laborers, once properly 
motivated through an indoctrination campaign, could achieve a great deal more than 
intellectuals. 
  Communization was set up to ease the diffusion of new knowledge, spread the 
risk of innovation, and allow indigenous techniques and human labor to be used in place 
of modern agricultural technology and equipment.
186
 Nearly 30 million new workers 
were absorbed into the state sector during 1958.
187
  In rural China alone, millions of 
workers were relocated from their agricultural units to work in factories, including 
backyard steel mills. Without sufficient knowledge of metallurgy, Mao ordered every 
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commune and every urban neighborhood to build small backyard furnaces. Peasants were 
told that they had to produce steel out of scrap metal, so they used their own pots, pans, 
and other metal artifact to supply the scrap for the backyard furnaces, hoping to meet the 
unrealistic steel production targets set by the government. Laborers at all levels were 
pushed to work overtime seven days a week in an attempt to meet these targets. The 
output consisted of low-quality iron that was basically useless. The targets were never 
met. 
  
Mao’s Socialist Education Campaign  
 Mao launched a social indoctrination campaign predicated on the belief that 
people’s love for communist ideals could move mountains, and that collective goals 
could transcend individual interests; he believed an egalitarian society would produce far 
greater results than would a society in which individuals merely pursued their selfish 
interests.
188
 It was the capitalist tendencies that bred greed and corruption, which 
ultimately led to the failure of the Nationalist Party.  To support his goal of creating an 
egalitarian society, Mao created part-time and part-work/part-study institutions for 
peasants and working class children. This bold new experiment allowed both student and 
workers to acquire productive labor experience, contributing to the economic 
development of the country, as well as access to an education. Red and expert universities 
were set up by local governments throughout China, which took on the role of 
indoctrinating the masses in support of the revolution.  
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 Many of these institutions taught advanced agricultural techniques, because a 
greater emphasis was placed on practical training, which could be used to develop the 
country, rather than on theoretical abstract concepts, for which Mao believed China had 
little use at that stage of development. This type of work experience helped develop 
appreciation for manual labor and offered keen insight into the lives of peasants in the 
countryside, advancing revolutionary ideals by deepening the masses’ understanding of 
the class struggle.
 189  
However, this strategy was not conducive to the industrial 
development of the country, since educating scientists and engineers took a back seat to 
manual labor.  In the end, China was set back even further. 
 
Cultural Revolution 
 After 3 years of sharp economic decline as a result of bad harvests and poor 
planning, China was suffering from severe food shortages that claimed the lives of over 
30 million people. Hunger became a major problem particularly, since grain output fell 
sharply from 200 million tons in 1958 to 170 million tons in 1959 and further declined to 
144 million tons in 1960.
190
 The Great Leap Forward was also disastrous because it 
further split the party leadership along ideological lines and exacerbated tensions between 
party moderates and conservatives.
191
 Additionally, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s 
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technical assistance in 1960 led China toward a policy shift that closely resembled the 
First Five-Year Plan, which was technologist in nature.  
   In an attempt to improve China’s overall economic condition, Mao decided to  
temporarily retreat into isolation and hand over the reins to moderates Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng in 1960. Mao understood that a fresh start was needed after the devastation from 
the Great Leap Forward. The moderates in power shifted the country’s approach to 
education by placing an emphasis on training experts and highly skilled technicians over 
offering a rudimentary education and productive work experience.  
 The moderates understood that, in order for China to develop, it was important for 
people to possess all levels of skills, from highly skilled technicians and experts to semi-
skilled laborers. The party in 1962 shifted its orientation for learning in order to elevate 
the importance of fundamental theoretical knowledge instead of practical knowledge. 
There was a renewed emphasis on stressing individual achievement in a classroom setting 




 In order to avoid their mistakes of the past, Deng and Liu would seek to link the 
number of schools and students enrolled in higher education to the needs of the national 
economy. Heavy enrollment, in essence, would put a drain on already scarce resources. 
Educational levels needed therefore simply to meet the current level of economic 
development.  According to the Ministry of Education, only a few full-time schools were 
actually required to train skilled manpower for China’s economic development. Under 
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Mao’s previous education policies, enrollment at all levels was greater than required for 
development. Deng and Liu sought to reverse the expansionist policy. They also realized 
that work-study skills were especially important in order to meet most of the 
technological demands of the rural areas by training a small number of 
agrotechnicians.
193
  By 1965, Deng and Liu had accomplished what they set out to do, as 
the number of institutions had been reduced to 434, returning to their 1958 level (see 
Appendix B-3).  
 In 1961 Deng and Liu also implemented their two systems of labor and two 
systems of education policy, which allowed students and workers either to work or study 
both full and part time. By 1965, a system was put in place in which education consisted 
of both regular schools and work-study skills designed to diversify the workforce for 
satisfying all facets of economic development.  The dual system would produce 
intellectual elites and experts on the one hand, but also educate the masses for 
employment in manual labor. The regular schools were attended by those students who 
sought a university level education, because it had much higher academic standards and 
prepared them for further study.  Work-study schools were attended by children from 
peasant backgrounds; these children had little probability of ever getting a university 
level education; they were developing basic skills fit for full-time labor. Schools that 
were expected to educate the next generation of professionals had the best teachers and 
facilities. The party began to emphasize the importance of developing expertise while 
remaining loyal to the party.    
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 Despite the shift in fundamental policy that Porter would consider conducive to 
industrial development, Mao returned from isolation in 1966 with his launching of the 
Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, in response to the sharp divisions between party 
members. Though the moderate policies may have lifted the economy during the first half 
of the 1960s, Mao saw the long- term consequences of these policies as a movement 
away from socialism, even if production continued to expand. Mao and his followers, 
mainly the Gang of Four--Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao 
WenYuan--argued that, in spite of the recent increases in production, the allocation of 
state investment resources was not producing optimal results.  The educational policies of 
the early 1960s were not serving the interest of the proletariat class, who were studying 
under teachers with capitalist world views. Mao sought a reversal of Deng and Liu’s 
policy that would once again emphasize collectivity, ideology, and commitment to social 
egalitarian society.  According to Mao, the adjustment policies of Deng and Liu had 
promoted social differentiation and elitism.
194
   
 The conservatives blamed the capitalists within the party for sabotaging the Great 
Leap Forward and of being opponents of the revolution. Just as Peng Duhai had spoken 
out against Mao at the Lushan conference, other rightists were against the revolutionary 
goals and needed to be dealt with. Mao enacted the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution 
to get the younger generation on board with his revolutionary ideals and to root out all of 
the capitalists he believed were opponents of the revolution. Mao mobilized China’s 
youth, who would later be referred to as “Red Guards,” consisting of high school- and 
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college-age students, to instigate, demonize, and torture their elders and party members 
accused of being capitalists. In 1966 Mao rallied Chinese youth against corrupt officials 
in government and around his revolutionary ideas. 
 There is no reliable data available of how many people the Red Guards killed, 
jailed, or tortured, before they were forced to relocate to the countryside in 1969 when 
they began to turn on each other. Scholars estimate that nearly a million people died 
during the purges and related violent incidents, and that more than three million were sent 
to the countryside and forced to do manual labor. During the Cultural Revolution serious 
damage was also done to the CCP, as a large percentage of leading figures were relieved 
of their duties and some were also forced to do manual labor in the countryside, if not 
killed. “The Cultural Revolution also caused economic disruption; industrial production 
dropped by 12 percent from 1966 to 1968.”
195
 Intellectuals were considered elitist and 
opponents of the revolution as well. Mao once again reemphasized the importance of 
collective economic production and egalitarian values.  
  The Red Guards destroyed libraries, books, and modern facilities it deemed 
capitalist in nature. They also persecuted and tortured professors, teachers, and 
educational administrators. Many of these professionals, if not killed or tortured, were 
sent to work in factories to be retrained and to get a real sense of what the revolution was 
about. For example, “1,200 of the 2000 staff members of Beijing University were sent to 
experimental farms in Shaanxi province. Most of the staff was on farms for two years 
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largely between1968 to 1970."
196
  The PLA’s strategy ran counter to continuously 
upgrading its factor conditions, as Porter advises. 
 During this period, urban elementary and secondary education were disrupted for 
at least 6 years, and for much of the period from 1966 to 1968 schools in many urban 
areas were closed altogether. Despite what has been listed in official Chinese 
publications, most universities were closed intermittently for about 12 years; there were 
very few to no new entrants in universities from 1967 through 1970 and a sharp decrease 
in the total number of enrollments during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted ten years 
(1966-1976).
197
 When they did open, one’s political background and class would 
determine if one was eligible for college.   
 Students were enrolled in the university if they were able to get a 
recommendation from their local political unit, with little or no attention paid to one’s 
scholastic or academic abilities. Second, class background prevailed over merit as the 
important determinant for entry into college. This favored workers and peasants rather 
than children who were perceived to have had a middle- or upper-class background. Prior 
to 1966, students had to take a national entrance exam, which clearly favored the urban 
over rural youth, because the resources available and the level of education were better in 
the cities. The schools were better equipped and better staffed. By 1958 only 36.42 
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percent of college students consisted of workers and peasants.
198
 Mao found this highly 
problematic for a society that aspired to be egalitarian in nature when peasants consist of 
85-90 percent of the population.
199
 It was proof that the old privileged class still had 
many advantages over the majority of people in society.  
 Unquestionably, the nationwide exam favored urban over rural youth. “Therefore 
from 1970 to 1972 the colleges and universities admitted nearly 200,000 students from 
among workers, peasants and soldiers,”
200
  in a clear demonstration of Mao’s 
commitment to an egalitarian society. 
 Mao also shortened the length of time it would take to earn a college degree from 
4 years to two or three.
201
 He argued that students did not have to waste much of their 
time reading books that were theoretical in nature and could not be put into practice in the 
short term. Fifty aviation technical schools and technical high schools, for example, were 
changed or transformed into factories. Consequently, the aviation industry was on the 
brink of collapse by 1969 and wouldn’t ultimately recover to until 1972.
202
   
  Most of the students were chosen to attend college based on their family and class 
background rather than their academic achievement. Therefore, these students’ basic 
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reading, writing, and math skills were substandard.  Studies show that quite a large 
number of “enrolled students were incapable of doing university level work even with 
curriculum and teaching methods modified to accommodate them.”
203
  Universities were 
then forced to offer remedial courses at the college level.   
 The effects of Mao’s policies did untold damage to the nation. It deeply felt the 
effects of the 10-year period in which schools were closed down intermittently, and when 
higher education was only offered to students based on their class background and not 
their academic abilities.  This was evident by 1980, when there were 250 seats available 
for graduate study at Beijing University and only 78 students qualified to take on 
graduate level work.
204
 The level and quality of education received during the period 
were dismal. The nation’s best scholars and intellectuals had been brutally treated. Those 
who survived physically were forced to countryside for reeducation. They were not 
employed to teach the next generations of professionals and scholars, nor were they able 
to resume their research, which could have been an asset to the development of the 
country--Research, innovation, and creativity were stifled, considered out of line with 
communist thought.  
 The failure to maintain universities and research institutes, and respect for the 
teaching profession, has been one of the main explanations for the technological gap that 
existed between China and the West. Knowledge is gained by building upon previous 
research and existing information; China lost that ability because universities, colleges, 
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institutes, and research facilities were dismantled. Basic research was ignored and an 
anti-technological slant encouraged by the party elites.
205
  
 The aviation industry suffered immensely during the years of the Cultural 
Revolution. From 1966 to 1976, graduates of aviation schools reached 54,000, 38,000 
less than in prior years.
206
 Those who actually graduated, moreover, were not sufficiently 
trained, considering that many of the teachers had limited experience as well. Therefore, 
developing an indigenous aircraft would remain a huge obstacle for China to overcome 
because the country was facing a shortage of qualified people to work on its 
development.  
 
RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES  
 Porter’s third determinant, Related and Supporting Industries, posits that firms 
gain a competitive advantage when they have internationally competitive suppliers or 
related industries based in their home nations.
207
 The main valuable benefit that firms 
gain from working closely with internationally successful home-based suppliers and 
related industries is that the connection helps them find new methods and presents new 
opportunities for the use of new technologies to make their products more cheaply and 
efficiently. From such a relationship, firms can gain “preferential treatment and early 
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access to new ideas, insights and supplier innovation.”
208
  As Porter describes, such 
relations develop when there are commonalities or cultural affinities between the firm 
supplier and related industry.   
 The gains from working with world-class suppliers and related industries who 
share common productions cannot be understated. China benefitted immensely from its 
big brother- little brother relationship with the Russians. They shared a common 
commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Chinese were given state-of-the-art 
technology and aircraft and were helped to improve their production facilities. What is 
not apparent from Porter’s determinant is that many suppliers and industrial firms are 
hesitant about passing along information that can potentially groom another competitor, 
or that such technology could make its way to an unfriendly military. This shortcoming in 
his model is an important reason why China lacked the ability to design an indigenous 
aircraft. Its trade relationships with the Russians were based on acquisition of production 
technology and aircraft. They were taught how to reproduce existing aircraft without 
knowing how they were built and designed. Therefore, they lacked the ability to advance 
knowledge of existing products.  
 The Soviet Union was hesitant about passing along technology that had the 
potential to change the dynamics of the big brother-little brother relationship. In order to 
prevent an alteration of the relationship, the Russians gave technology to the Chinese 
without teaching them how products were made, thus creating a continued dependency. 
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Different kinds of technology 
   Technology acquisition is of interest to all developing nations; as they are 
gained, some form of technical knowledge-  whether it is an advanced skill, technique, or 
piece of technological equipment- is also gained to enhance the overall quality of a 
product/and or reduce production costs. Missing from Porter’s model but still an 
important variable for understanding why China lacked the ability to create aircraft are 
the two different categories of technological acquisition and know-how, one being the 
tools man creates (design technology) to meet the demands and challenges of his 
environment. The second is the application of learned techniques and tools 
(manufacturing technology) used in production.
209
 
 Manufacturing technology relates most directly to the latter of the two types of 
technology acquisitions, more specifically “the actual physical production—skills of 
fabrication techniques of processing refinement of materials and so forth.”
210
 It is in this 
area of technology that the Chinese have become really skilled, mainly due to the 
knowledge and technology gained from the Soviet Union throughout the 1950s. 
 Since firms may be reluctant to pass along sensitive information and the latest 
generation of technology, the best method for developing design technology, as Porter 
states, is for a nation to develop its science and engineering fields. Experts and scholars 
in the natural sciences should continually, or over extended periods of time, be able to 
conduct research, testing, and experimentation in up-and-coming areas in which their 
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findings could potentially yield benefits for all facets of the economy and the military. 




 China remains relatively underdeveloped in this area largely due to its focus over 
three decades of Communist rule on developing an egalitarian society where all citizens 
were entitled to the same rudimentary education. The system placed greater emphasis on 
being Red. Nations that have achieved great success in design technology have managed 
to develop and sustain strong science and engineering programs in their countries.
212
 
China under Mao was not one of them.  
 Secondly, the assistance offered by the Soviets emphasized manufacturing 
technology over design technology. This strategy prevented the Chinese from acquiring 
the theoretical and analytical training for aircraft design. Consequently, their technology 
was only as sophisticated as the last shipment they received from the Soviets; this is 
shown in the next section.  
 
SUPPLIERS AND RELATED INDUSTRIES INVOLVED IN THE MAKING OF 
THE Y-10 
 To strengthen communism around the world and to be better prepared to meet the 
capitalist challenge, the Russians transferred modern technology to the Chinese over a 
seven year period. The Russians helped the Chinese develop its military, heavy industry, 
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and supporting economy. China’s plan was to absorb as much knowledge as possible 
from foreign countries until it could stand on its own two feet and become self-sufficient.  
 This plan was first put into practice when the Russians and the Chinese signed an 
accord calling for the construction of 291 major industrial plants by 1967, with 
equipment worth approximately $3.3 billion.
213
 Also included was the transfer of vast 
array of blueprints, specification standards, and posting of more than 10,000 Soviet 
experts, specialists, and advisers to assist the Chinese in its development; the Soviet 
Union also allowed 38,000 Chinese technicians, scientists, students, and skilled workers 
to come to the Soviet Union for further training.
214
  
 The massive technological assistance supplied by the Russians was instrumental 
in developing the building blocks of a modern economy and military for the Chinese. The 
Russians helped develop 156 key industries, which supplied a foundation for industrial 
development that ultimately led to massive industrial output by 1957. Of 156 key 
industries, the Russians agreed to help China develop 12 related to aviation, 44 to the 
defense industry (12 aviation-related, 10 electronic industry, 16 weapons-related, 2 space 
industries, and 4 shipping industry), 20 to metallurgical enterprises (7 steel, 13 
nonferrous metal), 7 chemical enterprises, 24 machining enterprises, 52 energy 
enterprises, 25 electricity, and 2 petroleum, and 3 light industry and pharmaceutical  
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 “The Soviet Union supplied $300 million in loans divided into 5-year 




  In 1952, when the Russians agreed to offer assistance, China’s industry 
constituted only 28 percent of China’s total GDP, and agriculture 64 percent. By 1975, 
industry was taking up 72 percent of GDP, and agriculture 28 percent. Industry had 
grown 30 percent larger than in 1949.
217
  By 1976 China’s GDP was 283 percent higher 
than that of 1949. Steel production for example, went in 1952 from 1.4 million tons to 
31.8 million by 1976, increasing 22.71 times the 1952 amount. Production of crude oil, 
virtually non-existent at the start of the Mao era, jumped to 104 million tons by 1975. 
Coal production soared to 66 million tons from 3 million, or 21.67 times 1952 
production. Fertilizer production jumped from 39,000 tons to 222.9 times that amount in 
1976.
218
 More than 20,000 kilometers of railway were completed over the next 20 years. 
Over 1 million kilometers of highway were developed as well during this period.
219
   
 Many of the industries established during the era are considered the backbone of 
the economy today, despite the dismal effects that the Great Leap Forward had on the 
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country. It did take away from these achievements, but many industries, including 
aviation, benefitted immensely, especially from the building of military aircraft, which 
was one of the primary reasons for Soviet aid. 
   
Technology Transfer and Acquisition of Aircraft 
 China witnessed its first shipment of Soviet aircraft during the first 3 weeks of the 
start of the Korean War.  The PLA received Soviet Mig-15 jet fighters in addition to 
other combat aircraft. The Russians also provided training for Chinese pilots and ground 
crews to fly and maintain the aircraft at their main aircraft plant in Shenyang and in the 
Soviet Union. The Russians replaced the estimated 2,000 aircraft the Chinese had lost 
during the course of the war.
220
  This was only the start of the Soviet build-up, which 
continued through the 1950s. “They created a Chinese Air force of some 4,000 aircraft 
(fighters, tactical and strategic bombers, transports and support), a complex of training 
establishments as well as maintenance and overhaul facilities.”
221
 The Chinese at this 
time did not possess the technological capability or the know-how to build or develop 
aircraft. Therefore, they acquired them by purchasing them from the Soviet Union, which 
put them heavily in debt. 
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Technology Acquisition during the First-Five-Year Plan 
 During the First-Five-Year Plan, beginning in 1953, the Russians systematically 
rebuilt China’s aircraft industry, which was virtually nonexistent prior to receiving Soviet 
help. Not only did they supply the Chinese with state-of-the art aircraft, but they rebuilt 
and expanded the Manchurian plants previously damaged, especially those in Shenyang 
and Harbin, as a result of the Civil war and the multiple Japanese invasions. Russian 
engineers and technicians completely rebuilt airframe and engine factories with its most 
advanced equipment and technology.
222
 They provided Chinese factories with complete 
metal fabricating and forming plants, components, and avionics manufacturing 
facilities.
223
 Most of these factories and equipment were for assembling aircraft. The 
Chinese were not, however, taught how to design aircraft or to improve on the current 
production technology and equipment. 
 The technology transfer provided by the Russians was quite similar to what the 
United States provided the Japanese subsequent to World War II. Firstly, the United 
States supplied the Japanese with a relatively unsophisticated and simple T-33A jet 
trainer, and, as they became familiar with the assembling technology and process, they 
were given more advanced aircraft like the F-104J to work with. They followed a phase-
in procedure beginning with the reassembling by the Japanese of a licensed knockdown 
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aircraft that was manufactured and shipped under an American license. As the Japanese 
became more familiar with the aircraft, they would reproduce it on their own.
224
 
 Using the same method, the Russians, in 1954, after equipping China’s newly 
named National Aircraft Factory in Shenyang with state-of-the-art technology, the 
Russians began to ship the relatively unsophisticated Yakolev Yak-18 jet trainer in 
knockdown form so it could be reassembled.
225
 The Soviets also provided the Chinese 
with the production licenses, engineering drawings, assembly tools, and production 
tooling, so they could develop the knowledge and experience necessary for advancing 
from the assembly stage to producing the components on their own, and ultimately to 
reproducing the entire aircraft on their own.
226
  The plan was for China to be able to 
develop the Russian jet fighters Yak-18 and Mig-15 with indigenous components. 
Aeroengine production developed in the same manner.  
  With Soviet help and assistance, China was able to build a series of aircraft at 
their Nanjing Aircraft Manufacturing plant in 1954. Although the Chinese could not yet 
develop all the components indigenously, including the plane’s propeller, it still 
represented a milestone when it successfully copyied 18 Jacques CJ-5 trainers using 
Soviet parts.
227
 China was also able to replicate the MIG-17 using the drawings and 
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blueprints that it received from the Russians in 1954; their version of the aircraft was 
called the J-5.  In 1958, China produced a carbon copy of the Soviet 10-passenger 
Antonov An-2 biplane, which was powered by the Shevtic 750-hp Ash-21 piston engine 
until an upgraded Chinese version, the 1000-hp Soviet ASH-62 radial engine, was 
produced by the Chinese.
228
  China’s domestic version of the An-2 aircraft, the Y-5, was 
in production for over 10 years; hundreds were produced and used for passenger and 




Change in Strategy 
 China had been grateful for all of the assistance provided by the Russians, but 
during the late 1950s political turmoil erupted China when Mao Zedong set out to lead 
the country down a path toward self-sufficiency rather than remaining dependent on 
foreign help for economic development. Mao was bent on mass mobilization, beginning 
with the Great Leap Forward, where the proletariat served as the main source for 
innovation, which ultimately failed.  It placed stress-producing limits on the country’s 
scarce physical and material resources. This was the first sign of China’s seriousness in 
trying to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union.  There was a degree of pulling away 
from Soviet guidance and assistance beginning with the Great Leap Forward. It picked up  
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momentum overtime and ultimately led to Soviet withdrawal in 1960.
230
 
 Despite the rejection of everything foreign that permeated the country at that time, 
aircraft production was considered vital for national security, so it had been insulated 
from Maoist rhetoric. China and the Soviet Union signed their last two Sino-Soviet 
technical cooperation accords in August 1958 and February 1959, which was the main 
reason for why aviation remained productive during the midst of the Great Leap Forward. 
During these last 2 years of joint Sino-Soviet cooperation, China’s aircraft industry took a 
major leap forward, becoming relatively more sophisticated and complex.  
 The Russians granted the Chinese the licenses to produce the highly sophisticated 
Supersonic MIG-19 aircraft along with the state-of-the-art Klimov RD9B axial-flow 
turbojet engine at its Shenyang plant; they also supplied the Chinese with the Mil Mi-4 
Whirland helicopter, with its 1700-hp ShetovASH-82V 14- cylinder radial engine, at its 
Harbin plant.
231
 Such licenses clearly spelled out what components were needed and how 
to carefully assemble the aircraft. They didn’t explain the justification for each 
component’s use; therefore, the Chinese would be unable to advance the aircraft. 
 The Chinese were provided with massive assistance with the expansion and the 
spreading out of its aircraft industry deep into the nation’s interior. This was referred to 
as the Third Line Project and was considered deeply strategic because, in the event China 
was attacked by its capitalist adversaries, its plants would be scattered sufficiently across 
the country to remain virtually unharmed; this wouldn’t be the case if they were located 
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along the coast. The Russians also helped the Chinese build two large complexes in Xian 
and Chengdu, where the Chinese versions of the Tupolev Tu-16 medium bomber (the H-
G) and the MIG-21 fighter (F-8) were produced. The Russians provided over 20,000 
project documents, which contained information that it had acquired over several 
decades.
232
 All China was required to do was to pay for the cost for reproducing the 
documents, assistance; such assistance was unheard of in modern history. 
 
Path towards Self-Sufficiency 
 Understanding the limitations associated with acquiring knock-downs of Soviet 
aircraft, the Chinese sought to break the chain of dependency.  They began to emphasize 
the importance and relevance of studying science and technology, and determined to rely 
on its own experts and specialists, which is in line with what Porter advocates, in order 
take foster its economic development and meet the country’s most pressing and urgent 
needs. China allegedly plunged into a frenzied campaign of mass innovation and 
independent design adaption. While the campaign yielded no truly original designs, it at 
least served to build up engineering confidence. Students, instructors, and workers from 
various aeronautical institutes worked together to try to develop original Chinese design 
aircraft in 1958 and 1959. They produced dozens of different types of aircraft claimed to 
be of original design but actually were replicas of Soviet aircraft and engines.  It was a 
still a major accomplishment for the Chinese and a confidence booster because they were 
able to apply what they had learned in practice on their own. 
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 At the Shenyang Aeronautical Institute, Chinese engineers built the Chinko No.1 
in just 75 days. It was a prototype of the Soviet Yak-12, a general purpose monoplane 
powered by the Soviet Shvetov M-11FR radial engine. The Chinese also produced the 
Hiryu No.1, developed in Shanghai in 48 days; it was a seaplane version of the Yak-12 
and used the same Soviet engine.  The Heilungkiang No.1 was made in Harbin Aircraft 
Engineering College and was an agricultural crop-dusting version of, again, the Yak-12. 
The Yenan No.1, created by the Northwest Technological University in Xian, was also an 
exact replica of the Yak and also powered by the 260-hp Soviet Ivchenko Al-14R radial 
engine. The Peking Shou-tu capital No.1 was the most sophisticated of all of China’s 
copied planes, but it was a still a copy of the Soviet Anatov an-14 twin-engine light 
utility aircraft, built in just 68 days. Of all the planes produced at this time, only one, the 
Peking No.1, was mass-produced in the 1950s and 1960s.
233
 
 The Chinese were kept at bay since the Soviet Union offered little to no training 
in research development and aircraft design. They wanted to ensure that the Chinese 
would remain dependent upon them for technology and military hardware. The Russians 
would always negotiate with the Chinese from the more dominant, big-brother position, 
and China would be forced to take on more of a subservient role. The Russians wanted 
the Chinese to follow their lead in both domestic and world issues.    
 In keeping with this strategy, Chinese engineers and designers were forbidden 
from visiting or participating in the pioneering research conducted at leading Soviet 
Aeronautical Research Institutes such as TsAGI and TsIAM. These special institutes had 
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a virtual monopoly on all specialized and advanced scientists and equipment (wind 
tunnels, test rigs, etc.) capable of carrying out advanced designs, testing, and 
experimentation. Russian scientists would then provide their tried and proven findings in 
the form of designer handbooks to Chinese aircraft designers in the bureaus, who would 
then be responsible for executing those plans.
234
 The Chinese were not granted access to, 
nor did they have any contact with, the key Soviet airframe design bureaus such as that of 
Vladimir Klimov, whose aircraft and engines they were learning to build under license.
235
 
On this account, Chinese engineers were not prepared for independent design and 
development tasks that they might be called upon to meet in the 1960s. Only after the 
severing of ties between the Soviet Union and China in 1960 did the Chinese move 
forward with development on its own.  
 The Chinese set up a Military Science Academy under the Ministry of National 
Defense for purposes of conducting R&D for defense, which also included aircraft 
design. The academy did play a pivotal role in fostering independent design subsequent 
to the Soviet Union’s departure; however, because Mao prioritized being Red over being 
an expert during the 1960s, there was an overall rejection and downplaying of the 
importance of developing scientific and technical personnel for the economy, which 
retarded overall growth and overall development of aviation industry, including 
aeronautical design.  
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Soviet Departure Leads to Aviation Industry Stagnation 
 All of China’s plans with respect to reproducing advanced Soviet aircraft came to 
an abrupt end in 1960, when the latter withdrew 1,390 experts, opted out of 343 
contracts, and abandoned 257 scientific and technical projects. The Russians withdrew, 
not only their advanced equipment, machines, and tools from the national factory in 
Shenyang, but also the highly detailed blueprints they had provided the Chinese to 
reproduce the Mig-19.  For more than 3 years following the Soviet departure, virtually 
nothing of an aeronautical nature was produced in China, and the aircraft industry was in 
a state of shock and complete disarray.
236
  
 China was so completely dependent upon the Soviets for technology that a 
profound degree of helplessness settled in after the Russians left. However, given the 
level of production capability, and with its level and familiarity with aircraft technology 
the Chinese had obtained from the Russians over the previous decade, the nation was 
more than capable of resuming the production of the MIG-17. After the Russians 
departure, another contributing factor in the aviation industry’s stagnation was Mao’s 
apparent shift in priorities.  At that crucial moment, he diverted the country’s scarce 
resources (human and physical capital) from aircraft production toward its nuclear 
development program and rocket propulsion programs. 
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China’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons 
 By 1962, Mao set up three major production facilities for the development of a 
nuclear weapon. He created a uranium conversion plant, a 600-megawatt plutonium 
plant, and a gaseous diffusion plant near Lanzhou in Gansu province.
237
  The shift in 
priorities placed aircraft development behind that of nuclear weapon and rocket 
propulsion development.
238
  At the time, there was an intense competition over China’s 
limited resources between proponents of air force modernization and nuclear weaponry. 
Because fuel shortages had become a pressing issue, production of new aircraft ceased. 
The aviation industry, which had come out on the losing side of this competition, 
experienced a slow and dramatic decline, and industry morale fell to an all time low. 
 Yet, although the Russians withdrew equipment, personnel, and technology from 
China in 1960, they did not completely cut off all supplies. They did not want to destroy 
their relationship with the Chinese for fear that the latter might establish better relations 
with Western countries, through which a potential alliance could be formed to bring 
down the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Russians continued to provide critical parts, spare 
materials, and replacements when needed for China’s manufacturing machinery and 
equipment. Despite their differences, the Soviet Union provided the Chinese with two 
TU-16s (one in 1961, and another in 1964) and MIG 21 fighter aircraft with their 
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relatively powerful 13,000-lb thrust Tumanskii R-37f afterburner turbojet engines,
 239
 in 
the hope of dissuading them from establishing a new technological relationship with the 
West. 
  Though the Chinese were not granted permission to dissect both of these aircraft 
for reproduction, they did so anyway. Without the necessary blueprints and tooling once 
provided by the Russians, reproducing aircraft was not easy. However, after becoming 
familiar with the disassembled parts and with the Russian production system, the Chinese 
were able to successfully copy the TU-16 in 1963. The H-6 was the Chinese copy of that 
aircraft, abut they were able to produce it a rate of only one per month.
 240
 
  The Chinese began working on the MIG-21 in 1962. Not only was the aircraft 
highly sophisticated for the Chinese, so was its Tusmanskii turbojet engine, which was 
the main reason why they were only able to produce it in small numbers in 1969. The 
Chinese version of this plane was the J-7; it would not have its first test flight until April 
1970. The engine was quite difficult for the Chinese, considering they had relatively 
primitive metal-forming technology (forging, extrusion, precise casting) and materials 
technology (high-quality aluminum alloys, refractory metals, special steels) at their 
disposal. 
241
 By most international standards, this engine contained the technology of the 
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1950s, and China’s trouble producing it showed it was already more than a decade behind 
the most advanced engine technology of the West. 
 In 1964, after an approximately 4-year layoff, the MIG-19 resumed production at 
the National Aircraft Factory in Shenyang.  Instead of building the aircraft with Soviet 
components, the Chinese were able to do it using indigenous sources, naming the near-
carbon copy the F-6. China was able to produce this aircraft at high rate by 1965, thus 
allowing it to export the aircraft to Pakistan and Albania in 1966. 
 
China’s Acquisition of Foreign Civil Aircraft 
 When Soviet aircraft and spare deliveries declined sharply in the early 1960s, the 
Chinese became very interested in the acquisition of Western aircraft and modern turbine 
jet engine technology. China was aware of its technological backwardness and believed 
that, if it was able to procure modern aircraft and jet technology that would somehow 
bridge the gap between it and the West.  After China broke ties with the Soviet Union in 
1960, it was able to broker a deal with Britain when the two parties signed a contract on 
December 1961 for China to receive six Viscount aircraft at a cost of $5.6 million, and an 
additional $4 million for spare engine parts.  “The Viscounts became a real workhorse on 
medium range to long range domestic routes.”
242
 In 1965, the Chinese worked out 
another agreement with the British, with a purchase of two Herald 200 short-haul 
turboprop transports from the British Handley Page company. 
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 There were serious U.S. objections to these purchases and potential sales between 
European aircraft manufacturers and China. There was a fear that the Chinese would 
convert the civil aircraft to military use. Many European aircraft makers went on to 
ignore U.S. suspicion and brokered deals with the Chinese anyway. France was rewarded 
for opening diplomatic relations with the PRC’s purchase of 15 Aerospatiale Alourtte III 
helicopters with their 570-shp turbo artouste 3B turboshaft engines in March 1967.   
 
Jet Engine Technology 
 China’s vested interest in purchasing jet engine technology came after the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, when the PRC purchased its first pure jet transport 
from the Soviet Union. It acquired five sturdy I1yushin I1-62s, whose four-engine long-
range transport resembled the British VC-10. These planes were used for such long 
domestic routes as Beijing-Canton and as VIP flights abroad for their European routes. 
 While placing its order with the Soviet Union, China also purchased four used 
Hawker Siddeley HS-121 Trident 1 jet transports from Pakistan International Airlines 
(PIA). They particularly wanted this medium-range transport because it was powered by 
three state–of-the-art Rolls Royce Spey engines. Ever since they saw this model on 
display at a British exhibition in Beijing in 1964, they had pursued it. 
 The British were eager to sell their aircraft to all potential buyers, as their main 
airplane manufacturer, Hawker Siffley, was on the verge of bankruptcy. China 
understood this and took advantage of the ability to acquire state-of-the-art aircraft, 




company alive, guaranteeing that it would remain open until at least 1976.
243
 A 
relationship developed between China and Hawker Siffley and Rolls Royce that would 
result in long-term plans for advanced technology transfers for years to come.  
 After the forging of diplomatic relations in 1972 with the Americans, China 
acquired 10 Boeing aircraft (four B707-320B passenger planes, and six 707-320c 
convertible passenger cargo transports) to service its international routes. Additionally, 
the United Aircraft Corporation signed a $20-million contract for the sale of 40 spare 
Pratt and Whitney JT3D turbofan engines, which differed from normal international 
aviation procedures, in which the customary spares ratio is only about 25 percent of the 
order.
244
  The purchasing of additional spare parts had become common practice for the 
Chinese, to avoid being left without spare parts should their relationships with foreign 
suppliers go sour; they wanted to ensure they would not be in a position like they were 
after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.
245
 
 China’s purchases of foreign air transports and engine technology served two 
purposes: to have the opportunity to study, dissect, and reproduce advanced western 
aircraft; and to add them to its current fleet.
246
 However, China faced immense difficulty 
trying to replicate advanced Western aircraft because its technology vis-à-vis the West 
was at least 20 years behind. In fact, its technical-industrial ability in the 1970s was 
roughly comparable to that of the U.S., Western Europe, and the U.S.S.R in the mid-
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1950s. This was largely known to experts and scholars at the time, because the three 
aircraft that China was able to produce--the TU-16, the MIG 19, and the MIG 22--were 
all produced in the Soviet Union during the 1950s. The United States built the B-50, F-
86, and F-104, all possessing comparable technology to the Russian-built planes that had 
gone into production in the 1940s.
247
  
 Experts found the technological differences between China and the West 
extraordinary--they were at different levels when it came to aircraft design, fabricating 
skills, machining precision, materials application, etc. China was also unable on its own 
to develop a high-bypass turbofan engine required for supersonic planes. Considering the 
Chinese had not mastered the technologies of the 1970s, it would have been virtually 
impossible for them to replicate a state-of-the-art air transport. However, this did not stop 
them from trying.  They carefully dissected and studied the airframes, engines and 






 Porter’s model fails to consider is the shortcomings of acquiring production-based 
technologies from foreign nations and companies. There are also growing misconceptions 
among developing nations that rapid development can be achieved simply by adopting a 
deliberate policy for prototype copying. This process entails acquiring a model, 
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dissecting and analyzing it, and then attempting to replicate it.  However, if the engineer 
does not have access to the design or manufacturing data, he must attempt to recreate the 
basic blueprints, engineering drawings, and material specification with near-pinpoint 




 To devise adequate materials specifications, you have to conduct sophisticated 
metallurgical analysis, testing, and experimentation; after such testing, it is possible that 
the level of fabricating technique attained by the copier may not be adequate enough to 
duplicate the metal casting, forming, shaping, joining, and finishing operations to reach 
the necessary endurance, tolerances, dimensional accuracies, and critical weight 
distributions.
250
 It is important for the prototype to be at the same level of technological 
sophistication, with respect to design engineering fabrication, as the original. If the model 
is too advanced, reverse engineering becomes too difficult.   
 The ultimate goal when trying to reproduce an original design is to be able to 
produce it on a large scale, not merely make a single duplicate. But this requires the 
design standardization to achieve perfect interchangeability of parts and components, in 
order to achieve which one must have proper production tooling, plant layout, materials, 
etc.
251
 If the copier is successful at serially manufacturing the aircraft, all that it really 
demonstrates, all that has been learned, is that an existing design can be copied.  There 
has been no advance in the copier’s ability to design aircraft.  
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 A prototype describes the end result of the original designer’s choices: it does 
little to explain the reasoning or the rationale behind these choices. Every major design 
features a wing shape and a tail structure, or a rudder control surface, that are the 
outcome of a very large number of engineering compromises or trade-offs reached 
through a series of tests and experiments.
252
  The prototype copier must be able to 
reproduce the original designer’s calculations and investigations in order to learn how to 
improve on, or upgrade, a model; this is extremely difficult to do, especially if 
technological ability is not on par with that of the original producer. “Understanding the 
design so that the copier can ultimately improve upon it, means understanding and 
knowing why these compromises were made and how the trade-offs were arrived at.”
253
  
 The copier obtains this information from studying the finished product. This is 
why little progress with respect to the original design has been made in China. Once the 
model becomes obsolete, its technology and ability to produce aircraft will be stuck at 
that level. This provides further evidence for the failed attempt at the development of its 
Y-10. 
 
Prototype Copy and the Y-10 
  With, thus, little original design experience of its own, China originally planned 
to model its large passenger aircraft, the Y-10, after the H-6 bomber, the Chinese 
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imitation of the Soviet TU-16 made in 1963.
254
 However, its plans changed on December 
19, 1971, when a Pakistani-owned B707 practically crash-landed in Xinjiang. The 
Chinese referred to this crash landing as a “Gift from God,” because they suddenly had 
the opportunity to intensively study one of the world’s most advanced aircraft.
255
 
 Marshal Ye Jianying, along with 500 people, including engineers and scientists 
from over 32 departments, were sent to analyze the wreckage on January 13, 1972, to 
gather vital information that might be helpful for the development of its own indigenous 
large passenger transport, the “708 project.”
256
  The staff sent down included leading 
engineer Xiong Yan, who was responsible for gathering information related to the plane’s 
structural design and integration system that the Chinese could copy and incorporate into 
the Y-10,
257
 the first plane to be designed in accord with American airworthiness 
regulations and to use the Boeing 707 that it acquired from the crash as its model.  
 China’s leaders demanded that the Y-10 aircraft not be lower in quality than the 
707, so workers worked around the clock, including nights, weekends, and holidays.
258
 
They used the fallen 707 and its Pratt and Whitney engine to conduct experiments and 
                                                          
254
 Zuodi Zheng and Guoqiang Zhao. “Tragic Y-10-The Whole Story of the Development of Y-10,” (“Bei 
Qing Yun 10-Yun 10 Yan Zhi Shi Mo”), Aviation Archives, Vol. 6 (2005): 44, (Hang Kong Dang An, Vol. 
6 (2005): 44-51). 
 
255
 Ibid., p44-51. 
 
256
 Xitao Hu. The Construction and Development of China Aviation Industry: Classified: Insider 
Information, (Zhongguo Hangkong Shiye De Jianshe Yu Fazhan: Neibu Ziliao), Book consists of collection 
of reports for Government Officials and Party Leaders, 1997, (Benshu Baokuo Le Gei Zhengfu Guanyuan 
He Zhengdang Lingdaoren Baogao De Heji, 1997), p295. 
 
257
 Personal interview conducted with Shengwu Chen, Chief Engineer and Director of Sales at AVIC’s 
Chengdu Engine Co. Ltd on October 18, 2009. 
 
258
 Xiongxin Lou, Tale of Y-10 (Yunshi de Gushi), (Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Factory), (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2009), (Shanghai Feiji Zhizaochang, Shanghai: Shanghai 





test-measure every component, part, and criterion of plane, including the engine, against 
their prototype.  
 Ironically, the Chinese were soon also able to get their hands on an undamaged 
version of the B707 in the 1970s, when the Cultural Revolution was winding down. 
President Richard Nixon saw it as expedient to develop diplomatic relations with China 
to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The opening of diplomatic relations 
basically signaled the resumption of trade relations between the two nations that had been 
suspended for more than two decades. Shortly after Nixon’s visit, a deal was struck in 
which the Chinese would purchase 10 Boeing 707 aircraft. The Chinese saw this as an 
opportunity. not only to add the world’s most advanced aircraft to their fleet, but to study 
a version of a B707 that had not been damaged by a crash. 
  Boeing officials believe that a B707 was taken out of circulation sometime after 
the Chinese had received it in 1973 and that there was an attempt to reverse-engineer the 
plane to again help with their development of the Y-10.
259
  The Chinese attempted to 
carbon copy the plane in the same manner they had reproduced Soviet aircraft decades 
earlier.
260
   
 The Y-10’s structural design and system integration were almost identical to those 
of the Boeing 707, while the shape of the wings was copied from the British Trident, 
which China had purchased in 1975.
261
 The designers also managed to salvage parts from 
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the JT3D-7 engine they had removed from the downed airplane in Xinjiang, and some 
parts China had obtained when they purchased B707s in 1972 for replication; China’s 
engineers had studied the engine and made a poor imitation known as the WS-8.
262
  
Problems with Copying the JTD-3 Engine 
 Many problems, however, surfaced around the turbofan aeroengine; China had a 
lot of trouble reproducing advanced engine technology. Before it had access to the JTD-3 
Pratt and Whitney engine, it first attempted to copy the Rolls Royce Spey engine; 
however, it did not possess the technological capability, the expertise, or the skilled 
engineers capable of successfully duplicating the engine, and therefore had to stop the 
project.
263
 This did not stop the Chinese from trying to replicate the Pratt and Whitney 
engine when they had it in their possession. Unlike years earlier, when it tried to carbon 
copy the British engine, China was quite optimistic about replicating the JTD-3 engine, 
because the Y-10 was part of the national plan, through which the country allocated an 
exorbitant amount of resources, money, and equipment toward the project (more than 5 
million Yuan). 
   At first, China planned to use the Pratt and Whitney engine for testing the 
airplane, later to be replaced with their indigenous copy.
264
 Again, the Chinese found 
themselves unable to master the technology and therefore produced a poor-quality 
domestic copy. The engine leaked oil badly, a flaw their engineers were not skilled 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
262
 Ibid., pp44-51. 
263
 Personal interview conducted with Shengwu Chen, Chief Engineer and Director of Sales at AVIC’s 
Chengdu Engine Co. Ltd on October 18, 2009. 
 
264
 Xiongxin Lou, The Story of the Y-10 (Yunshi de Gushi), (Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Factory), 
(Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2009), (Shanghai Feiji Zhizaochang, Shanghai: 





enough to repair, so they discontinued making it.
265
 Instead, they decided to purchase 
brand-new foreign Pratt & Whitney turbofan engines.  
Problems with Prototype Copying the B707 
 Though China had the B707 to analyze, its technological sophistication was 
nowhere near the level of the technology embedded in the 707. Of the 435 parts needed 
for the Y-10, 305 had never been manufactured in China before.
266
 The overall structure 
of a complicated plane such as the B707 was above the technological ability of the 
engineers in China. Its technology lagged far behind Europe and America. The Chinese 
did try to compensate for what it was not familiar with by trying to replicate components 
using indigenous resources. However, the Chinese did not have the expertise, training or 
experience to do so. For example, they had to develop an aluminum alloy using 
indigenous sources but had limited experience developing such metal. This was a 
relatively new industry in China; they were able to make it but only in small amounts. 
China’s domestic factories could only produce 0.8 meters, while the industry’s standard 
requirement was 2.2 meters.
267
  The aluminum alloy the Chinese produced was also too 
thick, which increased the size and weight of the plane and resulted in high fuel 
consumption. 
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 The plane that the Chinese built was not economical; it was too heavy, too noisy, 
and required too much fuel while only able to fly within a limited range,
268
 reportedly 
only half an hour before having to refuel.
269
 There were also safety concerns; the plane’s 
heavy weight, along with a very small CG shift limiting, made it unsafe for civilian 
application.
270
 Yet, despite its many troubles, the Y-10 took its maiden flight on 
September 26, 1980, flying over Shanghai for 24 minutes. The test flight had been 
conducted though China lacked the equipment necessary to adequately test the safety of 
the plane in advance.  
  To ensure reliability, the Y-10 needed 163 tests, including 1,400 hours in the wind 
tunnel and static tests of fuselage damage, but this couldn’t be done adequately because 
the wind tunnels were too small.
 271
  Without adequately testing the plane, in addition to 
its technical problems, it was perceived as accident-prone, like many other planes built 
during the Cultural Revolution, when less attention was paid to quality than to quantity, 
resulting in a lot of unsafe and defective aircraft:  as many as 400 F-6 III’s manufactured 
in 1971 were recalled for repair because they had many accidents.
272
 They were also not 
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adequately tested before leaving the factory. The Y-10 was discontinued in 1985. It 
would have been unwise to allow a Chinese official to fly on a plane that was deemed 
unsafe. 
 
FIRM STRATEGY STRUCTURE AND RIVALRY 
 The fourth determinant mentioned in Porter’s model for gaining a competitive 
advantage in industry is associated with the context in which firms are organized, 
managed, and compete with one another (rivalry).
273
 A firm’s competition plays a role in 
influencing and motivating it to innovate or offer products with new features to satisfy 
market demand or produce existing products more cheaply by developing scale 
economies.  How efficient a firm is at gaining an advantage over its competitors is largely 
determined by how suitable its organizational structure is for competing and adapting to 
market demands. A firm’s competiveness can be determined by how well it can motivate 
its employees to meet company objectives.  
 Porter’s Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry force us to pay attention to China’s 
rigid planning system and lead us to understand many of the inherent deficiencies it has 
in developing, maintaining, and sustaining an industry.  Decisions were made at the apex 
of the rigid top-down systems while the free market virtually played no role. Worker 
motivation was lacking, because they were paid and given welfare benefits that were 
guaranteed and not based on work performance. This was especially problematic when 
competition was lacking, which further encouraged stagnation. 
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 China’s aviation manufacturing was controlled through a hierarchical system. At 
the request and direction of the Party Politburo, the State Planning Commission (SPC) 
would draw up production targets and planned schedules for the Ministry of Aviation and 
Military groups to meet. Due to the complexities of the aviation industry, the SPC would 
have to ensure that industries from unrelated fields such as metallurgy, electronics, and 
petroleum were able to supply the needed resources of the aviation industry set in the 
plan within a given budget.  They would also have to make sure that factories were 
supplied such utilities as electricity, water, and other infrastructure from local 
governments.
274
 Aviation factories did play a major role in local economies because they 
employed so many people and tended to be significantly larger than other factories. The 
MAI was responsible for managing the bureaus and factories and had to ensure that they 
follow through, so the assigned task was completed.   
The MAI shared its factories and facilities with equal- ranking military 
organizations within the army, navy, and air force; production of military aircraft and 
hardware took precedence over civil aviation, for it was considered crucial for purposes 
of national security. At nearly every factory, military personnel maintained an active 
presence, even though they were more actively involved in research and development and 
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design aspects of the production cycle.
275
 More attention and resources were devoted to 
military aircraft than anything else. 
The Ministry of Aviation Industry was divided up into sub-ministerial 
departments or bureaus, which included the Aircraft Bureau, Engine Bureau, Quality 
Bureau, etc.
276
 These bureaus were assigned and delegated responsibilities by the MAI 
and were placed in control of the factories under their jurisdiction. For example, the 
Engine Bureau was in charge of all of the engine factories, while the Aircraft Bureau 
controlled all of the airframe factories.
277
 The Quality Bureau had the authority to 
exercise quality control across all of the factories. The MAI was responsible, not only for 
appointing all bureau chiefs, who also had to be party members, but for coordinating all 




Factory directors were also Party members usually appointed by the MAI; 
however, if the factory’s work was considered important for the national interest, they 
would be appointed by the central government or military leaders.
279
 Each bureau chief 
and factory director, at times the same person, carried out the plan assigned to them and 
also made sure that their subordinate factories had the necessary resources to complete 
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All senior members of the industry were held high ranking and import state positions in the party, 
government and military-often all at the same time. 
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assigned tasks. Even though factories may have had their own style of management, they 
did not have much autonomy, nor did they yield much influence over the process, as they 
were responsible for carrying out the production targets assigned to them by their 
respective bureaus, which was where decision making actually occurred.  
Factories did not have an individual identity; they were often referred to by the 
number assigned to the factory. For example, Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Factory was 
known as 122. Numbers were assigned to factories to shield the actual activities of 
factories from non-insiders. The process was very secretive because work related to 
national security was done at these factories.  Every aspect of the free market, including 
individuality, was removed from the process.  
 
The Structure of the Service Side of the Industry 
 As far as the service side of the industry, the CAAC was originally created in 
1954 to handle all responsibilities related to civilian air transport, including making 
decisions on the purchasing of foreign aircraft, the construction of new airports, the 
volume of daily aircraft departures, and the designing of airline routes. Like the 
manufacturing side of the industry, the system was run hierarchically from the part elites 
at the apex to the Central Military Commission or the State Council, all the way down to 
the CAAC’s bureaus and factories. Most of the CAAC’s decisions, regarding aircraft 
acquisition of foreign aircraft were heavily influenced by party elites and were made in 
consultation with the central government in accordance with the State Planning 




 The CAAC was also responsible for scheduling daily flights and routes in China. 
However, it remained difficult for example to predict if there would be enough demand 
for the number of flights scheduled daily. It wasn’t wise for the CAAC to order a bureau 
to run 1,000 flights between Shanghai and Beijing per year at 20 flights per day, because 
there was no way of knowing if there would be enough demand or freight to support this 
forward planning.
280
 Such planning could have resulted in many flights being empty. 
 To run civilian air service operations, planning forward was thus of little use, and 
the administrative system had to be more flexible with its scheduling. There was very 
little to no profit to speak of because air travel was only a luxury for high-ranking 
government officials who, most of the time, did not pay for their air tickets. Chinese 
citizens were not allowed to fly unless they had special permission from the government. 
Business was conducted without the free market playing any role. As far as how many 
aircraft the aviation manufacturing side of the industry needed to produce for the air 
service side or how many flights should the air service side offer to civilian passengers 
and specific routes and their frequencies were based on administrative conjecture and 
speculation. Many of those estimations, along with the industry’s lack of flexibility, made 
the service side of the industry highly inefficient and inadequate, producing many 
shortages and bottlenecks.  
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Shortcomings of the planned system 
 As Porter correctly notes, there are major deficiencies within a system that lacks 
competition. Without it, firms and enterprises are not going to organize in a suitable way 
conducive to competing with rivals. The Chinese system during the Mao era contained 
many inconsistencies that emanated from the workings of the economic planning system. 
In such a system, a unit such as factory would receive a production quota that it was 
expected to meet from its upper bureaucratic superior, which could be a provincial 
government department, a bureau, a ministry, and even the state planning commission 
itself. The factory was given a certain amount of resources to produce the amount of the 
product its superiors had requested.  
There were a host of problems associated with this system in terms of efficiency.  
The large and powerful bureaucracies were so far removed from knowing the exact 
amount of resources subordinates needed to meet their target that shortages often 
occurred, leading to factory failures to meet targets. Also, teams of administrators were 
responsible for keeping statistical records and were in charge of overseeing the factories 
to make sure they were doing what they were told. However, these production teams 
were not often familiar with the subordinate factory’s supply chain and with whether the 
inputs they needed were in abundance or in short supply. They were not even sure if 
factories could receive what they needed to complete orders they received from above.
281
 
“Without extensive administrative coordination and communication, bureaucratic 
decision makers could not know how much their subordinate factories were able to 
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produce and how much they should produce.”
282
 The administrators did not know who 
the end users of the product were or their desires and needs. Not only was the planning 
system a difficult task, but the work staff lacked any sort of motivation to work hard. 
These system inefficiencies often led to massive shortages. 
 
State-Run Enterprises   
The success of the Planning System was highly dependent on the workers 
employed at the State-Run Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs were originally established to 
restore damage to a suffering economy. It was a way in which the top leaders of the 
country maintained direct control over it. Through this process they would be able to lead 
and guide the developmental process. However, the production targets set by officials 
through the planning system were often not met, partly because worker motivation and 
productivity were low. The Danwei system guaranteed lifetime employment to workers 
and cadres regardless of work performance or productivity. This encouraged laziness and 
a lack of incentive to work hard.  
Workers in the Danwei system were also entitled to a comprehensive welfare 
packages known as “iron rice bowl,” offering egalitarian wages, health insurance, 
housing, education for their children, hospital services, and retirement packages, etc. 
These benefit packages were offered mainly because wages at the plant were so low that 
the government had to supplement workers’ incomes with these welfare packages.
283
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There was also a tradition of occupational inheritance known as “dingti,” through which 
employees who would soon retire could pass on their jobs and their Danwei services to 
their sons or daughters. State-run enterprises were required to foot the total cost of 
lifetime social services for all of their employees and retired employees. “The State-
owned enterprises ate from the big iron pot of the state and the members of the Danwei 
from the big iron pot of the State Owned Enterprise.
284
  
The Danwei system in essence created a high level of social dependency on the 
state. The government was also able to exercise high levels of control over the individual.  
Workers were restricted to the enterprise for which they were employed and were 
forbidden to seek employment elsewhere.  Any thought of departure would lead to a 
suspension or revocation their existing Danwei services.   
The Danwei was highly inefficient in its execution and produced poor-quality 
products. Because the government was responsible under this system to provide jobs to 
the populace, many State Run enterprises and factories were overcrowded. In fact, State 
Run Enterprises in 1980 employed 80 percent of all workers in the urban labor force.
285
  
People would come to work having nothing to do. One reporter observed the workers at 
the Guilin Silk Factory. When the journalist walked into the factory, three female 
workers were chatting with three other female colleagues. When the workers noticed the 
journalist had walked in the room, they went back to their seats. In the several minutes 
that he stayed, only one actually worked. Several days later, he returned to the factory 
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and interviewed some of the employees; nobody knew exactly what their job 
responsibilities were or how much they should produce each day. Chinese workers 
viewed their jobs as a right rather than an opportunity. The Guilin factory had 2,500 
workers, and not one had ever been fired.
286
 It was highly inefficient.  
Another report was published on a home-appliance enterprise in Qingdao, also 
indicating the lack of motivation and incentive on the part of the Chinese to be productive 
at work.  A journalist observed the factory for several weeks and noticed that, if the vice 
general manager didn’t come to work, none of the employees would stay more than an 
hour. People would come to work at 8 a.m. and would leave be by 9 a.m. If you had 
dropped a bomb on that factory at 10 a.m., nobody would have been hurt. The work 
environment was anything but professional, as employees treated the corner of the 
enterprise as a place to relieve themselves. When the vice general manager issued a rule 
forbidding such behavior, employees still urinated in the corner. There was no fear of 
being fired or reprimanded for doing inappropriate things. The reporter also noticed that 
if the employees didn’t leave work early, they would instead drink alcohol, play cards, 
and smoke with their colleagues during designated work hours.
287
 
Another journalist who observed the Chongqing steel factory found that there was 
a machine still in operation that was over 140 years old. Factory hardly upgraded their 
equipment under this hierarchical system. The reporter asked the head of the factory if 
there was something wrong with the age of the piece of equipment. He was told, no, the 
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machine was of good quality, so it was in still in use.
288
 Government officials were not 
privy to knowing how factories actually functioned. Workers cared little about production 




Y-10 STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND RIVALRY 
Mao encouraged the development of an indigenous civilian aircraft though he had 
little knowledge of whether China had the technological capacity to produce state-of-the-
art aircraft. Many of the intellectuals and scholars who were able to make such a 
determination had been forced into penal camps, jailed, or tortured as a result of the 
Cultural Revolution and the Hundred Flowers campaign. Decisions were made by leaders 
instead of technicians and experts.
290
  
The project was financed solely by the central government, without holding any 
department or administrative bureaucracy accountable for its success or failure. There 
was not a clear delineation of responsibility between and among departments, and the 
main department traditionally responsible for aircraft development, the Ministry of 
Aviation (MAI), wasn’t placed in charge of the entire operation. It was the Shanghai 
government who was assigned the responsibility.  
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The department, equipped with experts and technicians in position to make an 
accurate assessment as to whether China possessed such capability to build an indigenous 
aircraft, was ignored. In fact, the MAI believed that the project was a bad idea. The MAI 
understood that China lacked adequate design experience, and that the aircraft industry 
had developed a culture of reproducing aircraft that it had received from the Soviet 
Union.
 291
  Manufacturing had been more important throughout China’s aviation history 
than design. It took blueprints and licenses from the Russians and, with their help, was 
able to produce military aircraft. The MAI had little confidence in China’s ability to 
develop a modern indigenous airliner on its own.  
Even though the most competent department in China for aviation, the MAI 
opposed the Y10 project it was deeply offended when Mao Zedong assigned the 
Shanghai government the responsibility to centrally manage this project. Since the project 
was not under its jurisdiction, and the responsibility was believed to have been somehow 
taken away, the Third Ministry of Machine Building was accused of not working as well 
as it could have given the responsibility it was delegated by the central government.
292
 
Every department had its own interest; if the plane was to be successful, they wanted 
credit. Less attention was paid to the benefit of the country as a whole than to the  
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Y-10’s Organization and Structure 
 In 1970, Mao openly decided that the development of the Y-10 plane should take 
place in Shanghai because of its strong industrial base, which also included a strong ship-
building industry and many modern factories.
294
  Shanghai’s long, rich history of 
producing military aircraft had convinced Mao that it made it a good candidate for the 
production of the large indigenous civil aircraft transport.  
Immediately after Mao expressed his desire for the development of a large 
passenger aircraft, the Shanghai government, along with the Air Force developed a 
proposal for the building of its first commercial indigenous aircraft for the approval of the 
Central Military Commission and the State Council.  It required the approval of both 
branches because the military controlled the majority of factories, facilities, equipment, 
and technology needed to build an aircraft. The military was also needed to execute the 
plan that would be devised. The State Council, however, was responsible for coordinating 
and organizing the many departments and factories.  
The State Council also controlled the aviation-related enterprises, bureaus, and 
factories, institutes under the Third Ministry of Machine Building, which was important 
for aircraft design and the research and development aspect of the project. The 1973 
                                                          
293
  Xitao Hu. The Construction and Development of China Aviation Industry: Classified: Insider 
Information, (Zhongguo Hangkong Shiye De Jianshe Yu Fazhan: Neibu Ziliao), Book consists of a 
collection of reports for Government Officials and Party Leaders, 1997, (Benshu Baokuo Le Gei Zhengfu 
Guanyuan He Zhengdang Lingdaoren Baogao De Heji, 1997), pp200,356-358. 
 
294
 Feng Lu, “China's Large Aircraft Development Strategy Research Report, (zhongguo Dafeiji Fazhan 





document proposal presented to the State Council and the Central Military Commission 
laid out the management structure of this project. This document, in very broad strokes, 
delineated the responsibilities of the main parties involved and their assignments with 





The Shanghai government was responsible for the overall management of the 
project.  Therefore, on July 28, 1970, the central government handed the 5703 Air force 
factory to Shanghai, because it had state-of-the-art technology and equipment needed to 
manufacture the aircraft; they also had use of the military airport to conduct test 
flights.
296
 The official assembly of the aircraft would also take place in the 5703 aircraft 
factory. Shanghai had to organize the manufacturing and assembly of the aircraft. The 
engine was also to be built in the Shanghai automotive enclosure factory. The Shanghai 
Aerospace Equipment Factory produced the landing gear. The Y-10 Shanghai Aviation 
Electric Appliance Factory also produced parts of the landing gear, and nearly 300 
subordinated factories, institutes, colleges, and military units, and over 10 ministries, 
participated in research and manufacture of Y10.
297
 
The Third Ministry of Machine Building, under the authority of the State Council, 
was responsible for creating innovative technology required for the project. It was placed 
in charge of managing and organizing the research and development aspect of the project, 
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which included aircraft design. The MMB3 consisted of over 172 factories, 420 factory 
research departments, and 6 colleges, which also housed 605 research units.  
The project, however, could not have been executed without the use of military 
equipment, engineers, and facilities. The Third Ministry coordinated with the military for 
use of its equipment and facilities. Factories were often divided between the Air Force 
and the MMB3, with the former always given priority because of its importance to 
national security. The military had great experience, having manufactured and produced 
many aircraft in China. The Third Ministry for Machine Building was held responsible 
for organizing the various departments and factories, especially those factories that were 
controlled by local and provincial governments outside the Shanghai jurisdiction. For 
example they had to coordinate local and provincial governments, who were needed for 
providing electricity and other important utilities necessary for aircraft manufacturing and 
assembly. 
The State Planning Commission was responsible for creating a budget outlining 
how resources, equipment, and money would be allocated among the various 
departments, bureaus, and factories involved in the process.  It was keenly aware of how 
much money could be spent on this project and how to best meet Mao’s goal of 
developing China’s first large commercial aircraft. The State Planning Commission, in 
1973, first projected a budget of over 150 million Yuan, which was initially approved by 
both the State Council and the Central Military Commission.
298
  In 1974, the State 
Council approved the SPC’s request ordering the CAAC to arrange for the shipment of a 
B707, pilot, and ground crew, maintenance personnel, and technicians, to Shanghai for 
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research purposes. The approved budget called for the Ministry of Metallurgy to send 
metal-cutting machine tools, 31 different kinds of bearings, 90 forgings large non-ferrous 
and ferrous metals, 25 kinds of large-scale forgings, and 236 non-standard non-ferrous 
metal and 54 non-standard profile plates, to Shanghai.
299
  
By the mid-1980s, the total cost of the project amounted to over 200 million 
Yuan; the new budget, created by the State Planning Commission and approved by the 
Military and the State Council, allocated nearly 117.514 million Yuan, which amounts to 
about 66.02 percent of the entire investment, to infrastructure that was yet to be 
developed in China and necessary for the building of an indigenous aircraft; instead, such 
a large scale project should have been investing more than half of its financial resources 
in product development and technological innovation. In the budget, 66.057 million Yuan 
was allocated to the building of the Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing factory, of which 
28.848 million was used for construction, and 37.209 million on equipment needed to 
manufacturer and assemble the plane; 7.39 million Yuan was needed for the Shanghai 
Aviation Electricity Factory, with 3.299 million earmarked for construction and 4.64 
million for equipment for the nose gear and main landing gear of the aircraft; 36.811 
million Yuan was needed for rebuilding the airport for testing the aircraft, and 6.708 
million for building the Shanghai Electric Tools factory.
300
  
According to many official Chinese sources, the Central Military Commission 
allegedly played a small role in managing the project; however, it was heavily involved 
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in decision making, including budget approval and the execution of the plan.
301
 Given 
that most aircraft developed since the founding of the People’s Republic of China were 
military in nature, they had a proven track record of being able to manufacture aircraft. 
The military factories also contained China’s most advanced facilities and machine 
technology, required for executing the plan. It was better aware of what was within the 
realm of possibility and what was not.   
 
Design 
Leaders within the Air Force, Shanghai, and the MMB3 held several meetings in 
the early 1970s to determine which design would be chosen for their indigenous aircraft. 
On July 28, 1970, they decided to model their aircraft after the H-6 plane, a prototype of 
the Russian Tu-16 but with slight and partial modifications.
302
  The plane was expected to 
house three or four engines, have a range of 5,000 kilometers, and able to fly 10,000 
meters high at a speed of 1,000 kilometers per hour. In order to meet the requirements of 
the plane, the Air Force, and the Third Ministry of Machine Building, under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, sent the first batch of 150 engineers in 1970 along 
with hundreds of skilled technical personnel to the Shanghai Aircraft Research Institute 
(in 1978, this institute was renamed the 708 Institute, after the project) to map out the 
design for this plane. 
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After the initial model decision, a team of engineers led by Xiong Yan and Wang 
Ke-Qing spent 40 days developing a high-speed and low-speed hair model of the 
dimensions and requirements decided by the three groups in Beijing to test to see if the 
design was feasible; they developed a 1:1 prototype in wood and soon realized, in 1971, 
that a prototype of the H-6 would not meet the requirements laid out by the Air Force, 
Shanghai, and MMB3.
303
 Therefore, design engineers had to develop a different design 
for the plane if China wanted to realize its dream of developing an indigenous aircraft.   
On April 21, the Air Force became aware of the design problems and believed 
that, if a new design had to be created, it should be from scratch and not based on a 
previously produced aircraft. It should, however, meet the world standard. The Air Force 
proposed a higher requirement for the plane in 1971; the MMB3 had a different opinion. 
The Third Ministry believed that China’s abilities were not at the world standard and 
therefore should not aim so high. 
When various disputes arose between two different agencies and a compromise is 
not reached, the issue was taken to superiors in the respective agencies or in the Party.
304
  
After much discussion among higher-ups in the Party Committee of the air force and the 
CAAC, a compromise was reached.  In January 1972, the design of a new model began 
with the approval of the State Planning Commission, the State Council, and the CMC. At 
this meeting, it was decided that the aircraft’s performance should be no less than the 
current world standard. The practical range of the aircraft should be around 7,000 
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kilometers, and that it should possess a cruising speed of 900 kilometers per hour or more 
to reach the aircraft ceiling of more than 12,000 meters.
305
  
The plane was expected to fly this distance mainly at the request of Zhou Enlai, 
because he wanted to be able to fly direct from Beijing to Tirana, Albania, which was 
considered the Communist lighthouse of Europe. China maintained good relations with 
that nation and therefore wanted a plane capable of flying there non-stop, because other 




Shortly after the meeting among the three departments, the design team met to 
discuss the preliminary design standards for the plane. The team agreed on developing a 
plane with four-wing hanging 8-Turbofan engine programs. 
307
 To meet this requirement, 
China’s overall design plan and strategy for the aircraft had to change. In the past, it had 
used Soviet aircraft design specifications.  Chinese aircraft design had been blindly 
following the Soviet methods of standards since 1953. Chief engineer Ma Feng Shan said 
outright that they ought to follow the American international FAR25 standard.  Some 
engineers believed that the Russian standard should be followed because of its 
familiarity, but this view was quickly dismissed because Russian standards lacked 
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precision and often led to the development of an aircraft that was too overweight, making 
the plane less economical and efficient.  The Soviet method was viewed as imprecise.
308
  
After much discussion, the design team decided to make the plane in accordance 
with United States transport aircraft airworthiness standard FAR-25. The design team 
decided that its aircraft would be based on the Boeing 707, which it had in its possession 
since the Xinjiang crash. They would attempt to copy it by way of dissecting it, studying 
it, and then reverse engineering it. The United Kingdom’s Trident, and Russian aircraft, 
would be used as references if needed. This was the first time in history that China would 
design a plane according to Western standards and requirements. It was believed that, if 
the specifications for airworthiness were followed, they could better regulate the weight 
of the aircraft and better ensure safety.  In the process of following FAR standards, China 
was able for the first time to develop 147 useful technologies, including 35 winners of 
significant Chinese scientific achievement awards.
309
 It received a lot of help from the 
fallen B707. Many of these technologies were learned when Marshal Ye Jianying and his 
team dissected and analyzed that plane over a period of 3 months. 
 
Motivation 
The country’s best and brightest engineers, technicians, and personnel were 
invited to partake in the Y-10 project. At the start of the project, aviation facilities were in 
poor condition, lacking adequate infrastructure and basic technologies. Workers such as 
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Fang Xiu Zheng did not even have a calculator or other essential equipment to perform 
basic tasks.
310
 He even had to invent small stuff, like pens to draw up blueprints. 
Researchers, technicians, and engineers worked in dining halls, because the labs and 
other research facilities were so poor.   
Despite these poor working conditions, highly respected engineers remained 
highly motivated, because they saw it as an honor to serve their country; they took great 
pride in the fact that their country’s leaders had great confidence in them and had called 
upon them to participate in a project considered important for the nation’s development 
and national security. In a society that had stamped out capitalist tendencies, money was 
not considered a motivating factor, especially for the people associated with the project. 
Ideology and rhetoric were very strong during Mao’s tenure. Society valued those who 
contributed to the country. The most admirable occupations were soldiering, engineering, 
and the sciences, not commerce or business.  Those who contributed to the greater good 
of the country, and more specifically the Revolution, were held in the highest regard.
311
  
The engineers and scientists who designed the plane were so passionate about 
having national officials trust their abilities that they often worked around the clock, 
including weekends and holidays.
312
  On the other hand, workers and laborers who made 
up the largest population among those involved in developing the Y-10 felt less of an 
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allegiance to the project; they were part of the Danwei system. They were not 
encouraged, and lacked motivation to work hard. There was a great disconnect between 
them and the project.  Regardless of their work performance, they were guaranteed 
employment for life and were recipients of social services.  With the delineation of 
responsibility between and among factories and departments blurred, if a job or a task 
wasn’t completed, hardly anyone was held accountable.  
 
The Cancellation of the Y-10 Project 
Approximately 10 years after the start of the project, despite inadequately testing 
the plane to ensure its safety, the Y-10 carried out its test flight in Shanghai on September 
26, 1980, with no Chinese leaders in attendance. One vice-minister of the Ministry of 
Aviation said to the Deputy Director of the Shanghai Aviation office Wang Yunxiang: 
“this plane can’t fly.”
313
 Why did the ministry of aviation have a negative opinion of the 
Y-10 project when it was a matter of national pride?  First, the Y-10 was out of the 
Ministry of Aviation’s jurisdiction. Mao’s decision to go ahead with the project and 
assign the task of management and supervision of the project to the Shanghai government 
deeply offended the Ministry of Aviation. Secondly, against the advice of the Ministry of 
Aviation, the Y-10 had followed a degree of self- innovation and design.  
There were several reasons for why the Y-10 was canceled, however the Chinese 
government predominately blames the CAAC for its termination. In January 1981, the 
CAAC stated that it would not purchase the Y-10 aircraft, and this virtually forced the Y-
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10 out of the market.
314
 The Civil Aviation Department in China said that there was no 
need to buy it because they had enough airplanes and did not anticipate buying new ones 
anytime soon. In reality, between 1981 and 1985, China had purchased many planes from 
Boeing.
315
 Secondly, the CAAC declared due to a lack of adequate testing and the 
reputation associated with airplanes built during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 
the Y-10 was considered unsafe; many planes that were built during the Cultural 
Revolution had serious structural and engine defects and also had malfunctions. 
316
 The 
CAAC had concluded, just as the MAI had years earlier, that China lacked the expertise 
and modern technology to build its own airplane. 
Director of the CAAC Shen Tu issued two reports to the State Council in 1981 
conveying these points. In the first report, he said that the plane faced severe 
technological problems and was uneconomical; it would not be an asset to the 
commercial aircraft industry.
317
 In the second report, he wrote that the Y-10 was a poor 
copy of the B707. China would not need the Y-10 because it had already bought 10 
Boeing 707s in 1972.  By the time the Y-10 prototype was first flown, debate had 
surfaced about who would want to fly a plane that was based on a 30-year-old design.  
The CAAC, which already owned a modest Western fleet, would not purchase the plane 
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when it was able to purchase 737s with modern technology if needed. This happened at a 
time when China was beginning to embrace trade with the West. Also, no one wanted to 
take chances with flying China’s leaders on a plane that was not deemed safe. 
Consequently, Director Shen Tu was arrested in 1985 and charged with 
attempting to sabotage the Y-10 project, after the Chinese government allegedly 
absconded secret documents showing that the CIA had organized a secret meeting at 
which the Boeing company bribed Shen Tu with money if he would help bring down the 
the Y-10.
318
 It was allegedly believed that if the Y-10 were successful, American aircraft 
manufacturers could be potentially shut out of the market. 
Despite all of the departmental differences, another reason for the cancellation of 
the Y-10 that surfaced in the media was due to a lack of funding. The government 
claimed that China’s resources, such as steel, petroleum, electricity, and money, were 
needed for more urgent projects. It might strke people as odd that the project was 
canceled because of 30 million Yuan when the government already invested over 
5,377,537 Yuan and that, when funding ceased by 1980, Shanghai had provided 29 
million Yuan.
319
 The engineers were already 65 percent done with their third Y-10 plane 
and believed that, with an additional 30 million Yuan, the technological and structural  
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problems could be corrected.
320
 However in October 1982, the Ministry of Finance 
argued that it would be foolish to put another 30 million Yuan into a large-scale project 
when there were no customers remotely interested in the plane.   
In reality, while all of the reasons mentioned played a role in the cancellation of 
the Y-10, the main reason was because the political climate had changed. The Y-10 took 
on new dimension as the project came to be seen as a political rather than technical 
failure. The central government changed leadership and policy. Deng Xiaoping, one of 
many Chinese officials formerly sent to the countryside for reeducation, had become 
China’s next leader. He, along with other Cultural Revolution intellectuals and officials 
who had purged during the CR, were soon reinstated. They detested anything remotely 
associated with the Cultural Revolution and advocated terminating more than 100 
projects that had begun during that time. The political winds began to blow in a totally 
different direction after the death of Mao Zedong.  
When the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the Chinese people had soon 
become aware of the untold damage it had wreaked upon the country, particularly the 
economy and the government. Mao’s revolutionary policies began to fall seriously out of 
favor with the Chinese people. Leaders started distancing themselves from projects that 
had been launched during the Cultural Revolution, particularly the Y-10 project, in order 
to preserve their own political careers.
321
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No Chinese officials wanted to be associated with any of those people or leaders 
whose names were associated with the revolution, including Wang Hongwen, a Gang of 
Four member and strong advocate and supporter of the continuation of the Cultural 
Revolution even after Mao’s death in 1976.
322
 Wang Hongwen had been heavily involved 
in organizing the Y-10 project, as he held the position of Party Secretary in Shanghai 
when the Y-10 was being developed.  Some might even say it was his baby. No 
governmental officials attended the ceremonies, for fear of being connected to him.
323
  
 Wang and the other Gang of Four members wound up taking the brunt of the 
blame for the Cultural Revolution’s lack of economic success and for the millions of 
Chinese officials, experts, and intellectuals tortured, killed, imprisoned, or sent to the 
countryside. Since the government could not denounce Mao because of his success in 
fighting off foreign imperialists and founding the PRC, guilt was pinned on these four. 
Wang Hongwen was arrested for his participation in the so-called attempt to usurp power 
after Mao’s death in October 1976. He was tried, convicted, and received life 
imprisonment.  The Y-10 suffered in consequence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the path to developing a successful high-tech industry is for a firm to 
develop a technologically advanced product and sell enough of it to develop scale 
economies, which affords the firm the ability to sell more cheaply than its competitors. 
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The predatory state, under Mao Zedong, stifled China’s ability, not only to develop a 
large commercial airliner, but to do so competitively. Not only was private enterprise and 
the market economy abolished under the PRC, the predatory system favored rule of man 
over rule of law. In the absence of a market economy, decisions were made from the top 
down, indicating that officials knew what was best for individuals and society as a whole. 
Along with rooting out capitalism, desire and societal demand is lost, which would 
otherwise emerge naturally through the workings of a free market. Under the predatory 
system, there was limited incentive to create products that people wanted and needed, 
simply because there was no monetary reward or prestige associated with being 
innovative. Decisions about what direction the country ought to take were made by the 
government elite. The state, through its role of demiurge, relied on its bureaucracies to 
carry out the development process, and it was responsible for developing industry. 
 While Peter Evans’s framework is crucial for helping us understand China’s 
limitations and policy choices (demiurge and custodial) available for developing industry 
under the predatory state, Michael Porter’s determinant model guides us through the 
important societal variables that China was unable to develop and therefore failed to 
build an indigenous aircraft.  
   The decision to launch the Y-10 project was not based on projections of great 
demand that would emerge over the next decade, but on the desire of the upper echelon 
of elites to travel abroad in an indigenous aircraft as a matter of national pride.  There 
was no demand in China for air travel in the early 1970s, as people barely had enough to 
survive on a salary of 605 Yuan per year. Travel by air was not even an afterthought in 




satisfy a demand or a niche in a growing market.  As Porter correctly notes and is visible 
in the Chinese case, without a natural demand, no enterprise or company can work in 
close collaboration with airlines to create a product to satisfy the existing customer base 
and to attract new business. Naturally, products improve over time, after the customer 
base alerts firms to shortcomings in the current product or features that ought to be added 
to improve the overall product. 
  Technology advances as firms develop and look to acquire new solutions to 
address current problems, and if there is no perceived need for a new application, there is 
no motivation to produce or continuously improve a product to better meet customer or 
market needs.
324
  This part of the process will be virtually absent without a demand for 
aircraft travel. Also, producing enough planes to develop economies was unrealistic in 
the case of the Y-10 considering that the majority of Chinese people during and after the 
Cultural Revolution were looking merely to survive rather than to engage in luxurious 
travel. 
 In order for a state to satisfy a potential niche in the market, according to Porter’s 
factor condition variable, it must continuously develop and upgrade its pool of highly 
skilled and specialized scientists, engineers, and infrastructure.  Under China’s predatory 
state, educational policy oscillated back and forth between the moderates and the 
conservatives on the question of whether to train experts and intellectuals to develop the 
economy, or to offer all citizens a rudimentary education in the belief that on-the-job 
training would provide them with the skills needed to better develop the economy. The 
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tug-of-war between the two camps delivered a severe blow to the education system and 
the training of experts and intellectuals in society. For years, experts and scholars were 
mistreated and considered opponents of the revolution. Thousands were jailed, tortured or 
killed, or sent to the countryside to be re-educated. Many intellectuals were forbidden to 
do individual research for fear that it wasn’t egalitarian in nature. Generations of scholars 
and intellectuals were unable to carry out their research and participate in developing the 
economy through their knowledge and expertise. This further exacerbated China’s 
condition, because scientists and engineers were needed to advance China’s technology, 
which this was vital for the current and future success of the Chinese economy. 
  During the Cultural Revolution, universities were closed for years, and when they 
did reopen, those most loyal to the revolution, regardless of their prior educational 
background, were chosen.  Those most deserving of a college education were frequently 
passed over, and most of the people accepted were peasants just beyond a primary 
education. This further exacerbated China’s condition, because, without a strong 
emphasis on science and technology, it would be nearly impossible for the country to 
innovate and either pioneer technology or meet the world standard.  All of this worked 
against the development of a competitive aircraft. Though Porter’s model doesn’t specify 
a numerical quantity of trained and specialized scientists and engineers a state needs to 
develop and sustain an industry, it doesn’t present a problem in this case, due to the 
number of intellectuals removed from their posts, jailed, or killed.   
 China’s inability to design an aircraft on its own was partially the result of the 
loss of a generation of scholars, intellectuals, and students who had been denied the 




the time of the founding of the PRC were forced into blindly accepting the help of the 
Soviet Union. Porter argues against completely relying on foreign suppliers of 
technology.  His model advocates that firms rely on domestic suppliers and related 
industries because they are more likely to share technology and production processes 
beneficial to developing a competitive advantage.  
 What Porter’s supporting and related industries variable doesn’t discuss is the 
importance of the different types of technology and knowledge that a firm can gain from 
working with other suppliers and industries in manufacturing and design. The Russians 
provided the Chinese with blueprints, technology, and equipment for imitating and 
copying their aircraft. The Chinese relied so heavily on imitation and copy that they had 
limited to no experience designing aircraft. The importance of being able to design 
aircraft, in establishing an aircraft industry, cannot be understated.  
 This technical information by the Russians was useful for imitation and 
duplication; it was useful for copying but it only teaches the skills of manufacturing and 
assembling. Without the ability to design, you are left able only to develop an aircraft 
containing the technology you were given without the knowledge or the ability to go 
beyond, because you lack an understanding of the structural reasons the aircraft was 
made in the way it was. Being unable to design an original aircraft makes it difficult to 
create a competitive product. Porter does mention, however, the importance of being able 
to continuously improve and develop new products, which leads one to believe he 
stresses the importance in being able to acquire technological know-how needed to 




  Porter does note that no nation, for the sake of its own security, would give away 
its secrets or tacit knowledge of to develop its most technologically advanced 
components.
325
 Therefore it was imperative that China develop a platform for developing 
an indigenous technological capability, or it would always remain years behind the most 
technologically advanced nations.  
 Porter’s Structure, Rivalry and Organization variable clearly shows the 
importance of the free market and how firms organize and strategize in a way that 
maximizes their ability to compete with its rivals. Conversely, the organizational system 
set up in China mirrored the Soviet system.  It discouraged factory workers from 
performing at optimal levels. The Danwei system provided lifetime employment and 
health benefits unrelated to work performance. As long as such a system is in place and 
factories are often overstaffed, there is limited incentive to work hard. People were not 
judged or criticized for how well and what they produce.  There was therefore less of a 
desire to create or devise strategies or new ways to perform jobs more efficiently. 
Managers, all the way down to the factory workers, had limited incentive to perform at 
optimal levels because their jobs were guaranteed for life.  
 The development of a large civilian aircraft is technologically complex and 
demands the highest quality standards; successfully developing an advanced aircraft 
requires a major commitment, not only from the engineers designing the aircraft but the 
factory workers as well. Large aircraft development involves thousands of different types 
of parts and complex product systems to integrate a large number of techniques, sub-
systems, and every single item of technology has its own specific nature and particular 
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progress in the track.
326
 Without such a commitment, the success of the project is 
unlikely, and with it the development of a competitive airliner with pioneering 
technology. Furthermore, the hierarchical system set in place was largely inefficient at 
meeting assigned tasks as there was no clear delineation of responsibility, resulting mass 
duplication and a waste of scarce resources.   
  The lesson of the Y-10 is that, if China wants to develop a large aircraft program, 
it must break with its traditional system and introduce a new organization schematic, 
focusing on a system favoring the bottom-up rather than the top-down principle as both 
Evans and Porter advocate. From the onset, a clear strategy, detailing the large aircraft 
program’s objectives and the way forward to achieving them through its new bottom-
organizing principles, is the way through which the country will not be doomed to 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE C-919 AIRCRAFT 
The creation of the intermediate state in China has been credited to Deng 
Xiaoping, who put China on a path toward both political and economical reform. China’s 
new direction was designed to correct the failed economic policies of Mao Zedong and to 
further restore faith in the Chinese Communist Party. The new system that was created, 
which developed slowly over time, blends the essential features of a liberal market 
economy with authoritarian rule. The state has grown to respect private property and to 
promote competition to a limited degree while, at the same time, ensuring that the 
Communist Party maintains a firm grip over society by censoring the media, silencing 
political opposition, picking and choosing firms to become national champions in select 
industries, and executing grave human rights violations.
328
  
While many scholars are quick to tout these major changes that have taken place 
over the last 30 years as a model for other developing countries to emulate because of the 
country’s rapid economic growth, most of the changes implemented by the party were not 
planned in advance but were responses to potential crises that could potentially have 
threatened or jeopardized the one-party rule system created in 1949. These incremental 
changes were in line with Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “Cross the River while Feeling the 
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Rocks,” under which the Party has been tweaking and refining its institutions so as to 
produce great economic growth and to assert greater control over the populace, which 
both would reduce the chances of any potential threat to its rule from being realized.
329
   
China continued to devote much of its attention to economic development 
because the Party’s continued existence is predicated upon improving the quality of life 
for its people. The government has embarked on a nationwide strategy for meeting the 
demands of the next phase of development, indigenous innovation.  In China’s Medium 
and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), the 
guidelines were set for channeling 2.5 percent of the nation’s total GDP toward research 
and development in areas of strategic importance for future economic development and 
national security.
330
 The government listed the development of an indigenous large 
passenger aircraft as one of those 16 key pillars industries for China’s continued growth. 
 
THE INTERMEDIATE STATE UNDER DENG 
The intermediate state, as described by Peter Evans, is one that maintains a degree 
of both autonomy and embeddedness but at times falls prey to an imbalance that can take 
the form of excessive clientelism or isolated autonomy.
331
 The state appears to possess 
autonomy and embeddness but has a tendency to disrupt that balance, thus complicating 
the developmental process because the degree of autonomy and embeddedness have not 
been fully legitimized within the state. The intermediate state is plagued by 
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inconsistencies; it often reverts to solving problems in ways with which it is most 
familiar. China beginning under Deng Xiaoping began to exhibit the characteristics of the 
intermediate state. 
         Deng set the stage for great economic development that would span three decades 
by establishing precedent and introducing the country to the rule of law; China, however, 
still cannot be classified as an embedded and autonomous developmental state; though at 
times, it possesses those characteristics, it has on many occasions been overly 
autonomous, making it an intermediate state. China grew at an annual rate of about 10 
percent for more than 30 years because of the changes it made beginning in the late 1970s 
toward a socialist market economy. It transitioned from a nation that placed a premium 
on serving the state before the individual to valuing individual interest over the collective 
under Deng. “The state’s role in production was gradually curtailed and reliance on 




 The state introduced a legal system that recognized private ownership and 
contracts. These reforms did diminish the state’s importance and capacity, but by no 
means did they eliminate its ability to influence outcomes. Market forces did, 
nevertheless, play a greater role in the economy.  “Despite China witnessing a degree of 
market liberalization, political liberalization did not occur at the same pace. They lagged 
consistently behind economic reform.”
333
 The state asserted its authority while casting 
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rule of law aside in various ways, which included the Tiananmen Square crackdown and 
its quest to nationalize private firms and force them to merge with State-owned 
enterprises.  
 The Tiananmen Square massacre on June 4, 1989, for example, showed how 
China’s reputable leaders would circumvent established law and precedent and call upon 
its military to end nonviolent student protests by the use of force. The soldiers were 
instructed to fire on the students who were gathered at the square in the name of a modest 
form of democratic reform. The protesters were interested in rooting out corruption and 
opening the channels of communication between students and party officials within the 
state structure. It was estimated that as many as 2,000 students were killed that day so 
that order could be restored.  Proper procedure was casted aside as Deng Xiaoping and 
other party elders, who did not hold Politburo positions at the time, made the decision to 
begin firing on the students.
334
 This resulted in widespread condemnation, which 
included the imposition of sanctions, some of which are still in place today. Because of 
this incident, the U.S. issued a ban on the selling of certain arms to China.  
A recent incident in which the state took advantage of a growing crisis occurred at 
the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. The Chinese government pumped about $1.5 
trillion into SOEs, resulting in major bankruptcies of private enterprises.
 335
 It became 
increasingly difficult for private firms to compete with SOEs possessing unlimited capital 
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during troubled economic times. By eliminating private firms or forcing them to merge 
with State-owned enterprises, national firms would be in a better position to compete 
with foreign enterprises on a global scale. Without domestic competition, national firms 
would profit immensely by exploiting the large domestic market, giving them the 
opportunity to develop scale economies and channel profit toward research and 
development. “Many of China's State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have grown into giants, 
eclipsing the relatively young, private companies that have contributed heavily to the 
country's progress.”
336
 In 2008 alone, more than 300,000 small and medium-sized firms 
either closed down or merged with State-owned enterprises.   
 The government also showed a blatant disrespect for private property in Shaanxi 
province when it forcefully took over many small firms because they violated state 
environmental regulations within 1 year.
337
 Even though some coal-miner operators had 
implemented the environmental standards required by the state, they were still forced to 
sell their businesses to the state at a rate of 30 percent less than they were actually 
worth.
338
 The Chinese government, has on various occasions bypassed the rule of law and 
asserted its authority, which has been predatory in nature. Without the respect for rule of 
law, entrepreneurs are discouraged from investing their money in projects when the state 
does not provide a stable set of rules which make returns on investment predictable. 
Under the current situation, firms have to be wary of governmental takeover.  
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ROLES PLAYED: DEMIURGE, CUSTODIAN, MIDWIFE AND HUSBANDRY 
 The intermediate state having the characteristics of both the predatory state and 
the developmental state utilizes at times all four policy roles mentioned in Peter Evans’s 
framework. The Chinese intermediate state espouses the demiurge and custodial roles 
with respect to the launching of its large commercial aircraft because of its importance to 
national security and economic development. Innovative technologies are known to 
emanate from the development of commercial aircraft that could potentially spillover to 
other sectors of the economy and the military. Since the industry is naturally driven 
toward a monopoly, the Chinese government will not allow any private whether foreign 
or domestic firms to exploit China lucrative market. Over the next 20 years China’s 
demand for large aircraft will constitute nearly 25% of the world’s total demand 
Allowing private enterprise to enter such strategic industries are believed to create 
situations where personal greed can trump the interests of the country.  Private firms 
could not only exploit the nation’s scarce resources but they could  potentially refuse to 
share its innovative technology with other sectors of the economy or the military if they 
feel it is not in their best interest. Private interest often runs counter to that of public 
interest or national security; therefore, it would prevent private firms from entering such 
industries.
339
   
China does, however, espouse the midwifery by inviting foreign firms and capital 
to help develop aircraft subsystems, parts and components that their domestic enterprises 
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are not able to produce indigenously.  The Chinese government offers incentives, 
including reserving a degree of the Chinese market for the foreign firm’s products in 
exchange for entering into joint-venture arrangements with its state-owned. Once the 
foreign firm commits to entering a venture with the Chinese, the government may play 
the husbandry role by offering tax credits and allocating money toward the venture’s 
research and development. These ventures are especially important for the Chinese 
because they gain access to world class manufacturing technology and infrastructure in 
addition to learning western managerial practices. These foreign companies are also 
welcomed because they employ many local people.  
 
DEMAND FOR THE C-919 
 
Passenger Traffic 
 On May 11, 2008, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), a 
limited-liability company, was created to manage and oversee the development of its 
indigenous large passenger aircraft, the C919. The corporation was primarily created to 
satisfying China’s growing demand for large passenger aircraft over the next two 
decades. China’s domestic passenger volume grew at an astounding rate of 16.5 percent 
between 1976 and 2008; air passenger traffic jumped from 2.31 million people in 1978 to 
192.5 million in 2008.
340
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     Since China’s economy is expected to grow at its current annual rate of 9 percent over 
the next two decades, China’s air passenger traffic is also expected to continue to grow at 
a steady annual rate of 16.5 percent--we can expect more than 770 million passengers to 
travel by air in 2020. This would pay huge dividends for China if it is able to successfully 
manufacture an indigenous passenger aircraft. China will require over 3,560 airplanes (as 
revealed in the regression model below) with more than 60 percent in the 190-seat range 
worth $340 billion over the next 20 years.
341
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The slope of the line for the number of large passenger aircraft is 18. In 2007, the number 
of planes increased by 124 from the previous year. The regression chart predicted that, in 
2008, there would be an increase of 142 (124+18), and that, by the end of 2010, it would 
rise to 178. We can then assume that the increase each year is fixed at 178; therefore, 
over the next 20 years, the total demand will be 178×20=3560. 
 
Cargo and Freight Traffic 
 China today has the world’s second-largest cargo market, right behind the U.S. In 




















staggering 4.07 million, increasing by 14.5 percent annually.
342
 With the expectation that 
China’s economy will continue to grow at an annual rate of 9 percent, we can project that 
cargo will also continue to grow at 14.5 percent annually; we can then forecast that, by 
2020, cargo will exceed 12.7 million tons; it is reasonable to assume that China will be 






Reform as a Catalyst for Demand 
This surging demand, which will literally require China to quadruple its fleet over 
the next two decades, can be attributed to the success of China’s reform beginning with 
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Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations, consisting of paying special attention to certain 
sectors of the economy: agriculture, science and technology, industry, and national 
defense. Politics and ideology became less important than the overall development of the 
country. Market reform was also introduced by allowing small-scale private interest the 
ability to pursue its material desire by operating alongside, and to a limited degree 
competing with, the state sector in a system previously dominated and ordered around the 
principles of a command economy.
344
  For the most part, newly established private firms 
competed in small- scale industries, while the large, bloated State-owned enterprises, 
continued to monopolize, the large-scale industrial sectors.  As long as private firms did 
not grow so big that they can significantly affect market outcomes in sectors deemed vital 




Allowing private firms to form and compete in the market against SOEs exposed 
the weaknesses of these government-owned firms. “The competitive market is one of the 
most important external forces that discipline a firm and force it to become more 
efficient.”
346
 This level of competition revealed how poorly managed State-owned 
enterprises actually were. For example, it was often unclear for employees in such 
enterprises to know who they had to answer to. Were they directly responsible to their 
superiors in the vertical state bureaucratic system or to their superiors under the local 
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bureaucratic system? Having to answer to their superiors in both groups led to mass 
confusion, as one group would often contradict the other. Enterprise managers and other 
employees often complained that they had too many mothers-in-law claiming a share of 
the property and responsibility of the SOE.
347
  Enterprise rights were not clear. 
During the 1980s the government started to shift SOE orientation toward 
profitability, and since many of these state- owned enterprises were operating at a loss 
and were not considered vital to the function of the economy, they were allowed to go out 
of business or to be completely or partially sold off in the market.  New laws began to 
surface protecting private property and the rights of both buyers and sellers when 
transactions took place. The introduction of a Property Rights law in 1994 led to a 
reduction in the overall number of SOEs and an increase in both jointly owned firms and 
privately owned firms. The number of State-owned enterprises fell to 21,300 in 2008 
from 102,200 in 1994 as a result of the campaign known as “grasping the large and 
letting the small go.”
348
 The government was mainly concerned with holding onto large 
enterprises that were important for national security and economic development. They 
included energy, telecommunications, and natural resources.
349
 With foreign and local 
businesses having entered the picture, consumers could choose between products that 
were made by private businesses and those made by the state; there was a more diverse 
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environment.  By 1998 approximately 95 percent of industrial goods and services were 
traded in the market.
350
 
In 1975, before the reform period began, 81 percent of all industrial output was 
produced by State-owned enterprises, with collectively owned firms managing only 18.9 
percent, leaving private industry at 0.1 percent. By 1998, SOEs only produced 49.63 
percent of total industrial output while collectively owned constituted 19.46 percent and 
individually owned 30.91 percent.
351
  China’s State-owned enterprises in 2008 accounted 
for 28 percent of total industrial output, while collectively owned consumed 1.76 percent 
and private and individual enterprise taking 70.24 percent, indicating a significant decline 
in SOE contribution to industrial output.
352
 As China remained committed the principles 
of the market, incentive and motivation grew among private firms to increase production 
and produce better-quality items that consumers demanded. As firms continued to sell 
their products, they looked to expand, thus hiring more people, who would then earn 
money, enabling them to purchase more goods, thus contributing to the overall growth of 
the economy. In 1978 401.52 million people were employed in China; that number 
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Open Door Policy 
Beginning in 1978, China opened its doors to other nations, allowing them access 
to its large, virtually untapped markets. Foreign trade corporations and external trade 
channels popped up all over the country and revenue was generated as a result of foreign 
direct investment; it became an important component of the domestic economy. Before 
the 1970s, most of China’s foreign trade was mainly between countries of Eastern 
European and the Soviet Union.  In 1978, foreign trade was approximately 9.8 percent of 
China’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP); it skyrocketed to 30.4 percent in 1990 and 
35.2 percent in 1996.
354
  The open door policy has integrated China into the global 
economy, introducing it to some of the world’s finest products, managerial techniques, 
and technology. China became the largest importer of foreign capital between 1992 and 
1995, receiving 42 percent of all foreign direct investment going to developing countries  
round the world.
355
 The stock of FDI in China rose to a record high of $92.4 billion in  
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 Over 46 percent of this money went towards industrial manufacturing.
357
   
With a greater number of Chinese people employed thanks to market reform and 
foreign direct investment, the quality of life among Chinese citizens improved 
immensely. Along with such improvements in the quality of life is a desire for material 
goods and enhanced comfort, especially when traveling. In 1985 the average disposable 
income for a city resident went from 653.62 Yuan (approximately $222) to 13,231 Yuan 
(approximately $1,945) in 2008 (see appendix B-1).
358
 More Chinese during their 
national holiday have traveled by plane than ever before, demonstrating the rise in 
income and life quality. In 2009, during the 7-day National Holiday, 5.89 million people 
traveled by air, an 18 percent increase compared to 2008.
359
  The development of an 
indigenous airliner will satisfy this growing demand. 
  
C-919: FACTOR CONDITIONS 
Porter’s model stresses the importance of a merit-based and competitive education 
system for bringing the best out in students. A nation must make a commitment, not only 
to invest in its factor conditions, but to reinvest in or continuously upgrade their quality 
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 Understanding this, Deng Xiaoping introduced a merit-based 
educational system in order to close gap with the West and for China to transition to 
high-income nation status.  He understood that, for China to become a great world power, 
it must rely on future generations of intellectuals and experts who could create and 
develop advanced technology, which would in turn facilitate great economic 
development and trigger a higher living standard for the Chinese people. Even though 
China today has the second largest economy in the world, the living standard of its people 
is still relatively low compared to those of the world’s most advanced countries; its per 
capita income equates to $3,000, less than 10 percent of that of the United States and the 
European Union.
361
 With this in mind, Deng re-instituted the merit-based system in order 
to attract the best students into college, who in the future would be capable of making a 
valuable contribution to the economic development of the country.  
 
Merit-Based System  
  The “GaoKao,” (高考) a college examination equivalent to the SAT through 
which colleges select high school graduates based upon their scores in comparison to 
other students, was reintroduced in 1977. That year alone, 5.7 million students took the 
exam, and 270,000 students, a total of 4.7 percent of all test takers, were admitted into  
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college, demonstrating the competitiveness of the admissions process.
362
  Universities 
began recruiting students based on merit after a nearly 12-year hiatus. Prior to these 
changes, only select students demonstrating a strong commitment to revolutionary goals 
had an opportunity to pursue higher education.   
From 1976 to 2007, over 60 million students took the “GaoKao” (高考) exam, 
with only one-sixth of that number entering college, demonstrating just how fierce the 
competition is to get into college.
363
 However, in recent years, the odds of getting into 
college have dramatically improved. In 2007, for example, there were 10.1 million 
students taking the college entrance exam, with 5.67 million (approximately 56 percent) 
entering college.
364
   
 Many students still face the harsh reality that they may not get accepted into 
college, so they spend most of their adolescence preparing for the exam. It is not 
knowledge that is most in demand but test-taking strategies that play a larger role in 
Chinese society. If students do not score high enough to get admitted into college and still 
wish to attend college, they must repeat the last year of high school in order to retest the 
following year. Some students are fortunate to come from wealthy families and bypass 
the GaoKao exam (高考) and study abroad. Still, many students with high GaoKao (高考
) scores may wish to study abroad in pursuit of a higher quality of education than they 
would receive in China; the higher education system in China has many deficiencies.  
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While Porter’s model emphasizes the importance of having a high-quality and 
competitive education system that will train its intellectuals, scientists, and engineers to 
be creative and innovative in order to create a world-class economy, he doesn’t 
specifically provide a detailed blueprint of the kind of education conducive to such 
development. Although he does mention the importance of nation of to continually invest 
in upgrading its factor conditions, but exactly how to do so is absent.   
 China’s higher education system has hardly produced world-class scholars and 
experts who have consistently made valuable and innovative contributions to the 
world.
365
 There have been very few Chinese Nobel Prize laureates in the last century. 
Recognizing the sharp differences in educational quality between China and the West, 
between 1978 and 2008 more than 1.39 million Chinese students went abroad for further 




These students do not come back for several reasons. The most prominent is that 
there are better opportunities to earn a higher salary and enjoy a better quality of life in 
the West than if they returned to China. The starting yearly salary for students abroad in 
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American is approximately $40,000, compared to 10,000 ($1,510) Yuan in China.
367
  
Someone with a college degree living in the West is likely to earn eight times more than 
he or she would in China, even though the cost of living is four times that of China.  
 Also, students who are intellectually curious are likely to stay in the countries 
where they studied because they have the ability to conduct research and carry on their 
work using state-of-the-art facilities and equipment; they may also have the opportunity 
to work with some of the world’s leading scholars in their respective fields; this is not 
available in China, and, with the censoring of the internet, accessing pertinent 
information for their research may be troublesome. Others do not return because they 
admire the American healthcare system, considered the best in the world.
368
   
Students are more likely to return to China during times of economic crisis--
100,000 of the total number of students returning to China came back last year because of 
the financial crisis, up 56 percent from 2007.
369
 Most students coming back have either 
had trouble finding employment in the country where they studied or had good career 
prospects or jobs lined up before they left China. 
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Engineers and Scientists 
Since the year 2000, there has been great cause for alarm in the West as China has 
been graduating more than 600,000 engineers annually, twelve times the number reached 
in the United States (70,000).
 370   
Contrary to what many scholars think, there is less 
cause for concern than might be imagined, especially when we look at the differences in 
educational quality between engineers trained in China and those trained in the West. 
China’s educational system exhibits clear-cut deficiencies in the system that discourage 
and stifle student innovativeness and creativity. A nation that doesn’t focus on training 
students to think creatively is less likely to produce technologically advanced goods and 
services.  
  The Chinese educational system overemphasizes the importance of knowledge 
rather than understanding the productive system that lies behind creating it.
371
 The system 
prioritizes memorization over reasoning. Students become capable of storing and 
spreading knowledge but don’t have the ability to create it. Academia is not interested in 
getting its students to explore deeper questions of philosophical thought for 
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understanding and explaining the world; it is more focused on teaching practical 
information to deal with world realities.
372
  
But philosophical thought is an important component of education, which ought 
not to be primarily concerned with mere factual information but focus on how and why 
knowledge is and was created. The Chinese educational system trains its students to be 
experts; there is a huge difference between experts and scholars.
373
 The former are 
limited to knowing empirical information related to fields of study. Their focus tends to 
be narrow and is not interdisciplinary in nature. The latter are primarily concerned with 
understanding and explaining knowledge and how it was arrived at, for the purpose of 
creating new knowledge; they seek to create generalities, or law-like regularities, with 
applications beyond the scope of their study; they seek to make the world more 
intelligible, so as to improve life quality. This is one reason why China has been less 
creative and innovative than its American counterparts over the past 100 years.
374
 
Critical and analytical thinking today takes a back seat to expertise mainly 
because many of the professors themselves are a product of the China’s education 
system. Chinese professors do not, for example, clearly understand the difference 
between the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Many believe they are doing Social 
Science research when they are in fact doing Humanities.
375
  Scholars in China 
predominately publish articles and books that are descriptive rather than theoretical in 
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nature, hindering the possibility of reaching beyond the narrow confines of their study. 
Chinese scholars also don’t adhere to a strict academic standard like those in the west. 
Academia in China is known for plagiarism, cheating, and falsified academic works.
376
  
Cheating is clearly pervasive when International Relations Professor Jiangyong, 
of Qinghua University, had to make announcements on several occasions, during the 
course of the semester, to graduate students in his Analysis of International Strategy class 
promising that, if students wrote a publishable final paper, he would not take credit for 
the work and publish it under his own name.
377
 He also mentioned on a regular basis that 
Qinghua now has very expensive computer software that can detect plagiarism and 
warned his students not to try it.
378
 Announcements of that sort lead one to believe that 
academic integrity in China clearly leaves something to be desired. 
 
Culture and Education 
Inherently absent from Porter’s model, which is important for understanding why 
the Chinese lack creative ability, is the Confucian culture. The Confucian Philosophy 
provides for the ethical and moral foundation governing social relationships for 
maintaining social harmony and order in society. In order to achieve these goals, the 
Confucian tradition places a strong emphasis on hierarchical relationships where 
individuals completely subject themselves to the complete subordination and respect for 
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 For example, a son must commit to the unquestioned obedience of his 
father, a wife to her husband, and an employee to his boss. Confucianism guides and 
dictates how individuals behave toward others of similar or different ranking in social 
hierarchies.  
The Confucian culture is believed to be a major driving force for why the Chinese 
have not been creative or innovative, which is especially important for the aviation 
industry. Within the Confucian culture, students must never challenge and always respect 
their teachers. Teachers control what students learn and how they learn it. Seeking out 
information independently or exploring intellectual curiosity is frowned upon and is a 
violation of the traditional cultural norms of Confucianism. This denies students natural 
freedom of expression and a sense of individuality.
380
 Students are not expected to 
actively think out problems and employ their critical and analytical thinking skills for 
problem solving. For example, even if a teacher commits an error while working out a 
mathematical equation on the board, students would not dare to speak out, for fear the 
teacher might lose face, or “mianzi” (面子), or feel embarrassed. It is important to be 
aware of one’s place in society. If one point’s out the teacher’s mistake, that person 
would be stepping out of line; they would not be adhering to the strict hierarchical order 
that, to some degree, still persists in China: Children must respect their teachers as a 
higher authority.  
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While voicing differences of opinion in a college classroom is frowned upon in 
China, it is encouraged in the United States. America is widely known to have the best 
higher-education system in the world. It attributes its success largely to ethnic, cultural, 
and racial diversity, for this improves the quality of a student’s overall educational 
experience. Students with unique experiences and diverse backgrounds will share their 
views and opinions in class and will open the minds of other students in one of two ways: 
either what they say will change their minds by introducing them to a line of thinking 
(perspective), or evidence, they haven’t considered before, or it will force them to think 
deeply and critically to defend their own positions in the light of criticism. This element 
of education is largely missing in China. Classroom discussions and debates sharpen 
one’s critical thinking and analytical abilities in the West. In China, a typical class is 
taught by the teacher straight out of a book.
381
 Information that is conveyed is hardly ever 
challenged or opened for discussion, and is often accepted as scientific fact rather than a 
scholarly viewpoint. 
Unlike the Chinese education system, there is a greater emphasis in independent 
thought and reasoning in the American system; for example, it is very common, after a 
lecture, for students to be asked to grapple with course materials; they are expected to 
independently formulate opinions, either for writing research papers or for preparing 
class presentations. In China, independent thought and creativity are stifled.  
The Chinese educational system leans towards conformity mainly because the 
system is test centered. Teachers in primary, middle, or high school, or even in college, 
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are trained to teach students how to score high on exams rather than emphasize the 
importance of learning. If students were to offer their opinions in class, they could expect 
their teachers to point out that their opinions do not matter because they will not appear 
on the test, so they needn’t waste their time thinking about such opinions, but rather draw 
the conclusions that the teacher wants them to draw, so they can score high on the exam. 
In fact, at every level of their education, exams will determine whether they have 
mastered enough of the material to go on to the next level. If a student doesn’t score high 




Most students in China must decide within their first or second year of high 
school whether they will choose a career in the natural sciences or the social sciences; 
their education will then primarily follow the track they have chosen, with limited 
exposure to the discipline they didn’t choose. They would take the GaoKao (高考) either 
following a natural science or social science track. In the United States, students are 
required to take a multitude of classes within both the social science and natural science 
tracks. It is very difficult for children 15 years of age to decide on a career path when 
they haven’t taken enough classes in different disciplines, or had enough life experiences, 
to determine where their passions lie. It is common for parents in China, by contrast, to 
choose the career path their child will take.  
It is also extremely difficult in China to change a major once it has been decided 




of study. Students have little experience taking classes in a range of other fields, as their 
American counterparts do who are trained in a system that tries, not just to create experts 
in a given field, but students who are learned and well-rounded. Creative inspiration 
partly comes from piecing together and drawing information from unrelated fields, which 
often results in coming up with something entirely new, an element missing from the 
entire Chinese education system. 
These limitations are not problematic for job seekers after graduation. Unlike 
Americans, who seek to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge in college to succeed 
and find jobs in the fields of study, it is known among college students in China that, if 
you don’t have any interest in furthering your education beyond the undergraduate level, 
doing the bare minimum to earn your degree is sufficient, because it is the reputation of 
the university you’ve graduated from that will get you the job; your own your individual 
skills and abilities count for much less.
382
   
In fact, many Chinese students do not see the limitations in the education system 
within their respective fields or disciplines as a major problem, because many students, 
after graduation and regardless of their majors, aspire to work in government-affiliated 
jobs. They value job security and benefits over a higher salary that could be taken away 
should the economy take a turn for the worse.
383
  State-owned enterprises rank first, 
because they are more stable and provide medical insurance and pensions for their 
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employees. During economic crises, private enterprises and joint ventures may cut jobs, 
as they have done in amid the current global financial crisis. SOEs, however, often 
expand during rough times as the government tries to assert greater control over the 
economy. “Number of applicants for 2010 national civil service exam reached 1.46 
million people which is 16 times the number in 2003.”
384
  
 Obtaining a job in a State-owned enterprise seems to be very popular, as 34.1 
percent of college graduates choose to work in SOEs; 23 percent of college graduates 
seek to pursue a career in foreign-invested enterprises, 17.5 percent in joint ventures, and 
another 25 percent choose public institutions, private enterprises, or non-for-profit 
organizations.
385
 There is less of a desire to be innovative or creative in a State-owned 
enterprise, because there is never a threat that the enterprise will go out of business. 
Private enterprises need to sell their products in order to profit to stay in business.  
 
The 863 Program 
The shortcomings of China’s educational system have resulted in a lack of 
creativity and innovativeness on the part of its professionals. Still to date, the Chinese 
have had a hard time producing state-of-the-art advanced technologies and acquiring 
technologies that certain countries refuse to sell to because of fear that they might make 
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their way into China’s military.  In order to get around these shortcomings, China 
launched the 863 program, followed by the 968 program, designed to trigger indigenous 
innovation.  Not only has Porter’s model shown us why China has not produced world-
class intellectuals and scholars, it also directs our attention to understanding why its 
national research programs have not been successful. Research programs were not chosen 
on their merits but on what advanced the careers of low- to mid-level government 
officials. Therefore, a lot of money, talent, and resources were channeled to unproductive 
areas of the economy. The projects that the country could have benefitted from were 
largely ignored. This led to the country’s scholars and experts creating research projects 
that satisfied the interests of bureaucrats rather than what the country really needed.
 In 1986, four prominent scientists--Wang Daheng, Wang Ganchang, Yang Jiachi, 
and Chen Fangyun--who were all previously involved in China’s strategic weapons 
program wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping suggesting that China develop a national 
indigenous technology program to keep pace with the rapid technological development 
taking place around the world. In 1983, for example, the United States had already begun 
work on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); an inter-government initiative was formed 
among European nations called EURICA of Europe, which formulated a Comprehensive 
Outline of Science and Technology Progress for the year 2000; at the same time, Japan 
launched policies for the promotion of science and technology over a 10-year period.
386
 
All these programs had impacted the growth and the development of technology 
throughout the world. 
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In order to reduce the growing technological gap between China and foreign 
countries, Deng responded to the scientists’ letter by approving a strategic national 
science and technology program.  This high-technology research development program 
became known as the 863 Program, with the government channeling 10 billion RMB into 
seven key fields: biotechnology, space technology, information, lasers, automation, 
energy, and new materials; these fields were further divided into 15 subfields, with each 
having a chief scientist and a committee of experts who were responsible for organizing, 
selecting projects and participants, and allocating funds.
387
  
 Since the main goal of the 863 program was to keep pace over the next 15 years 
with the rest of the world in technological development, and to strive for scientific 
breakthroughs wherever possible,
388
 it was imperative to attract China’s best and 
brightest scientists nationwide to work on critical projects related to the development of 
the national economy and the military. Some of the critical projects undertaken by 
scientists included high temperature, superconductivity, non-linear science, important 
chemical problems in life process, and brain function and its cell and molecular basis.
389
 
Complementing the 863 program, the 973 program was established in 1998 with the 
creation of the State Basic Research and Development Program, which would support 
interdisciplinary scientific research endeavors.  
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The program originally called for the channeling of 2.5 billion RMB ($300 
million) over 5 years, 1998-2002, to projects falling within six categories relevant to the 
country’s economic and social development and funded by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST).  These were: population and health, information, agriculture, 
resources and the environment, energy, and new materials; each selected project would 
receive on the average of 30 million RMB ($3.6 million).
390
 “Between 1998 and 2001, 




MASSIVE CORRUPTION IN AWARDING LARGE-SCALE RESEARCH 
GRANTS  
 While there were some modest breakthroughs stemming from the 863 and 973 
programs, which included high-performance computers, third-generation mobile 
communications, deep-sea robots, hybrid rice, and genetically engineered medicine, etc., 
this program was for the most part judged highly corrupt and inefficient.
392
 Most of these 
problems related to the Communist Party’s top-down structure, which lacks transparency, 
thus inviting massive and systemic corruption. Smaller-sized grants, such as those offered 
from China’s National Natural Science Foundation, were for the most part awarded based 
on scientific merit; however, that was not the case for large-scale grants awarded by  
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government funding agencies that ranged from tens to hundreds of million Yuan.
393
  
Each year the government, along with its team of scientists, lays out the 
guidelines of research areas and project types, based on the needs of the nation, which 
will receive funding. These projects are so narrowly defined that there is much skepticism 
over whether these needs are actually national in scope; it is clear that the scientists 
sitting on the committee that devise these guidelines adhere to the personal interests of 
bureaucrats who are overseeing or managing project distribution.
394
 These bureaucrats 
are not interested in seeking the advice of scientists, but use their scientific knowledge 
and expertise to support projects that they would like to undertake that will score them 
the most political points. Bureaucrats are often short-sighted and have only their political 
interests in mind, approving projects that will win favor with their superiors and improve 
their possibilities of getting promoted.  
Many scientists in pursuit of a large-scale grant will tailor their research to meet 
the needs of the agenda created by the scientists and bureaucrats, whether they believe it 
is the correct course of action to take or not for meeting the national need.  Most scholars 
and university professors are paid approximately 2,000-5,000 Yuan ($307-$769) per 
month.
395
 A famous professor at Peking University once revealed that his income, 
combined with the research funding he received from the government, amounted to 4,786 
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 Scholars are paid so little that they need to surrender their 
research interests to the needs of politicians and bureaucrats to get more money. If they 
receive the grant money, their salaries increase immensely and the government supplies 
their labs with state-of-the-art resources. They therefore must kowtow to the interests of 
the bureaucrats. 
For example, water shortages have threatened several villages in China--Qinghai 
and Ningxia. Due to limited rain fall, people did not even have enough water for 
drinking. Some villages have disappeared and their residents have been forced to 
relocate. Other villages in those areas are still in danger, but migration is not a viable 
solution for these poorer residents and communities. These villages could benefit 
immensely from the creation of research programs that focused on climate change; 
however, such research is seldom supported.  Since the research funds are allocated by 
government officials, many of which are engineers, from their perspective, research 
exploring and explaining climate change and drought is meaningless, for it doesn’t result 
in direct outcomes or show any political achievement while being very expensive.
397
  
They would ask their team of scientists to demonstrate the rationality of certain 
engineering aims like dam projects. Scholars in the research field of water resources all 
turned to suggesting dam projects to get research funds; they would demonstrate how all 
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government solutions were reasonable when, in fact, dams could cause great damage to 
water systems, especially under conditions of water scarcity.
398
  
This top-down approach is highly corrupt and suppresses creativity and 
independent thought. In order to become a recipient of large-scale grant in China, the 
decision is not based on one’s scholarship or credentials but on the connections that one 
has made with bureaucrats and a few powerful scientists; for obvious reasons, scholars 
and researchers spend a significant amount of their time on building connections, 
“Guanxi” (关系), instead of attending conferences, conducting research, or educating 
students; it is, for example, common in China for professors to use their students as 




Also, decisions on research grants are often made according to how much money 
one can offer the scientists in charge of making such decisions. Scientists are often bribed 
by scholars, so that they can receive prestigious research grants. When corruption 
happens, as long as the supervisor is satisfied with the subordinate’s work, the actual 
quality of that work is largely ignored. Culturally, and in a non-transparent society, 
people in China are only responsible to their supervisor. Getting the job done is most 
important. The end result matters more than the process it took to get there. Additionally, 
it is also hard to expose corruption, especially in a government that suppresses civil 
society and controls the media.  










Many professors, scholars, and researchers adamantly oppose the way this system 
operates but choose to remain silent because they fear the possibility of losing grant 
opportunities or other resources the government might allocate to them in the future.
400
 
They do understand that such corruption squanders the innovative potential of China. 
Many scholars therefore will adopt a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that, as China 
continues to develop and modernize, so will its political institutions. This unhealthy 
culture discourages future generations from entering academia or research institutes.  
 
COMMERCIAL ESPIONAGE 
What doesn’t fit into Porter’s model but is very important for understanding how 
China has acquired state-of-the art technology other than from developing its factor 
conditions and research facilities is commercial espionage, which poses the single 
greatest threat to the security of U.S. technology.”
401
 Nowadays, with obtaining classified 
information as easy as hacking into a computer system, economic espionage is on the 
rise, and has cost a thousand of the largest U.S. companies more than $45 billion in losses 
annually; China is now the world’s worst offender.
 402
 Although there is no hard evidence 
that exists that the Chinese government has been committing acts of espionage to gain 
technology and information for building its large passenger aircraft, the possibility, 
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however, can’t be overlooked from the proof that it has in other sectors of the economy 
and the military.   
 To commit industrial espionage, China has organized and developed a well-
coordinated campaign targeting western governments and companies by covertly stealing 
military and industrial secrets in pursuit of shortcut routes to bolstering economic and 
military modernization.
403
 Committing acts of espionage produces results in a shorter 
amount of time while using significantly less capital. China would have otherwise spent 
10 years and $10 million on research and development if it did not attempt to steal secrets 
and bribe competitors and foreign nationals at the rate of about $1 million apiece, and get 
the same if not better results.
404
  
Given China’s one-party rule and the unique overlap of its political and economic 
institutions, U.S. law enforcement has been ineffective at stopping this commercial 
espionage using the counterintelligence strategy it refined during the Cold War. Unlike 
the Russians, who were then restricted from entering the United States, the majority of 
PRC nationals who have acquired technologies illicitly have come to the U.S. legally.
405
 
The Chinese government has been quite efficient at enlisting a wide range of people, 
organizations, and collection operatives to acquire military and industrial technologies; 
these threats are also coming, not solely from Chinese intelligence operatives, but from 
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ordinary people who, along the way, were coerced, bribed, or directly employed by the 
Chinese government--including working scientists, students, business people, and  
bureaucrats.  Because the PRC technology acquisition is not centrally controlled or 
coordinated, the difficult challenge of combating it is made even harder.
406
 There is clear 
case for concern; the U.S. could suffer severe loses to its economy, and the espionage 
could pose a grave threat to its national security as well.  
 
Methods Used To Acquire Military Technology 
China’s two professional intelligence agencies, which have traditionally been 
prominent in acquiring technologies illicitly, are the Ministry of State Security (MSS) 
and the PLA General Staff’s Military Intelligence Department (MID). However, 
nowadays these professional intelligence agencies account for only a small percentage of 
the PRC’s foreign science and technology collection; most U.S. technology losses have 
occurred during commercial, scientific, and academic exchanges between the United 
States and China.
 407
 In fact, much of the data collection is done by non-professionals, 
including PRC officials, bureaucrats, students, scientists, researchers and other visitors to 
the west. These individuals are often coerced into working on behalf of the MSS or MID 
or other PRC-controlled organizations, scientific bureaus, commissions, research 
institutes and enterprises. The Chinese government relies more on developing non-
centralized, non-professional networks such as research institutes and military- owned 
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 A common method by which the PRC acquires technology is through the use of 
front companies, which are enterprises that are set up and controlled on the behalf of 
another. This is done so it masks the organizations true intentions to the public. In other 
words, the organization was set up to do one thing, but in actuality it does another. 
Overseas governments or state bureaucracies will set up front companies to circumvent 
laws that prevent sensitive technology transfers and acquisitions between companies of 
different nations.  Setting up shop in a foreign nation and masking your true identity so 
that the public believes that you are a local company seeking profit, would rid anyone of 
suspicion that you might transfer technology back to your home country. According to 
the 1999 Cox report, there are more than 3,000 PRC corporations in the U.S., many of 
which are connected with the PLA, a state intelligence service or technology acquisition 
roles. This is particularly troublesome for law enforcement to monitor because the 
Chinese government, and possibly intelligence services, have become savvy at blurring 
the lines between their commercial seeking-profit enterprises and those enterprises 
established to commit espionage.
408
 
In the past many, front companies would have recognizable names linking them 
directly to the PRC, like NORINCO and Poly Technologies. The boards of directors of 
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these companies did not conceal their true identity and were easily identified as former 
PLA officers, thus drawing a lot of negative publicity and media attention.  In order to 
avoid attracting such attention, Chinese companies no longer used names similar to those 
of their parent companies; they use American names instead. They have also brought in 
people who were unrecognizable to sit on boards of directors in order to avoid media 
attention that would otherwise draw law enforcement to closely monitor their activities.  
On many occasion, the PRC has also forced former dissidents to establish companies in 
the U.S. and to commit acts of espionage by throwing them in jail or harming their 
families if they did not consent to do so. 
In June 1993, a former Chinese philosophy professor, Bin Wu, and two other 
Chinese nationals, were caught trying to smuggle third-generation night-vision equipment 
to the Chinese government.
409
 The Chinese government first learned of such technology 
when the Americans used it in the first Gulf War in 1991. Wu and the two other PRC 
nationals relocated to the U.S. and set up small front companies in Norfolk, Virginia. It 
was then relatively easy for Wu and his cohorts to purchase sensitive technology from a 
number of U.S. companies in the names of their front companies and ship it to the MSS 
through a middle man in Hong Kong.   
Wu was not a typical intelligence officer; he actually had good cover, and U.S. 
law enforcement would never have expected him to commit acts of espionage, for he was 
a pro-Western dissident in China, a strong proponent of democracy who had been 
involved in the protests at Tiananmen Square. He was given the choice of relocating to 
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the United States to help MSS acquire technology or facing a stern prison sentence. In 
fear of what might be done to his family, and to avoid going to prison, he chose the 
former and was sent to the U.S. to establish himself in the political and business 
community. The MSS told Wu he would serve as a sleeper agent and could be called 
upon any time to complete a task.
410
 
Civilians   
Another significant source of the PRC’s technology acquisition comes from 
Chinese businessmen who have relocated to the United States but still show their loyalty 
to the PRC. Many businessmen that have immigrated to the United States have done so 
for monetary gain. The Chinese government believed that since these individuals were 
predominately motivated by financial incentives, they could easily be bribed with the 
right amount of money to commit acts of espionage; they would basically be inclined to 
sell their interest to anyone posing an offer.
411
 The Chinese government would contact 
these PRC nationals and offer them large amounts of money for stealing sensitive 
technology and shipping it back to their motherland.  
Peter Lee was a Chinese-born naturalized U.S. citizen who had worked at the Los 
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Having worked at the 
laboratories, Lee had access to classified information, which he passed to the Chinese 
government between 1985 and 1997. In 1985, Lee stole classified information for the 
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PRC about how to use lasers to create nuclear explosions on a miniature scale.
412
  In 
1997, Lee passed classified information to the PRC on very sensitive detection 
techniques that could result in threats to U.S. national security. They would have 
information and knowledge on how to threaten or possibly destroy U.S. nuclear 
submarines.
413
 The Lee case illustrates how PRC Nationals with no prior intelligence 
experience are bribed by the PRC to commit acts of espionage. The PRC uses Chinese 
nationals hired by U.S. firms for the purpose of data theft.  
Another example of such a case was of Chinese Canadian Xiaodong “Sheldon 
Meng,” who was employed at Quantum 3D Inc in San Jose California. “He was caught in 
2003 for misappropriating company secrets, including a product known as nVsensor a 
corporate night vision technology product used exclusively in military applications for 
training and simulation applications.”
414
 In a government issued report, Meng’s theft was 
intended to benefit the PRC Navy Research center in Beijing.  He was also charged with 
trying to sell the military application secrets to the Malaysian and Thai Air Force. The 
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Spy Posing as a Civilian 
Another case receiving nationwide media attention involved Dongfan “Greg” 
Chung, a Chinese spy who was convicted on July 29, 2010, of misappropriating sensitive 
aerospace and military information from his employer, Boeing.
415
 Dongfan, who had a 
high-level security clearance, kept over 300,000 pages of Boeing company secrets at his 
California home, which clearly violated company policy. He sent much of this secret 
information on the U.S. space shuttle, booster rockets, and military troop transports to 
China with the help of another spy, Chi Mak.
416
 It is believed that Chung had been 
sending sensitive information to China over a 30-year career working as an aeronautical 
engineer for Boeing and Rockwell International. The extent of what was sent to China, 
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 According to federal officials, stealing of industrial secrets appears to be most 
prevalent in California's Silicon Valley, where much of the country’s advanced research 
and technological development within the high-tech sectors of the economy take place. 
China has began flooding its scientists and engineers to the valley in pursuit of these 
commercial secrets by establishing business ventures with American companies where its 
staff members may have access to secret technology.
418
 Stealing company secrets 
nowadays, does not require advanced and sophisticated methods for acquiring it; in fact, 
is as easy as the click of a mouse. Foreign intelligence services have learned that U.S. 
government and private sector information that would require years of expensive 
technology or human assets to acquire can be accessed easily, or stolen using computer 
networks. Sensitive documents can be downloaded easily onto a USB Flash drive, small 
enough to conceal. The losses that a company can accrue from having its secrets stolen 
are devastating.  
The software company 3DGeo fell victim to this kind of theft. In 2000, the 
company set up a venture with one of its major customers, China’s National Petroleum 
Company. The venture called for sending Chinese staff members to Californian for 
training.   However, one employee, Yan Ming Shan while training on the software at 
3DGEO Development Inc. copied company secrets onto his personal laptop; he illegally 
copied the secret design and source code of one of the world’s most powerful software 
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tools for locating oil and gas deposits.
419
 FBI agents were tipped off by another employee 
at 3DGEO who noticed something suspicious taking place.  Yan Ming Shan was 
apprehended as he attempted to board a flight to China.  “The boss of 3DGeo says if Shan 
had succeeded, 'he'd be getting some technology that we keep guarded out into the 





 Another technique the PRC employs for technological and data acquisition is its 
reliance on the use of professional scientific visits, delegations, and other scholarly 
exchanges. In 1996 more than 80,000 PRC nationals visited the U.S. as part of 23,000 
delegations.
421
 During conferences and symposiums, many U.S. scientists accidently 
reveal sensitive information during heated professional discussions and debates.  This 
often occurs when sensitive questions are asked. Another strategy the Chinese employ in 
order to get scientists to reveal secret information is to plan a really busy itinerary for 
their invited guests while PRC intelligence agents break into the visitor’s hotel room and 
steal sensitive information and data.  The Chinese have also been known to employ 
another technique, which involves subjecting the visitor to a long and grueling itinerary 
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while providing a continuous flow of alcoholic beverages to the guest to lower his 





 The number of PRC nationals attending academic institutions in the United States 
presents another method through which the PRC can collect sensitive information and 
technology.  “During any given year there are over 100,000 PRC nationals who are either 
attending U.S. universities or have remained in the United States after graduation.”
423
 
These PRC nationals are often targeted by the Chinese government and the PRC 
intelligence services. The former is interested in enlisting PRC scholars who remain in 
the U.S. and have established strong networks in their respective fields. They could 
potentially be an asset, for they may have access to important scientific technology and 
classified data once employed in the States. Wen Ho Lee, for example, was born in 
Taiwan, educated in the United States, and employed by Los Alamos. He was accused of 
giving the PRC classified information on the W-88 warhead in the mid 1980s and 
information on nuclear weapons in the 1990s.  He was later set free when insufficient 
evidence was assembled to convict him for committing espionage. He did plead guilty to 
downloading classified information onto an unsecured computer. He was placed under 
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 PRC representatives who have previously worked in high-technology companies 
in China, or were government officials, have been able to purchase sensitive 
technologies, including electronic equipment.  The PRC has mainly been able to purchase 
these goods because of the carelessness of the Department of Defense, who was probably 
in rush to get rid of excess property. Without properly checking codes indicating that the 
material in quiestion was advanced military equipment, which would have prevented the 
sale of such equipment to certain parties, the D-o-D enabled PRC buyers to purchase 
such equipment. Many PRC companies bid on military equipment and technologies using 
American-sounding names to avoid suspicion and to conceal their relationship with the 
Chinese government. The PRC was, for example, able to purchase a multi-axis machine 
tool profiler used to build wing spans for the F-14 fighter for under $25,000 when the 
original price is over $3 million.
425
 
Purchasing of American Companies 
Other tactics the PRC has employed to gain state-of-the-art technology include 
the outright purchase of American companies. In 1996, to take one case, the Chinese 
purchased Sunbase Asia, an American company that produced ball bearings for the U.S. 
military, in California. Information on the extent of sensitive technology transfer to China 
has not been made public.
426
 With the purchase of certain high-tech companies, China  
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could easily gain access to technology that could strengthen their economy and military.   
 
C-919: SUPPORTING AND RELATED INDUSTRIES 
The supporting and relating industries determinant in Porter’s model lends great 
insight into how China plays the midwifery role by offer foreign firms a piece of their 
large market for entering cooperative ventures with Chinese companies. In exchange for 
share of the market, the Chinese would gain technological know-how with respect to 
assembling, manufacturing and designing aircraft. “The size of China’s domestic has 
provided a powerful magnet to Western aircraft manufacturers for many years. The 
government can make such offers to foreign companies because it controls the CAAC, 
the institutional body that is responsible for all purchases of aircraft. The government 
decides how much of the market a particular firm can and will occupy.  Although Porter’s 
fails to discuss the differences between production technology from design technology, 
his model does focus our attention on China’s strategy for developing a competitive 
advantage by creating innovative technology. 
 Despite the lessons of the Y-10, China has still embarked on strategy where it 
would acquire state-of-the-art technology from entering joint-ventures with western 
firms. These firms however remain reluctant to educate the Chinese on how to develop 
their latest generation of aviation technology because they could be grooming a future 
competitor. Relying solely on the technology from entering ventures or serving as a 
supplier for an airplane manufacturer could not help China realize its dream of 
developing an internationally competitive large passenger aircraft. This could happen 





China’s Three Step Plan 
The Ministry of Aviation originally devised a three step “take off plan,” with the 
goal of developing a 190 seat indigenous plane that was originally expected to be realized 
by 2010; the plane is now pushed back to 2016 due its lack of independent design 
experience. The first step of the plan was to cooperate with a foreign partner to assemble 
a medium-sized aircraft. To realize that goal, it was important for China to become 
familiar with the manufacturing process of an aircraft. It would have to start out 
supplying parts and components for aircraft manufactures and once they become familiar 
with the process of manufacturing, they could then team up with a partner to co-assemble 
an aircraft.   
The second phase of the three step plan was to co-operate with a leading airplane 
manufacturer to jointly design a state of the art 100 plus seat aircraft. It believed using its 
large market as bargaining chip will entice manufacturers to want to work with them. 
Lastly, China after having learned all of the relevant technologies in the areas of 
manufacturing and design, it would seek to develop a 190 seat large aircraft, the third and 
final step of its three-step plan.  
 
Contracting for Main Aircraft Manufacturers 
Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell Douglass, to name a few firms, have benefitted 
immensely from contracting the manufacture of airplane parts to China. The importance 
of China as an aircraft purchaser has in fact attracted an increasing number of Western 




share, those manufacturers would pass along technology and help it adopt the managerial 
practices needed to produce an indigenous aircraft. While aircraft manufacturers sought 
cooperation with China so that they could exploit China’s abundance of cheap labor, they 
also understood that, in exchange for educating and outsourcing the manufacturing of 
aircraft to China, state-controlled airlines would be more inclined to purchase their 
aircraft and products as well. Also, because of China’s low labor costs, these aircraft 
manufacturers were be able to sell their airplanes cheaper worldwide than if they had 
been manufactured in the U.S. or their other home countries. 
Most of the work that has been contracted to China through the aircraft 
manufacturers themselves or their suppliers have been limited to structural assemblies 
rather than making and assembling major components for the plane including systems 
and integration packages.
427
 China has not yet been able to transition from supplying 
components and parts to supplying major aircraft subsystems which include fuel, 
pneumatic, electrical and environmental control systems; these markets are very lucrative 
and are still dominated mainly by U.S. companies such as Goodrich, GE, and Parker.
428
  
Even though some of these companies have started to source some components to the 
Chinese, they are very careful at what they teach them.  
Profits for supplying major aircraft subsystems are very lucrative. For example, 
while Chinese companies have sold approximately $700 million worth of components 
and structural work to North American and European airliner programs in 2007, Parker 
earned approximately $3.5 billion in July 2008 for a single contract to supply Bombardier 
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with a fly-by-wire control system for its C Series airliner.
429
 Western companies are 
hanging on to the most lucrative areas of their aircraft- manufacturing programs; they are 
unlikely to give up their source of competitive advantage to the Chinese, which would  
lead to Chinese companies eventually competing with them in these areas. 
China’s indigenous skill set has been developed against the backdrop of an ever-
increasing presence of European and American aviation manufacturing companies that 
have entered China in pursuit of a share of the market.  After years of supplying work and 
joint-venture agreements to these companies, China's civil aircraft industry has acquired 
the basic capability of civil aircraft design, manufacturing, testing, and certificate 
verification. Many of China’s technological advances stem from cooperative agreements 
and investments made by these aerospace companies. There are six main aviation 
factories in China (Shenyang, Xian, Chengdu, Shanghai, Harbin, and Shaanxi) that are 
still currently involved in the production of parts for Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, and 
Embraer and will also contribute to the C919 based on what they have learned from their 
experience working with foreign aviation manufacturers. 
 
Shenyang Aircraft Corporation 
The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), a subsidiary of AVIC, was founded in 
1953 and is the oldest and probably the most important of all of China’s aircraft factories, 
as it employs over 30,000 people and designs and manufactures all of its fighter planes 
for its military, beginning with the J-5 and going all the way to the first Chinese carrier, 
the J-15. The SAC is divided into four departments: civilian aircraft, ancillary equipment, 
                                                          
429









Shenyang is currently the only supplier of the emergency hatch for the A320 and 
had delivered more than 10,000 of them by October 2010; it also manufactures spare ribs, 
sliding ways, and fixed advanced edges of airfoils for the A320 series, and doors for the 
A330/A340 cargo aircraft.
431
 It is the only supplier of leading edges of vertical tails for 
the B787 cargo door for the B757, and is providing parts for the B737 empennage.
432
  
SAC has imported all parts and raw materials from U.S. suppliers in order to ensure that 
its components meet the required quality control standards of the FAA. Shenyang also 
signed an agreement with Bombardier in 2008 to produce the center fuselage for the Q-
400 series. The general manager of SAC, Pang Zhen, has stated that, for the C919 
project, his company will produce the aft fuselage, vertical tail, engine bracket, APU 
Department doors, and other body structures.  
 
Xian Aircraft Corporation 
The Xian Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of AVIC I, was established in 1958 
and has over 20,000 employees. XAC has been responsible for developing more than 20 
types of major military and civilian aircraft.  The XAC mainly focuses on the production 
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of bombers and transports, which include the JH-7 and the H-6. It also produces a 
number of large- and medium-sized civilian airplanes, including the Y-7 and the MA-60. 
The Xian Aircraft Company was the first in China to establish international cooperation. 
Some of its supplier cooperation agreements include making the vertical tail for the 
B737-700 and parts for the B747, including the tail piston and the forward boarding 
gate.
433
   Xian delivered the first inner wing flap for the B747 to Boeing, and is supposed 
to become the only supplier of this part by 2012. The official contract for the project was 
signed on October 13, 2009, and will expire on December 31, 2024.
434
 It is the biggest 
and most sophisticated part of the plane that China supplies for Boeing aircraft. 
In 1999, XAC began supplying parts for Airbus, which include the wing and the 
electronics compartment access door for the A320 and A330/A340 series. XAC is also 
responsible for the A320 caisson, air conditioner pipe, and brake block for the 
A330/A340 series.
435
 “In May 1997 Airbus signed a contract for the manufacturing by 
Xian Aircraft Company for the rear section of the fuselage for the ATR 72 twin-
turboprop 74-passenger aircraft.”
436
 Xian is also one of the four main suppliers for the 
                                                          
433





 The announcement of the Xi'An Aircraft International Corporation’s contract signing agreement for the 
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Youyan Gongsi Guanyu Qianshu Shengchan Meiguo Boyin747 Xilie Feiji Chuizhi Weiyi Xiangmu Hetong 




 “Industrial Cooperation and Technology Transfer,” (“Gongye Hezuo yu Jishu Zhuanrang”), Airbus, 
(accessed January 2, 2010), http://www.airbus.com.cn/industrial-co-operation/. 
 
436






large aircraft  and regional project. It is responsible for developing the fuselage and the 
wing for the ARJ-21, taking more than 60 percent of the entire aircraft manufacture. 
In 2009 Xian acquired a 91.25-percent stake in Fischer Advanced Composite 
Components (FACC), the largest Boeing supplier in Australia. The former Australian 
company had already produced wing parts and interior components and systems for 
China’s regional aircraft ARJ-21-700 aircraft. With all of the technology, machinery, and 
automation at its disposal from the acquisition, its responsibilities for development of the 
C919 have increased. According to the agreement between XAC and COMAC, the 
former will supply six working packages for the C919, which include the middle of the 




Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HAMC) 
The Harbin Aircraft manufacturing Corporation was founded in 1952 and 
currently has more than 16,000 employees, who are mainly responsible for the 
development of light helicopters and light general aviation aircraft.
438
  Harbin Aircraft 
manufactures the H-5 bomber, the Z-5 and Z-9 helicopters, and the Y-11 and Y-12 
multipurpose air transports. Harbin and Airbus have established a joint venture focusing 
on high-grade composite materials, in which Harbin holds an 80-percent share. It has 
developed China’s most advanced technology on composite materials. HAMC is the only 
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supplier for the A350XWB rudder and manufacturer elevator. It manufactures the 
composite nose rib of the tail piston for the A320, the composite tailfin torque box, and 
spare fittings for the A330/A340.
439
 In September 2010, Harbin became the only supplier 
of B787 wide-body fairing panels. With 30-40 percent of the C919 to be made of 





Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation 
The Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) was established in 1958 and is 
involved in designing, developing, and producing aeronautical systems as well as non-
aviation products. The CAC follows a business development strategy known as “Main 
Body With Two Wings,” which entails the production of military aircraft as a main body 
and the supply of parts, components, and electrical work the two wings.
441
 CAC is the 
second-largest producer of fighter aircraft in China. The company was established during 
the first Five Year Plan with the help of the Soviet Union. It was one of the 156 industrial 
projects that warranted support of the Russians in 1956. Aircraft built at CAC include the 
J-7/f fighter, which was based on the MIG-21 and FC-1, which went into production in  
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early 1991 as a replacement for the aging J-7.  
Chengdu Aircraft serves as a major supplier for Boeing, as it is producing 
composite rudders for the B787 (it is the only supplier of rudders for this plane), and the 
tail for the B757. Its supply work for the B747-8 mainly consists of horizontal stabilizers, 
ailerons, spoilers, and sub-assemblies. CAC has been responsible for producing main 
parts and components for Airbus as well. It produces the gate for the Airbus A320/A330 
and has a contract with Airbus under which it will supply 5 percent of the body work for 
the A350WXB airplane.
442
 It also supplies the nose sections and parts of the rear 
passenger door for the A320 and A330/A340. It will manufacture the nose of the C919 
airplane as well. 
 
Shaanxi Aircraft Company 
The Shaanxi Aircraft Company was established after the severing of ties between 
the Chinese and the Russians in the early 1960s. It is known for modifying civilian 
versions of aircraft for use in other applications. For example, when it developed the Y-8 
civil airplane it was used as a patrol plane, a helicopter carrier, and an unmanned aerial 
vehicle for the military. Most civilian planes that are produced at this location are either 
changed or modified for military purposes. This company’s most important contribution 
to military development is the E-2000, the Chinese AWACS (Airborne Warning and 
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Control System), the PRC’s essential Air Force in a possible conflict with Taiwan.
443
 We 
can assume that, when the development of the C919 is officially launched, a military 
version of this plane will be built by the Shaanxi Aircraft Company. 
 
Guarding Core Technology 
There has been a growing fear among manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus 
that, if they pass along sensitive technologies to the Chinese, they will become less 
relevant in the Chinese market once China’s aircraft manufacturers become more adept at 
working with such sophisticated technologies. However, aircraft manufacturers, 
beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present day, have outsourced parts of the 




Western firms can protect intellectual property rights by limiting the amount of 
information and knowledge they share with Chinese industrial partners. "You can 
organize yourself in such a way that even if you are cooperating, people don't have access 
to sensitive information."
445
 Also, companies have created encryption software in order to 
protect their sensitive technology from being accessed by current or future competitors. 
They were especially worried about China, because it has a history of violating 
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intellectual property laws and reverse- engineer aircraft, as they suspect it did with Y-10, 
given its similarity to the B-707. 
 
Negotiations with McDonnell Douglas 
As more and more types of airplane parts and components have been 
subcontracted to China, it has nonetheless come to master the technologies and methods 
for doing so; it has become more interested in doing more sophisticated and advanced 
work in the design and assembly of aircraft. “Using access to its potentially huge aviation 
market as a bargaining chip, China has succeeded in getting foreign aircraft 
manufacturers to involve China in the design and production of commercial airliners.”
446
  
This was especially true when aircraft manufacturers faced stiff competition from rivals 
and wished to gain an edge over the competition by gaining a share of the Chinese 
market.  
In the late 1970s, competition among aircraft manufacturers (Boeing, Lockheed, 
McDonnell Douglas, etc.) in the large and medium transport range had been growing 
fiercely.  McDonnell Douglas’s DC-10 was virtually indistinguishable from Lockheed’s 
L-1011, which led to the two companies splitting their sales almost evenly, making it 
impossible for either to profit. In order to stave off bankruptcy, McDonnell Douglas 
entered a cooperative agreement with China on production of its MD 80 aircraft, hoping  
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that it would lead to a large share of China’s virtually untapped market.
447
 Consuming a 
decent share of which would ensure the firm’s survival on the commercial side of the 
industry. In the process, they taught elements of design to the Chinese, even if it had 
profound effects in the future. Survival was their immediate goal.  
After several years of negotiations, on March 31, 1985, an agreement was reached 
between McDonnell Douglas (MD), the Chinese Aviation Supplies Company, and the 
Shanghai Aviation Aircraft Company. The agreement stipulated that over a 12-year 
period, China and McDonnell Douglas would produce 30 to 45 jetliners in Shanghai, and 
25 aircraft would be purchased by the CAAC to be used to service domestic and some 
overseas routes.
448
 The remaining aircraft would be sold in the United States. Thirty-five 
in total were actually produced, with five sold to TWA in the U.S. market.
449
 This would 
be the first time in history that in U.S. history that one of the airline’s commercial jets 
would be assembled in another country.  
 
MD Cooperation Agreement 
 “Chinese factories provided an increasing proportion of the components used to 
construct the aircraft, going from 15 percent at the beginning of the program to 50 to 60 
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percent at the end.”
450
 MD was responsible for the more sophisticated components and 
parts of the plane, which included the engine, propulsion, hydraulics, avionics, etc. The 
Shanghai Aviation Industry was responsible at the outset for riveting the mid part of the 
body, connecting half wings, and running air tightness tests.
451
 As the engineers became 
more skilled and familiar with the equipment and the processes, the amount of 
responsibility increased. They would produce such components as the main landing gear 
doors, the front landing gear doors, rear service doors, electronic compartment access 
door, inner flap-slide bracket cargo door, horizontal stabilizers, rear service door frame, 
and so forth.
452
 They also test-flew the plane and delivered it in accordance with the 
engineering drawings and technical standards of MD. In all, China produced a total of 
2,000 processing parts for the MD82 project.
453
 The first step of China’s three step plan 
had been officially completed. 
 
How Did China Benefit from the MD Venture? 
The Chinese not only acquired advanced technologies but learned the importance 
of quality assurance engineering and standard management practices as well from the 
project. Prior to it, they had a very superficial understanding of airworthiness; although 
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they were able to build an aircraft on their own, as proven by the Y-10, they were not 
capable of building it in accordance with airworthiness standards that ensured the safety 
and security of the aircraft and its passengers. The joint venture helped China’s aviation 
industry to acquire modern assembly technology and facilities in line with FAA 
regulations and international standards, which laid the foundation for future aircraft 
development.
454
 The work the Chinese had done with MD also offered sufficient proof to 
other aircraft manufacturers that China was capable of assembling a plane a plane that 
incorporated such critical standards, which encouraged them to consider doing business 
with the nation. China had certainly learned more about aircraft development and 
management from the MD joint venture than from any other cooperative agreement to 
date.  
 
CULTURE DIFFERENCES MAKE COOPERATION WITH M.D. TOUGH 
Porter’s model suggests the benefit of having world class suppliers and related 
industries in your home market because cultural similarities will foster a strong work 
relationship. On the other hand, cultural differences can create high levels of distrust and 
serve as a roadblock to accomplishing common objectives, even though the paths to 
realizing those goals were different. Confucianism was designed to maintain social 
harmony where the collective good of the country is prioritized over the individual. On 
the other hand, western culture gives prominence to the individual over the collective.  In 
the joint venture between MD and China, a working relationship eventually developed, 
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not as a result of respect for one another’s culture, but because China’s conformed to 
MD’s methods and culture.  
 Because of China’s unique history, it was very difficult at first for the Shanghai 
Aviation Factory to work with McDonnell Douglas. A lot of time and effort was invested 
in cementing a formable and working relationship despite the totally different styles of 
thinking and cultural perspectives. In the early 1980s, the Chinese still remained 
distrustful of foreigners. In fact, most people, whether they worked on farms or in the 
Danwei (State-owned factory) had never seen foreigners before. They had spent entire 
lives exclusively with people with whom they were familiar. It was unheard of to work 
with people you didn’t know.  
Before a working relationship can develop, there needs to be a series of 
confidence and trust-building measures must be taken between two parties that set them 
on a track toward friendship. In the Chinese cultural framework, if you are friends, you 
may have a strong binding working relationship, but such a relationship will not develop 
between mere acquaintances. Identities, which stem back to its Confucian traits, were still 
very important in Chinese society.  Having to work with strangers did not accord with 
Chinese culture. It is not easy to trust people you do not know. If you want to do business, 
it is important to work on the relationship. Guanxi (关系) must be developed. All the 
Chinese knew about “Laowai” (老外), foreigners, was what they had heard from friends 
and family, and at school. As avid students of their own history, they remained highly 
suspicious of foreigners because of the humiliation and embarrassment their country 




 Chinese society under Mao Zedong trained and indoctrinated individuals to 
believe that a person who is motivated by financial gain possesses few of the morals and 
values that are essential for the development of a country. Foreigners were such people.  
They were selfish and would lie, cheat, and deceive in pursuit of material ends. 
The Chinese were patriotically sensitive and, in their hearts, would give up 
economic benefits to protect the nation and its core values.  This sense of nationalism 
made cooperation with McDonnell Douglas quite difficult. The Chinese believed that, if a 
company entered its homeland, it ought to follow rules and regulations in line with 
Chinese culture. McDonnell Douglas was very vocal about entering a joint-production 
agreement with China under which they expected the Chinese to follow its methods and 
rules of production for creating state-of-the-art products with the sole intent of making 
money. To the host country, this seemed rude and selfish. McDonnell Douglas failed to 
understand that the venture was not about business for the Chinese but about developing 
the nation.  Despite Deng Xiaoping’s desire to change the thought of Chinese people and 
imbue them with the notion that to be rich was glorious, 30 years after the abolition of the 
free market the Chinese people still felt social stigmatization in pursuing individual 
interests instead of looking out for the greater good.  
There also is a face-saving gesture in Chinese culture that does not exist in the 
West. When they dislike something or have a problem with something one says or does, 
they say so in an indirect way that is not offensive. You don’t directly criticize or praise 
people. If you praise an individual on a team, others will feel they have done a poor job. 






 It is expected in Chinese culture that everyone should perform well. Giving 
praise is a roundabout way of saying that the others didn’t fulfill the expectations of the 
company.  
But a system that does permit rewarding individual achievement stifles creativity 
and innovation. If a young person is promoted faster than older colleagues in a company, 
they lose face. The older, more experienced colleagues will feel humiliated. Younger 
colleagues aware of such feelings, therefore, choose not to to distinguish themselves. In 
Western culture, by contrast, employees will usually be proud of their colleagues’ 
accomplishments. Like most Western enterprises, (e.g., McDonnell Douglas) encouraged 
its employees to devise ways to improve the production system.  Promotions and bonuses 
were given based on merit. In China, bonuses were awarded to everyone for their time 
and effort; there was no distinction between their best and worst employees. 
Upon completion of the co-production agreement on March 3, 1985, McDonnell 
Douglas slowly introduced a handbook known as “the Bible” to the Shanghai Aviation 
Factory, which systematically laid out guidelines and procedures for the production and 
assembly of the aircraft from the factory floor all the way to the plane’s test flight.
456
 
There was a learning curve for Chinese colleagues to internalize MD methods because of 
the vast cultural differences just mentioned between the two labor forces. The Shanghai 
Aircraft Factory was intended to mirror, in image and operation, the MD factory in Long 
Beach, California.  
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The handbook set the responsibilities of each department in the factory, how it 
should be run, and how it might specifically coordinate others. The Bible defined the 
responsibilities of every factory, person, and department involved in the process. The 
standards were so specific and meticulous that MD actually calculated that the average 
assembly cycle was to take 245 days from start to finish. A total of 6,200 standard 
working hours are required to produce one airplane; testing the aircraft at Long Beach 
required 8 hours, and they calculated an additional 20 hours for troubleshooting.
457
 
McDonnell Douglas, in fact, set the exact room temperature for testing the plane, which 
the Chinese were expected to follow.  MD believed that it was important for the Chinese 
to adhere to these guidelines and procedures so the finished product could receive an 
FAA airworthiness certificate, which alerts potential customers that the plane is both safe 
and reliable. The FAA authorized an MD representative to ensure Shanghai’s compliance 
with its regulations on a consistent and regular basis. 
In order to achieve that goal, a team of McDonnell Douglas experts, in 
conjunction with Shanghai Aircraft Factory staff, set up a quality-audit chamber to assess 
factory worker and management methods.
458
 The chamber’s purpose was to ensure that 
procedures were being followed at all levels, that company goals were being met, and 
that the work complied with FAA regulations. In addition to identifying problems and 
inconsistencies, the unit was empowered to fix them. The process of carrying out quality 
audits actually strengthened the awareness, and standardized the behavior, of all 
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employees. Holding employees accountable for their actions forces them to develop good 
habits in accordance with mandated procedures and standards.
459
 
MD management standards were, nevertheless, quite troublesome for the Chinese 
to follow, for they were so different from what the Chinese were used to. It took time to 
internalize the procedures. Although Chinese State-owned enterprises had been created 
with the intent of both workers and management following standard operating 
procedures, those procedures were completely ignored.
460
 There was no clear delegation 
of responsibility among departments in an enterprise; having defined responsibilities 
would have meant holding individuals accountable for their work in situations in which 
praise or punishment could result in a loss of face. The result was a huge and predictable 
waste of time and resources that, in some respects, is difficult for a Western mind to 
grasp. For example, in a typical State-owned enterprise there are many departments. 
Usually, one is responsible for the manufacturing of a product that another employs. 
Without a clear delineation of responsibility, when the part is made, it can sit in the 
department for days, since no one knows whether the manufacturing department is 
supposed to deliver it to the department that uses the product, or the latter is supposed to 
pick it up.
461
  It is safe to assume that few Westerners could anticipate encountering 
problems of this nature. 
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The only time employees really worked hard in China before their collaboration 
with Western firms was when their factory received a “red-head file,” a document 
highlighted in red, sent by the central government, and addressed to the factory manager 
that indicated a sense of urgency regarding the completion of an assigned task or 
project.
462
 The manager then delegated responsibility to each employee, and they would 
work diligently night and day until the job was completed. When there were no such red-
head files to trigger action, many employees slacked off; they felt no need to work hard 
when employment and raises were guaranteed regardless of work performance and 
standing out was thought of an insult to others. McDonnell Douglass tried to implement a 
system that boosted worked performance by issuing bonuses based on merit.  
 
State-of-the-Art Technology and Infrastructure 
To ensure that their aircraft would receive U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
certification, McDonnell Douglas helped the Chinese renovate factories in Shanghai 
where the planes were being assembled, providing massive amounts of technical data, 
and tools and training, required to assemble the aircraft. The Chinese were provided with 
1,837 technical and design drawings of the MD 82/85, which were translated into 
Chinese in 370,000 standard pages; they were given 699 process standard documents, 
which translated into 14,000 standard pages, and 8 compensation trade products with 561  
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drawings that resulted in 80,000 pages in Chinese.
463
 
 MD helped China upgrade its technology at over 17 facilities at a cost over 82 
million RMB.
464
 These facilities included spray painting workshops, digital control 
processing workshops, computer laboratories which could meet the advanced technical 
request. Shanghai changed their workshop organization from 4 workshops which were 
riveting, general assembly spray painting and test flight to 10 stations which were mid-
body riveting, body connection, body air tightness test, general assembly, function tests, 
spray painting and test fly and deliver. The total construction area was 28,673 square 
meters.
465
   
MD trained thousands of Chinese technicians for the program and issued 7,951 
certificates to those who were trained. McDonnell Douglas even sent a team of Chinese 
engineers to the United States to educate them in technical training in engineering, 
tooling, and other technology-intensive areas for assembling a state-of-the-art aircraft.
466
  
Among the 132 staff from Shanghai sent abroad, 26 received training in quality assurance, 
25 in liaison engineering, 45 in manufacturing, 16 in tooling, 7 in process planning, and 6  
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  Through its work for MD, China was able to master state-of-
the–art technologies that included numerical control machining, CNC machining,
468
 and 





 Based on the success of the first cooperative arrangement, the China Aviation 
Corporation signed another contract agreement with McDonnell Douglas in 1992. This 
was not a supplier task for China but a cooperation venture in which the two parties 
would co-assemble the MD-90 aircraft--and of which China would have full intellectual 
property rights upon the plane’s completion. It would be the first time China had 
cooperated with a foreign country to produce 150-seat main-line aircraft incorporating 
the state-of-the-art technologies of the 1990s, in which 70 percent-- consisting of 40,000 
parts and components--were to be produced indigenously in China. Shanghai invested 
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  The skin is the material that covers the wings and the fuselage. In order to produce light-weight that 
would be tough enough to form close tolerance among aluminum parts the material needs to be able to 
stretch. Stretch forming is a metal forming process in which a piece of sheet metal is stretched and bent 
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McDonnell Douglas provided the Chinese with 21 tons of blueprints and technical 
files. Shanghai translated and followed 600 thousand engineering drawings, 7 million 
words of function-test documents, and 8.6 million words of technical standards. 
471
 China 
basically received all the manufacturing technology, and part of the design blueprints, for 
the MD-90.   
Aside from MD supplying the drawings and raw materials, engines, airborne 
equipment, and some other subsystems, China was responsible for parts manufacturing, 
assembly, and test- flight quality control in accordance with FAA regulations, to 
accomplish which China assigned approximately 10,000 people across four departments 
in Shanghai, Xian, Shenyang, and Chengdu to the project. More than 400 of them were 
trained in the U.S., while others were trained several times by MD staff locally.
472
 
  For the first time, the Chinese employed the main manufacturing company–
supplier management model, accepted as the international standard for managing such a 
project. Since there were more than 40,000 parts and components produced in four 
factories in China, quality control was very important. Shanghai was responsible for the 
management and coordination among these factories. It made copies of all the technical 
data and blueprints provided by MD for the three others, and was responsible for 
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delivering and tracking technological information, coordination of different technologies, 
evaluating the quality systems of the other facilities, following their progress, and helping 
them to finish their work in a timely manner. Shanghai was also responsible for meeting 
FAA requirements.
473
   
The Chengdu Aircraft Manufacturing Company was responsible for producing the 
nose section and forward passenger doors and stairs of the aircraft; the Xian Aircraft 
Manufacturing Company built components for the wing and cabin interior; the Shenyang 
Aircraft Manufacturing Company was responsible for the main components of the 
vertical tail; and the Shanghai Aircraft Factory itself took care of the large sections of the 
fuselage and wings, in addition to final assembly and flight-testing the craft.
474
 
Despite the increased responsibility on part of the Chinese, the MD-90 project 
came to an abrupt halt in 1996 when Boeing merged with MD and closed all of its 
production lines in China. Boeing wanted those lines shut down because, during the 
reform period, Chinese airlines and government institutions had more autonomy to 
choose what they wished to purchase, and many airline managers--in return for 
purchasing aircraft from abroad --received trips abroad as well, on which they would stay 
in five-star hotels.  When aircraft were domestically built, Boeing could easily offer such 
pampering, because a link existed between the pampering and the sale of airplanes.
475
  
The Chinese produced only two aircraft before the production line stopped.  The two 
proved, however, that the Chinese were capable of developing aircraft in accordance with 














FAA airworthiness regulations, while using a modern technology and a management 
system in line with the international standard. The MD-90 project’s most important 
achievement for the Chinese was assembling completed sets of advanced materials, 
techniques, quality control, airworthiness, and production management, and putting them 




Air Express 100 
During these years of cooperation with MD, Chinese officials continued to seek 
out other foreign manufacturers that would provide the Chinese with a more 
comprehensive co-production project; they wanted a larger role in the process where they 
could play a more active part in designing new aircraft.
477
  Although China on many 
occasions tried to draw prominent aircraft manufacturers into such cooperative 
agreements, most efforts failed to get past the initial memorandum-of-understanding 
phase. One notably did in the early 1980s when an agreement was reached between 
President Jiang Zemin and South Korean President Kim DaeJung to cooperate in building 
a 100-seat aircraft.
478
  They also decided that they would seek a third partner for this 
endeavor with experience in designing and building commercial aircraft. In 1996, 
negotiations reached a stalemate, as the two partners could not come to terms on where 
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 Weijia Sun, ‘The Breakdown of the AE-100 Aircraft Project,” (“Zhong’ou 100 zuo keji Yanzhi 





final assembly of the airplane would take place. South Korea insisted the general-
assembly line be located in Korea. Because the two sides couldn’t see eye-to-eye on this 
issue and on their respective shares of the partnership, South Korea opted out of the 
agreement in 1996.  
China reached out to Singapore (STPL) to replace South Korea as a potential 
partner in the project; STPL agreed to the partnership and to China’s request for having 
final assembly rights in Xian. As for the third partner, China was more interested in 
recruiting Airbus than an American company, because of the technology restrictions that 
had been set in place after the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989.
479
 In April 
1996, China’s Li Peng visited France and met with President Chiraq about having 
members of the Airbus consortium (France, Britain, and Italy) join the partnership with 
South Korea to build an aircraft in the 100-seat range. Chiraq accepted, and an agreement 
was reached under which China would own 46 percent of the company, Singapore 15 
perent, and Airbus 39 percent.
480
 Final assembly would take place in Xian, at the Xian 
Aircraft Company. Airbus did feel somewhat uneasy about China’s insistence on full 
access to all core technologies related to the project, and to acquire the plane’s 
intellectual property rights, with which it could produce derivatives of the original 
model.
481
 These issues Airbus believed could be worked out over time.  
The agreement nevertheless broke down in 1998, 2 years after the AE-100 
endeavor was officially announced to the public. The cancellation of the project was 
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largely attributed to management and other internal changes taking place within Airbus, 
whose new chief executive officer, Noel Forgeard, was not in favor of the project.
482
 
Prior to 1988, Airbus had not been listed as a single company, but as a series of 
companies that would cooperate with one another on manufacturing projects of similar 
interests. Forgeard turned it into a single company, a legal entity in which members 
would have to vote on whether to undertake a project.   
On September 3, 1998, Airbus canceled the AE-100 project on the grounds that it 
was not economically viable, arguing that it would cost over $2 billion in R&D alone, 
whereas R&D for an upgrade of its A320 model would cost less than half that amount.
483
 
There wasn’t enough market share in the existing 100 seat range to warrant the 
development of entirely new aircraft at such outlays.  
Airbus found it wise to produce the A318, a derivative of the A320 aircraft, 
intended to replace older editions of the B737 and DC-9 planes. Another important 
reason Airbus opted out of the AE-100 agreement was that Boeing had committed to 
developing its B717 plane and was expecting to deliver its first 100-seat plane to AirTran 
in 1999.
484
 If the Airbus consortium went ahead with the AE-100, which would not have 
entered service until 2002 barring any unforeseen delays, it would be forfeiting 
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approximately 3,000 aircraft to Boeing.
485
 Stage two of China’s three-step plan was, thus, 
not realized. 
 
Germany and the MPC 75 
In 1985, China sought an equal partnership with a major aircraft manufacturing 
company on the development of an entirely new aircraft; jointly designing an original 
airplane with a major aircraft manufacturer would be a fundamental and crucial step for 
the future development of its own indigenous aircraft. China’s Aviation Technology 
Import Export Company, and the AVIC, found such a partnership with the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s Deutsche Aerospace's company, (MBBB) which was interested 
in jointly developing a 70-passenger regional jet equipped with two propfan engines.
486
  
 In 1985, MBBB and CATIC signed a memorandum of understanding and began 
conducting a feasibility study. In December 1987, it was decided that the major designing 
of the aircraft would take place at the Xian Aircraft Design Institute, and that the plane 
would be produced and assembled at Xian Aircraft Company (XAC). In August 1988, 
CATIC and MBB of Germany officially signed a general agreement for the development 
for what was called the “MPC-75 project”; the agreement laid out the fundamental 
technology and data transfers that Germany would supply to China.  
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During the initial pre-development stage, MPCA organized and outlined the strategy 
for the joint development of the aircraft.  More than 30 technicians and engineers flew to 
Germany to participate. They discussed detailed information regarding the technologies 
that would be used in the aircraft and the tentative design and preparation for 
airworthiness assessment, along with marketing and sales activities and strategies and so 
forth.  
During the pre-development, with the help of German technology, China organized 
a supporting team and finished designing the plane’s landing gear, air conditioner, 
oxygen supplier, and successfully made SCCH mode, in addition to making over 60 tool 
kits for the plane’s assembly.
487
 In cooperation with the Germans, China participated in 
research and joint cooperation on 14 fields of engineering technology and management 
expertise. They included general, aerodynamics, pneumatic flight physics, structure, 




By 1993, more than 200 Chinese engineering experts and professionals had gone to 
Germany for on-the-job training and technical transfer. They established the MPC-75’s 
technical program during the detailed engineering design and development phase. 
Technical transfer consisted of 11 types of computer software including ASSCOS, weight 
and balance, scientific database, and 73 other applications.
489
 The experience and files of 
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technical transfer were collected into books.  Many of the technology transfers, which 
included advanced management and design techniques, and verification standards, would 
be put into practice when designing other models, including China’s Y-7 aircraft.
490
 
  The MPC-75 aircraft design and level of technology were expected to be on par 
with the A320 aircraft. It used the advanced engine and featured low fuel consumption, 
low noise, low pollution, etc.  The plane’s lifting surface was to be built out of composite 
material to reduce the plane’s weight. The plane was designed, in short, to possess a 
strong competitive advantage. 
 The project was eventually canceled in 1993, however, because, with the 
establishment of Airbus as a limited liability company, each of its member nations had to 
act in accordance with the conglomerate as a whole; the company had to speak with one 
voice. The decision had already been made to invest Airbus’s financial resources in the 
A319 model. Secondly, due to China’s commitment to its trunk liner with McDonnell 
Douglas, its funding for the project was limited. It therefore sought a third partner, which 
it could not find.  
 
Brazil Embraer 
While China still remains stalled on the second step of its three-step plan, it saw 
potential advantages in cooperating with Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer when it 
expressed interest in early 2002 in having its ERJ-145, a 50-seat regional aircraft, 
assembled in China. Brazil was facing tough competition from Canadian airplane 
manufacturer Bombardier’s CRJ series in the regional market, and it believed that forging 







better relations with China would pay huge dividends. Better relations with the Chinese 
would win it a greater share of the Chinese market, especially when, over the next 20 
years, China’s demand is expected to reach 950 regional jets.
491
 Because competition was 
fierce and Brazil needed to gain an advantage over Bombardier, China believed that 
Brazil, a developing country, would be more inclined to transfer technology than an 
assembly license.
492
  At the very least, China would import the newest state-of-the-art 
manufacturing technologies used by world aircraft producers in the 21st century.     
An agreement between Embraer and China was reached in December 2002 with 
the establishment of the Harbin Embraer Industry Group (HEAI), with a registered 
capital of $25 million
493
  According to the agreement, final assembly of the 50- seat 
regional aircraft was to take place at China’s Harbin Aircraft Industry.  Embraer would, 
moreover, own 51 percent of the company, and China 49 percent.
494
 It was the first time 
Embraer had ever assembled a plane outside Brazil.  
The Harbin plant would receive supplies and ready-made parts and components 
from Embraer’s vast global network and would be responsible for assembling, testing, 
and marketing the plane, which was to be built primarily for the Chinese market. At the 
start of the venture, production capacity was expected to reach 24 per year, at $19.5 
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 There was much skepticism over how much could be produced and sold 
in China from the very beginning. Despite the fact the plane took its maiden flight in 
December 2004, a few months behind schedule, Embraer needed to sell at least 20 
aircraft per year for the venture to be considered financially viable.  
The most accurate assessment of why, during the course of the 7-year period, the 
joint venture was only able to sell a total of 50 aircraft was that Embraer truly did not 
understand the workings of the Chinese market. It did grasp the nature of Chinese culture 
and the importance of developing “Guanxi” (关系) in order to gain access to China’s vast 
markets.   Additionally, local production had traditionally helped foreign companies to 
avoid paying import duties of 24 percent, but those were cut by WTO agreements 





What Did China Learn? 
Through the joint venture with Embraer, China became acquainted with the 
company’s management philosophy, which had enabled the company to grow into such a 
huge success in regional aircraft development. “The process of manufacturing and the 
production of ERJ145 aircraft is performed on the basis of dividing process interfaces by 
workstation instead of by a system in which other aviation products are produced.”  In 
order to ensure a smooth transition of the ERJ145 from its previous assembly location in 
Brazil to Harbin, Embraer set up intensive training programs in both China and Brazil, 
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which entailed theoretical training and teaching, and familiarizing Chinese engineers and 
technicians with the various state-of-the-art technologies used in aircraft assembly, 
quality assurance, and customer support, all in accordance with Embraer standards.  
In order to make certain that company regulations and standards were being 
followed during the initial stage of the joint venture, Embraer furthermore sent a team of 
engineers, specialists, and technicians to Harbin to serve as on-site supervisors and to 
offer technical support and assistance. During the first year of the joint venture, about 54 
Embraer representatives helped the Chinese assemble the first airplane. The number 
decreased to four representatives by the time the fifth aircraft was produced in 2004. By 
2005, China was able to assemble 97 percent of the plane on its own in accordance with 
company’s established rules, regulations, and processes. 
China’s ability to adhere to Embraer’s strict standards was rewarded on May 3, 
2006, when HEAI earned its AS9100B Certificate; it was now included in the online 
aerospace supplier information system (OASIS), and officially became part of the 
International Aerospace Quality Group. HEAI also was the first aircraft manufacturer 
Asia recognized by the NQA in the U.S.
497
 
Before assembling the ERJ-145 in China, the Chinese were only able to produce 
regional, propeller-driven airplanes. The ERJ-145 has brought the Chinese regional plane 
into the jet age. China learned advanced techniques in assembly, flight test delivery, and 
other turbojet technologies through the drawings and documents transferred in the joint 
venture, including commercial aircraft sealing drill riveting technology, structure sealing 
technology, aircraft spray technology, steam navigation and other electronic test 







technology system integration testing techniques, and cabin pressurization flight test and 
receive. 
From this venture, China has also learned how to manage global partners and 
suppliers. The Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry Company had 20 people contracting and 
monitoring more than 200 suppliers and was in charge of purchasing more than 5,000 
different kinds of parts. The process was supervised via internet and advanced 
computerized software. The aircraft produced ERJ145 had reached the standard of 
Embraer produced airplanes.  
 
Airbus 320 
In Tianjin, on May 18, 2009, China also played host to the first Airbus aircraft 
that had ever been assembled outside Europe. On June 28, 2007, the joint-venture 
contract for the Family Final Assembly Line (FAL) of the A320 airplane, to take place in 
Tianjin, was signed between China and Airbus in which Airbus holds 51 per cent of the 
shares, while the Chinese hold 49 percent.
498
  Since China had had no prior experience 
assembling an aircraft in the 150-to-180-seat airplane prior to this agreement, the Tianjin 
project will not only provide a model to learn from but will train and educate Chinese 
engineers and technologists in the latest manufacturing technologies, processes, and 
techniques in the large passenger aircraft range.  Aircraft assembly requires high-end 
manufacturing technology employed by the original aircraft manufacturer. “The FALC is 
the first final assembly line outside of Europe however it is almost identical to the state-
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of-the-art Airbus single aisle final assembly line in Hamburg, Germany.”
499
 The FALC 
employs the same processes, tools, and procedures used in Europe.  The agreement 
worked out with China is that the A320 final assembly venture includes putting together 
the fuselage, wings, engines, tails, noses, and doors that are shipped from Europe.
500
  
Also included in the arrangement are technology transfers to the Chinese including the 
famous Airbus wing structure-manufacturing technology, which is very important for a 
country developing its own large indigenous aircraft.  All 480 employees who work at 
FALC have received extensive training in Europe.
501
 This ensures that the aircraft 
delivered in China adheres to the same assembly standards that prevail in Europe.  
Airbus was primarily interested in setting up such a venture in China in order to 
develop a better relationship there, which it believes will translate into gaining a stronger 
foothold in the market, as it has done in the past. Airbus does not gain much with respect 
to cutting costs by having final assembly taking place in Tianjin. Airbus pays 800,000 
Euros for each plane, and has to pay much higher salaries to engineers sent to China to 
assemble aircraft in Tianjin. For example, the average annual salary for Airbus 
employees in Europe is about 60,000 Euros, compared about 250,000 Euros for 
employees sent to China.
502
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By the end of November 2010, there were 643 Airbus aircraft in operation in 
China, which accounted for 44 percent of the entire market share.
503
 With the production 
line in operation in China, Airbus expects to acquire more than half the Chinese market in 
the coming years. Its foothold in that market has grown exponentially since it first 
produced aircraft for China in 1995. There were only 29 aircraft operating in China then, 
which accounted for a mere 7 percent of the total market. It is expected that 80 to 90 
A320-series aircraft will be delivered to Chinese airlines on average annually.
504
 This 
will boost Airbus market share in a market in which their indigenous plane will consume 
a share. 
 
AVIATION-RELATED INDUSTRIES AND SUPPLIERS 
Building an entire commercial aircraft requires the integration of technologies 
from unrelated fields. It is virtually impossible to cover all industries important for 
aircraft development; therefore, this section pays special attention to the major 
roadblocks with respect to technological obstructions China must surmount in order to 
successfully create a large state-of-the-art civilian air transport. 
One major obstacle China’s aviation industry faces to building an entire civil 
airplane has been its inability to create a turbofan engine technology. It has not yet 
mastered jet engine technology. China, however, has engaged in a multitude of joint 
ventures to expand its knowledge and gain the requisite technology needed to assemble a 
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jet engine by 2020. To date, however, it still has to import engines for its commercial 
aircraft.   
According to experts in this area, the main problem for Chinese engineers is that 
they are unable to produce an acceptable nozzle for the engine; if the main combustion 
nozzle is not built to sufficient tolerances, the engine will have limited capability and a 
short life span. While a nozzle of lesser precision may be sufficient for military 
endeavors, because the plane would only need to fly a limited number of hours, 
commercial airlines require their planes to fly at least 8 hours per day, and such an engine 
would not hold up under those conditions.  The Chinese have simply not been able to 
build enough power and thrust into their engines. Besides the lack of this core-hardware 
technology, there are also clear quality and control requirements that China can’t meet in 
machining processes and in fabricating the hundreds of components and parts used in 
turbofan engines.
505
 It lacks the technology and associated functions to test the engine 
and ensure its safety. So China it cannot meet airworthiness standards for powering a 
commercial aircraft.  
 
Chengdu Aero-Tech Company 
Though there are many foreign engine companies operating in China today, only 
a few to date have launched co-production ventures in which the Chinese gain access to 
state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities, processes and assembly, equipment, and tooling 
for aero-engine production. Other arrangements were predominately supplier-based and 
have not moved beyond contract work agreements. China only makes components that 
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are transported back to Europe and North America for final assembly.
506
 One noteworthy 
exception is the Chengdu Aerotech Company, which was established in 1996 between 
Pratt and Whitney, which owns 78.3 percent of the company; the Chengdu Engine 
Corporation, which owns 13.5 percent; and the China Aviation Industry Corporation 
(AVIC II), which owns 8.2 percent.  The company has a registered capital of $19.7 
million, with more than 200 employees.
507
  
The joint venture was established to produce commercial aircraft engines 
components and parts, for both China’s domestic market and world airline customers, 
using state-of-the-art manufacturing technology and standards. At the start, the company 
produced parts for Pratt and Whitney, and as its Chinese partner became more 
experienced with P&W’s manufacturing standards, procedures, and product line, it took 
on more sophisticated tasks, which included producing advanced components for high-
tech turbine engines. The company now produces precision sheet metal and machined 
components for aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines. The final products made at 




   To carry out such tasks, Pratt and Whitney built state-of-the-engine 
manufacturing facilities in Chengdu, which also included advanced engine-
manufacturing equipment, processes, and tools. Its production facilities are equipped with 
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a broad range of advanced computer-controlled machining, forming, and welding 
equipment. The special processes include vacuum brazing, vacuum furnaces, plasma 
spray, rubber application, NDT, MPI, FPI, EDM etc.  The production capabilities include 
large machining, small machining, and airframe ECS (environment control system) 





Another noteworthy venture that has put China on track toward developing its 
own state-of-the-art jet engine was the Xian Aero-engine Corporation (XAE), which was 
established in 1997 in partnership with Rolls Royce. Rolls Royce helped to build a state-
of-the-art facility in Xian that included advanced technologies, equipment, and tooling.  
XAE was responsible for producing steel and light alloy ring components made for Rolls 
Royce engines.
510
 As the Chinese become more experienced with Rolls Royce practices, 
standards, and procedures, the company’s responsibilities increased; it began to cast and 
machine turbine nozzle guide vanes (NGV) for use in the BR710 for the Gulfstream V 
and Bombardier Global Express, and in the BR715 for the Boeing 717.
511
 The company 
also makes NGVs for the Tay engine, the power plant for the Gulfstream IV and Fokker 















100. The Chinese were trained for these tasks by German technicians onsite and at the 
BMW Rolls-Royce Dahlewitz factory in Germany.
512
   
 
S-FA Engine 
The AVIC established a commercial aircraft engine corporation in 2009 for the 
purpose of researching and developing an engine of C919, a model known as SF-A. The 
Chinese were interested in an engine that brought together the strengths of both 
American-style and Russian-style jet engines while avoiding their weaknesses. 
Americans engines are high tech but tend to be very fragile; they are quite expensive to 
repair and protect. They also tend to need servicing often, which can also be very costly. 
The Russian engine, by contrast, is much cheaper but consumes more fuel and is very 
noisy. China’s aero-engine should be cheaper than American and Russian models yet 
easier to repair, and should offer lower fuel consumption.
513
 The goal for 2020 is to 
produce an engine that is cheaper than its competitors’ to purchase and that is low in fuel 
consumption, yet is easy and cost-effective to repair.
514
  
 To realize this goal, aside from having learned engine technology from a 
multitude of joint ventures, AVIC signed a cooperation program in 2008 with Cranfield 
University in England under which China would send 150 airplane engineers and engine 
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designers to learn development.
515
  Most of China’s experience with engine development 
had been for the military--the Russian AL-21 engine, used in the SU-27; and the WS10A 
engine, used in the J-10 aircraft. Until the S-FA is built and issued FAA airworthiness 
certification, China has signed an agreement with CFM International, a 50-50 joint 
venture between General Electric of the U.S. and Snemca of France, to employ its Leap-
X to power the C-919.   
 
Composites 
The most advanced materials currently in use by aircraft manufacturers and 
expected to be employed in greater percentages in the future for manufacturing airframes 
are composites, known their light weight (which reduces fuel consumption) and greater 
resistance to fatigue and corrosion (so the aircraft can be serviced less frequently) along 
with higher strength-weight ratios.
516
 Aircraft usually need to be serviced every 6 years; 
however, if a plane is built of composite materials, it needs to be maintenanced only once 
in 12 years, reducing repair fees by 32 percent.
517
 Planes have traditionally used 
aluminum in the structure of the aircraft, which weighs 40 percent more than composite 
materials and is not as strong and durable. Carbon-fiber composites are about four times 
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 Both Airbus’s A350 and Boeing B787 are now using quite a 
large amount of composite materials in the airframes of their planes. Composites have a 
strong capacity to prevent cracks and other damage. Overhaul is much easier as well 
when aircraft are fabricated from composites because damage is visible to the naked eye, 
thus making it easier to find and repair.
519
  
Understanding the importance of composite materials for the future of airframe 
building, China has managed to secure contracting work from companies such as BHA, 
that supply such materials to aircraft manufacturers. A joint venture was formed in 2002 
between Hexcel owning 40%, Boeing 40 and China’s AVIC owning 20% BHA.
520
  
Boeing, which now owns 80 percent of BHA, having bought out Hexcel for $22.3 million 
in July 2008, remained reluctant to enter a venture with China working on composites, 
because helping China to learn, understand, and possibly develop high grades of 
composite material will help them with building a state-of-the-art passenger aircraft that 
could potentially pose a serious challenge to its own. Boeing’s main competitive 
advantage rests on the percentage and quality of composite materials used in its 
airframes. Despite Boeing’s skepticism over passing along technology and information 
that could groom a potential competitor, China has in fact, developed a significant level 
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of expertise in composites from working for several years with Airbus sister company 
Eurocopter.   
China gained such expertise from jointly developing and producing carbon-fiber 
helicopter cockpits with Eurocopter.
521
 Nowadays, China is able to develop it 
independently.  Although the Chinese have the capacity to produce low-grade composite 
materials for commercial use, aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing and Airbus, require 
a more advanced type that must pass a rigorous testing and certification process for 
approval, which is long and expensive.
522
 It is not cost-effective for the Chinese. “The 
cost and time involved to certify production processes, materials tools modes would be 
cost prohibitive to customers.”
523
  This is the main reason why China has made it a 
priority to be able to develop the necessary machines and tools for the industry. China is 
still approximately 15 years behind Western countries in the use of such technologies.
524
 
Boeing has, then, since found a way to benefit from the venture while avoiding 
transferring technology that could potentially put their state-of-the-art aircraft at risk. The 
composite materials for the venture are laid by hand, so Boeing does not have to give the 
Chinese access to controversial automation technology it needs for developing high 
grades of composites that are cost-effective on its own. The joint venture produces 
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composite secondary structures and interior parts instead for the Boeing B737 NG, B747, 
B767, and B777, which include the flight deck close panels, dorsal fin, wing to body 






In January 2009, Airbus and a group of Chinese industrial partners signed a 
contract to establish a Joint Venture Manufacturing Centre in Harbin, China, for the 
purpose of manufacturing and developing composite material parts and major 
components for the Airbus A350 XWB programme (it will actually manufacture 5 
percent of the A350 airframe) and the Airbus A320.
526
 These components will be 
manufactured using the latest composite-manufacturing technology and equipment based 
on Airbus procedures, standards, and processes. The joint venture, known as the Harbin 
Hafei Airbus Composite Manufacturing Centre Company Limited, has Hafei Aviation 
Industry Company Ltd. (HAIG) holding a 50-percent share, Airbus China holding 20 
percent, and both AviChina Industry and Technology Ltd.(AVIChina) and Harbin 
Development Zone Heli Infrastructure Development Company Limited (HELI) each 
holding a 10-percent share.
527
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The factory first started its production at the end of 2009, working on developing 
composite work packages for the A320, including elevators, rudders, and horizontal tail 
plane spars.
528
 The partners agreed to begin production while in the midst of building the 
state-of-the-art manufacturing facility in Harbin, which was officially completed at the 
end of 2010. The company further plans to branch out into maintenance repair and 
overhaul in the near future. 
 
Maintenance 
China, which has thus far lacked experience with maintenance and repair, was 
compelled to establish a venture in those areas with Boeing. Providing customer service 
and repair is deemed especially important for China in the run-up to the launch of its 
indigenous aircraft in 2016.  In 2006, The Boeing Shanghai Service Co. was officially 
established, with Boeing holding a 60-percent share and Shanghai Airport Authority and 
Shanghai Airlines holding 24 percent and 15 percent, respectively.
529
 The joint-venture 
company is primarily responsible for providing heavy maintenance checks, repairs and 
upgrades to interiors, avionics, and in-flight systems for five major airlines and for the 
Boeing 737NG.  With its new hangar facility, the MRO is able to service four narrow 
bodies or two wide body aircraft at any one time.  “A clear advantage of the facility is its 
ability to combine the skills, quality and knowledge of an airframe manufacturer, an  
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C-919: FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND RIVALRY 
Porter’s model draws our attention to the structure and strategy of COMAC, the 
corporation responsible for developing its large indigenous aircraft. Although on the 
surface it appears that the company is organized around meeting the current demand, this 
is misleading. The company is primarily controlled by the state through the State 
Council’s State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and the 
state-run airlines will be forced to purchase the airplane. As Porter’s model indicates, 
such a level of subsidization will not inspire a company to produce state-of-the-art 
aircraft that the market demands, and motivation will be lost to continuously improve the 
product when sales are guaranteed through China’s large domestic market. The company 
is not going to organize in a way conducive to competing with other manufacturers.  
 
COMAC (LLC) 
  In 2008, the National People’s Congress officially approved the plan for the 
establishment of the limited liability company, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of 
China (COMAC), which is directly responsible to the State Council’s State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is its largest shareholder 
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owning 31.6 percent of the company, worth $2.7 billion; the other major shareholders 
include the Shanghai Municipal Government via Guosheng Group, which has a 25-
percent stake in the company ($700 million), and the AVIC, which has just under 25 
percent; three other shareholders, each holding a 5-percent ($150 million) stake in the 
company are the Baosteel Group Corp., the Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), 
and Sinochem Corp.
 531
  The estimated total investment on the C919 project is expected 
to be more than 200 billion Yuan, comparable to that of the Three Gorges Dam project.
532
   
In accordance with company law, COMAC follows a modern corporation system 
in which it has an association of stockholders, a Board of Supervisors, and a Board of 
Directors. The Board of Supervisors is made up of party members from the central 
government, which includes members from the Central Military Commission, the CAAC, 
the Department of Commerce, etc. This board represents the national interest of the 
country and makes sure that any business decisions decided by the Board of the Directors 
aren’t in conflict with the state’s interest. Whatever is deemed in the national interest 
takes precedence over all commercial business. Before any major decisions are made, 
including the devising of company strategies, goals, plans, and their execution, the Board 
of Directors must consult with the Board of Supervisors in order to make sure that they 
are in line with national goals and interests.  
The Board of Directors for COMAC thus focuses on the business aspect of the 
operation, while the Supervisory Board will balance that with political interest. For 
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example, the Board of Supervisors may make decisions regarding the selection of 
companies with which China may enter into a joint venture and an agreement can be 
made for the exchange of technology and market share. China has increasingly required 
that very exchange in joint ventures as a prerequisite and a condition for awarding 
manufacturing contracts.  The intention seems to be for China to develop the requisite 
knowledge and the domestic expertise in subsystems in addition to airframes.  
  
Board of Directors 
  The State-Owned Assets Commission, because it is the largest shareholder of the 
company, has the main responsibility for supervising the operation. The Board of 
Directors is chosen by the shareholders. Since the SASAC maintains the largest share of 
the company, it chooses the representatives sitting on the Board of Directors.  The 
SASAC has unmatched power to control the business aspect of all decision making. As 
one can readily see, this modern corporation system that was created to imitate a modern 
company with a formal separation of power is rather illusory. 
 
Plan and Strategy 
The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China’s (COMAC) plan is to develop a 
190-seat large indigenous commercial aircraft to satisfy its 17.5-percent annual growth in 
air transportation. The aircraft is known as the COMAC 919. The C represents “China” 




number 19 means the aircraft will contain 190 seats.
533
  
  The plane is expected to develop a competitive advantage by reducing fuel 
consumption by 15 percent and operating costs by as much as 12 percent as a quarter of 
the plane is expected to be made with composite materials; it is also expected to be more 
environmentally friendly than its competitors with a 50- percent reduction in CO2 
emissions.
534
 The plane’s cost is also expected to be 20 percent cheaper than those of its 
foreign competitors. COMAC also claims that the cabin will be more comfortable for its 
passengers, as the seats will be larger and the cabin more spacious. This will eliminate 
the overcrowding feeling that passengers’ experience. There will be larger observation 
windows and larger overhead bins to accommodate passenger carry-on luggage as well.  
To meet these objectives, COMAC will be responsible for carrying out aircraft 
research and development, producing components, final assembly, marketing, customer 
service and repair, airworthiness certification, and financial leasing.
535
  The plane is 
expected to profit after its sells somewhere between 300 and 400 aircraft.
536
 Before then, 
the project will depend on the government to primarily fund the plane’s development. 
China itself will build 30 percent of the entire aircraft, relying greatly upon foreign 
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suppliers (see appendix B-9). COMAC is planning to manufacture up to 3,000 aircraft in 
total, approximately 150 a year, to satisfy its domestic demand.
537
 It will count on its 
state-controlled domestic airlines to buy the majority of these planes. China will require 
3,560 aircraft worth $340 billion, of which 1,400 are expected to be large-size 
commercial airplanes, over the next 20 years.
538
  As of November 2010, COMAC 
announced that it has already received 145 orders for its C919 airplane from four Chinese 
domestic airlines--Air China, China Southern, China Eastern, and Hainan Airlines, as 




COMAC Board of Directors 
COMAC shareholders and supervisory board have appointed a team of China’s 
most senior aviation leaders to senior board of director’s positions in the company. The 
only task the central leaders and their Board of Supervisors have given to the Board of 
Directors, aside from finishing the project successfully, is to build the plane with 
domestic suppliers whenever possible; if Chinese suppliers lack the technological 
capability, the group may seek out foreign partners to fill the void. They are to gain 
access to the best materials and suppliers in the world to help build the plane if need be. 
Guaranteeing the plane’s quality will take precedence over anything else. Even though 
                                                          
537















the SASAC put together a team of Board of Directors capable of managing this very 




 Many of these leaders are young engineers who formerly played prominent roles 
in China’s defense industry. Zhang Qingwei, assigned the position of Chairman of 
COMAC, is well known his leading role in the success of China’s space program.  He is 
also a member of the Central Committee
541
 (204); therefore, he is very well respected 
within the government and can wield significant influence over the Shareholders and 
Board of Supervisors when they are developing grand strategic decisions.
542
 
Prior to joining COMAC, Zhang was the Director of China’s Aerospace Science 
and Technology Corporation (CASC) and brought some of the most senior and respected 
managers within the space and missile industry to serve with him on the Board of 
COMAC. Jin Zhuanglong is an alternate member of the Central Committee (204 +176); 
that is, if for some reason some of the current members fall ill or step down, when his 
number is called, he will serve.
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 Jin served under Zhang as Deputy Director of 
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and 
was appointed General Manager of COMAC. The new COMAC Deputy Director He 
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 Personal Interview with Richard Jones, Consultant for the C919 Project and former General Manager of 
the Marketing Department Airbus, China on April 15, 2010. 
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Dongfeng previously managed the CASC’s China Academy of Launch Technology’s 211 
Factory before becoming CASC Deputy Director, where he worked under Zhang.
544
  
COMAC decided that, based on China’s prior experience working with the most 
prominent aircraft manufacturers, it should be able to develop 30 percent of aircraft while 
enlisting the help of international suppliers through a standard bidding process for the 
remaining 70 percent. Priority will go to those foreign companies willing to enter joint 
ventures with Chinese companies and to share state-of-the-art technology. More than 47 
different domestic and foreign firms, contracted to work on this project in China and 
abroad, will be in the supply chain for the C-919. 
 
Delegation of Shareholder Responsibility 
The plane will be designed, manufactured and assembled in Shanghai. Shanghai 
was delegated this responsibility because of its prior experience with working on the Y-
10 and its co-production agreement with McDonnell Douglas. The Shanghai Aircraft 
Design and Research Institute, which is responsible for the plane’s design, was created in 
the 1970s, when Mao Zedong approved the Y-10 project. The Shanghai Aircraft 
Manufacturing Corporation is in charge of both producing and assembling the C919 
aircraft. This factory was where the joint venture between MD and China for the 
development of the MD80 and MD90 took place.  The Shanghai Aircraft Consumer 
Services Corporation will be mainly in charge of providing related services for 
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 It was set up by COMAC with a registered capital of 100 million Yuan. It 
will carry out life-long consumer services, which includes maintenance and repair, as 




  The Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) will provide all of the aluminum 
and titanium material for the C919. Chinalco, the third-ranking aluminum company in the 
world, is capable of developing the world’s most advanced grade of aluminum alloy.  It 
has already invested 5 billion RMB and is will develop advanced aluminum and other 
important materials for the C919 project. It has assigned over 100 engineers to work on 
this task.  Since the company is a shareholder, it has a priority over all other aluminum-
producing companies; whatever metals it can produce will be used in the C919. If  for 
some reason it is not able to adequately develop advanced aluminum for the aircraft, it 
will partner up with A-Alcoa Inc., the largest U.S. aluminum producer; together they will 
study and manufacturer aluminum structural concepts, designs, and alloys for the C919. 
The Aluminum Corporation of China is currently working toward achieving the goal of 
developing the first C919 aircraft with 30-percent aluminum alloy. 
  On December 29, 2009, Baosteel signed with its COMAC partners to carry out 
comprehensive cooperative research and development on aviation-use steel, raw material 
supplies for aircraft parts, and components for the C919.  In September 2010, COMAC 
managers visited Baosteel, and an agreement was reached that enables Baosteel, since it 
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is also a major shareholder, to develop steel on its own for use by COMAC in the aircraft. 
Like Chinalco, it will have priority over all other foreign and domestic manufacturers of 
steel. This, it was believed, would motivate Baosteel management to invest heavily in 
new research and technology.  The only way COMAC can refuse original BaoSteel 
products is if they are not made efficiently.    
The AVIC has been designated the responsibility of supplying equipment, 
factories, and manufacturing technology for this project and forging joint ventures with 
international companies; it will also work on developing its first successful indigenous 
commercial engine. Sinochem will be responsible for production of composites material.  
If it is not able to do it well on its own, it will seek international cooperation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Peter Evans’s framework proved to be very important for showing us the policy 
choices available to China following its transition toward an intermediate state for the 
development of the C919 airplane. Under the predatory state, it had relied on state 
institutions for economic development while at the same time restricting the emergence 
of an entrepreneurial class and foreign investment in the economy for fear that their greed 
would allow them to exploit the country’s limited resources for personal gain, which 
might in fact run counter the interest of the nation as a whole. With the abolishment of a 
market economy, important decisions regarding economic development were made by 
Chinese central leaders calling on the many state bureaucracies to execute their vision.  
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping set out to correct the deficiencies in the system by also 




to compete in the economy and stimulate demand. China at this time opened up to the 
world, allowing foreign companies to relocate and invest in the country. The newfound 
openness stimulated an economy that had suffered at the hands of Mao Zedong. With the 
emergence of private enterprise came products and processes that people wanted and 
needed. As businesses become successful, they expand, and hire more people. The newly 
employed then have the ability to purchase goods and products, thus further stimulating 
the economy.  The Chinese economy was soon growing steadily at a pace of about 9 
percent per year, lifting millions out of poverty. As more and more people entered the 
middle class, disposable income has risen immensely, and by 2008 it had reached 15,780 
Yuan ($2,300) for urban residents and 4760 Yuan ($696) for rural residents, creating a 
greater demand for air travel.
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Michael Porter’s framework proved to be very useful for showing us what China 
has and hasn’t done to build a competitive and successful aircraft. As demand rose for air 
travel, China correctly set out to once again develop an indigenous large passenger 
aircraft. When there is a growing demand in a society, firms look to satisfy it by 
developing a product based on close collaboration with buyer needs. Products will 
improve over time as wants and needs change and as the customer base alerts firms to the 
existing shortcomings in products; likewise, new interests emerge when new technology 
becomes available from other sectors of the economy and can diffuse into aircraft 
development. The continuous desire to create and innovate comes when there is stiff 
competition in the market. When rivals are present, firms try to outdo one another for 
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current and new business. Without such competition, firms are likely to remain stagnant. 
In China’s case, the desire to continue to innovate may perhaps be lost because the 
government will protect its market and guarantee that its State-owned firms will purchase 
its aircraft. As Porter notes, without such competition, the desire to create and innovate is 
lost. 
Just as important, as Porter notes in his Factor conditions variable, if a potential 
demand for a product or service arises, a nation must possess an educated population that 
has an advanced and specialized skill set capable of designing and creating new and 
innovative products. Even though there has been growing concern among nations that 
China has been consistently graduating twice as many engineers than they do yearly, 
Porter’s determinant paved the way for looking deeply into the actual nature of China’s 
education system. Although the model falls short of explaining what type of education is 
required for having the distinct population to design and create new products, it does 
force us to determine what type of education is most conducive to achieving such goals. 
Our research has shown how China’s educational system has served as a 
hindrance to developing innovative and indigenous aircraft. The system trains experts 
rather than scholars; Chinese students are skilled at knowing information but not at 
understanding how that knowledge is created. It is more important for scientists and 
engineers to understand how knowledge is created, and how to expand upon it, than 
merely possess the descriptive information. China’s mono-disciplinarian education also 
contributes immensely to this problem, as innovative thoughts and ideas stem from 




What is absent from Porter’s model and an important tool for learning and gaining 
access to new technology is China’s commitment to commercial espionage. It has 
devised a multitude of new methods through which it calls upon Chinese nationals, 
students, and former dissidents--through bribes or fear--who either study or work abroad 
to acquire sensitive technology and send it back to China. Government officials also set 
up front companies, under American names in the United States, to acquire sensitive 
technology. This has proven to save both a lot of money and the time it would take to 
develop the technologies on its own, and poses the single greatest threat to U.S. national 
and economic security. Although it is extremely difficult to prevent, the United States has 
channeled exorbitant amounts of money to preventing such espionage from occurring. 
Over the years, China has employed a strategy of using its large market as a 
bargaining chip for gaining access to advanced technology. It has continuously set up 
ventures with aircraft manufacturing companies such as Embraer, Boeing, and Airbus, 
which all seek to gain an advantage over the competition by gaining a foothold in the 
large Chinese market. China has gained access to state-of-the-art manufacturing and 
production technologies from these companies although most of them are unwilling to 
hand over design technology or their most sophisticated technology and components to 
the Chinese because they fear they will lose their competitive advantage and possibly 
groom another competitor in the industry. 
Still, the cooperative arrangement with McDonnell Douglas most enabled China 
to learn management, production, and aircraft development. With MD’s survival at stake, 
it wished to gain access into the largely untapped Chinese market, so it was willing to 




China and MD to work together due to their vast cultural differences, but once the 
Chinese had conformed to the leadership and strategies of McDonnell Douglass, they 
learned how to develop, organize, and manage the operation and the development of 
aircraft. What had also previously served as a roadblock to aircraft development and is 
absent from Porter’s model is culture, which in China, for example, prohibited praise or 
reward of individuals for their hard work, thus reducing incentives to work hard. When 
the Chinese began to offer these incentives and changed its system of management and 
structure, they learned how to develop a plane to meet FAA standards.  
Looking at Porter’s variable Structure, Rivalry and Organization, we can see that 
China has implemented changes from when it developed the Y-10. However, their new 
system is not without problems. COMAC, as a limited liability corporation, is 
predominately government owned. The new system does improve the overall 
management process in terms of being structured and well coordinated; however, the 
government is still calling the shots, not private interests. It still employs the demiurge 
role, as it was the government’s decision to push forward with the development of the 
C919 and put together a team including Zhang Qingwei at the helm of its Board of 
Directors to carry out the government’s vision. But it is a very different system from that 
that was in place when the Y-10 was developed, because COMAC has enlisted foreign 
suppliers to supply components and parts that China cannot produce on its own. The state 
also put a Board of Supervisors in place to ensure that any company decisions made do 
not run counter to the national security interests.  
Because COMAC is government owned, there is little fear that the company will 




necessity to continue to build state-of-the-art airplanes, because the government under 
CAAC controls domestic purchasing of aircraft and has ensured that its state-run airlines 
will purchase the aircraft. This removes an immense amount of pressure on the one hand 
but, on the other, weakens the company’s ability to compete with Boeing and Airbus, 
which face such pressures. COMAC doesn’t have the desire to organize and structure the 
company to compete with Boeing or Airbus in the free market when its home market will 
account for 25 percent of total world demand.  The guaranteed sales do not encourage 
hard work from the company and its employees.  












China has made remarkable progress in the development of its commercial 
aviation industry. It has gone from relying on the Soviet Union for aircraft and for 
helping it to develop the industry, to standing on the threshold of competing with 
industrial giants: Boeing and Airbus. The case studies utilized in this study demonstrates 
the value and the insightfulness the theoretical framework, which combines the work of 
Peter Evans and Michael Porter has on determining how successful a nation/firm is likely 
to be in building an internationally competitive industry. However, the framework is not 
without weaknesses, which can in fact be tweaked to make its value stronger when 
applied to other important industrial sectors. 
 The framework illuminated the reasons why China was unsuccessful at 
developing a large commercial aircraft in the late 1970s. As Evans notes, the predatory 
state has severe limitations in the policy choices available to manipulate the important 
societal variables captured in Porter’s model in order to build a competitive aircraft. The 
country became completely reliant on the state for economic development as large state 




The nation was confined only to the role of demiurge, because it did not possess the 
dense networks of legitimate rule-based ties among societal members who were primarily 
motivated by profit, which in turn will produce goods and services for the greater good of 
society. Mao inherently believed the capitalism possessed high levels of greed, and that 
private firms were more interested in profit than improving the country as a whole. Going 
hand in hand with the demiurge impulse, in which the state is in charge of producing or 
developing virtually all industrial sectors of the economy, is the custodial role, which 
prevents domestic and foreign entrepreneurs from exploiting, creating, or taking 
advantage of potential market opportunities. 
 
Demand and the Y-10 
As articulated in Porter’s model, aircraft development should have been pursued 
in accordance with societal demands; this impulse was absent in China. The society gains 
as whole when societal demands are met. For example, companies able to satisfy societal 
demands with products and or services are likely to generate greater profits, while 
societal members and potential consumers gain by having access to products they want or 
need, thus making life more comfortable and satisfying.  As demand grows in new or up-
and-coming industries, new and existing firms will try to compete in them, seeking to 
meet the needs of the people by introducing their own unique amalgam of products and 
services. This, in turn, forces existing companies to constantly seek to refine and improve 
their products, should they wish to sustain or expand their share of the market. 
Competition forces firms to find ways to make their products more cheaply, add new 




customer interest. Without a demand, there is no niche to satisfy--nor is there any reason 
for competitors to enter an industry that appears to be profitable.  
There was certainly no case to be made for the development of an indigenous 
airliner in the 1970s to the average citizen, barely having enough food, earning 605 Yuan 
per year. The decision to launch the Y-10 program was not based on societal need but on 
Chinese leaders’ desire to project an image of modern industrialized country abroad by 
being able to travel on a Chinese-made aircraft. However, as Porter’s model exemplifies, 
without a demand for a product, there is limited opportunity to achieve success in an 
industry. In communist China, the existence of private industry was forbidden, so 
enterprises were not allowed to freely enter an industry. Success was thus unachievable, 
since there was no incentive to produce a competitive product or sell enough of it to 
achieve economies of scale. 
 
Factor Conditions and the Y-10 
Porter’s model also correctly notes that, in order to satisfy or create a niche in the 
market, a nation must have a highly trained pool of advanced factor conditions.  Nations 
must develop their educational system so as, not only to train students in advanced and 
specified areas of science and engineering, but to devote a portion of their curriculum to 
research and development.  
Absent from Porter’s model is what must be taught to in schools that stimulates 
creativity. A solid education conducive to stimulating creativity and innovativeness 
begins with being interdisciplinary. It arms the student with more knowledge through 




solutions for resolving current and future problems. Society must allow access to 
information and allow students to grapple with what they are learning. In Mao’s China, 
students were not only denied access to information perceived to be threatening or 
contradictory to revolutionary goals and ideas, but made to understand that challenging 
what was taught was forbidden. Students had to accept whatever was taught as scientific 
truth, which stifled independent thinking. 
Colleges and universities were also closed down intermittently over a 12-year 
period, during and after the Cultural Revolution, resulting in a loss of a generation of 
scholars, intellectuals, and students that were denied the opportunity to learn, conduct 
research and development, and train the next and future generations of Chinese in their 
respective fields. This significantly hurt China’s quest at developing an advanced jet 
aircraft. 
 
Supporting and Related Industries and the Y-10 
While Porter’s supporting and related industries determinant discusses the value a 
nation can acquire from working with world-class suppliers and related industries 
(preferably domestic suppliers and industries), he doesn’t specifically distinguish 
between the two types of technological knowledge a firm can gain from working with 
suppliers and industries: manufacturing and design. Under Mao’s predatory state, the 
Russians provided the Chinese with blueprints, technology, and equipment for imitating 
and replicating their aircraft. The Chinese relied so heavily on copying Russian aircraft 
that they received minimal experience in designing and creating innovative aircraft. The 




This technical information provided by the Russians was useful predominantly for 
teaching the Chinese how to manufacture and assemble an aircraft. Without the ability to 
design, you are limited to developing aircraft with only the level of technology you have 
been given. You don’t possess the ability to go beyond, because you lack structural 
information about the aircraft that can explain why it was made the way it was. Being 
unable to design an original aircraft makes it difficult to create a competitive product. 
You will always remain at the same level as the aircraft you are able to duplicate.  
 
Structure, Rivalry, and Organization and the Y-10 
The framework presented in this study also highlights the lack of motivation and 
the vast waste of resources that the predatory state witnessed during production of the Y-
10 project, which hindered China’s ability to develop a competitive airline. The 
organizational structure of the work unit under Mao offered workers lifetime employment 
and health benefits, regardless of how productive they actually were; these benefits were 
not linked to work performance, which actually discouraged factory employees from 
working hard. In fact, it was rather difficult to monitor work performance because 
bureaucrats and factory directors were given lifetime employment no matter how 
efficient their subordinates were, and the system did not encourage those in charge to 
monitor or encourage workers to achieve factory goals. From managers all the way down 
to factory workers, people had little incentive to work beyond the bare minimum. 
Additionally, factories were predominantly over-staffed, and most workers were 




delineation of responsibilities for each worker; therefore, it was difficult to hold anyone 
accountable for completing specific assignments.  
Under that bureaucratic organizational structure, workers would work moderately 
hard when the factory manager received an order from his bureaucratic superior urging 
him to complete a task of central importance right away. On the spot, the factory 
managers would create a division of labor among his employees to complete the task at 
hand as soon as possible. Most workers cared about completing the task with little regard 
for the quality of finished product. In fact, in most cases, though factories were given 
orders from their superiors, they didn’t possess the right tools, materials, or resources for 
the task at hand, and workers had to improvise, using materials and tools they had instead 
of what they needed, resulting in poorly made and/or damaged products. Their 
bureaucratic superiors were actually far removed from knowing what resources their 
subordinates had available or could obtain.  
This problem played a role in the failure of the Y-10. Mao Zedong called for its 
development with little knowledge of whether China possessed the technological 
capability to succeed at it. Mao called for the development of the airliner in the 1970s, 
just after many of China’s scientists and engineers were forced into penal camps during 
the Cultural Revolution. He didn’t realize how severe the shortage of talent really was.  
There was also a lot of confusion during the production of the Y-10, since there 
was no clear delineation of responsibility among central administrative bureaucracies, 
resulting in overlaps in responsibility. When a particular department sent an order to a 
factory, it would often be the case that the factory received different requirements for the 




and a lot of wasted resources. Factories would be forced to pick and choose which 
department to satisfy and which to defy. With the central government financing the entire 
project, a lot of money and resources were wasted, and duplication of tasks and products 
was common.  Because the government controlled the purse strings, it decided to 
discontinue the project upon the return of Deng Xiaoping and his cohort, who had been 
sent to the countryside to be re-educated during the Cultural Revolution. Deng and the 
others discontinued all projects that had been started during, or were associated with, the 
Cultural Revolution, which included the Y-10 project.  
 
THE INTERMEDIATE STATE 
Deng Xiaoping saw it as imperative to reinstitute methods of governance, which 
entailed legitimizing the constitution and rule of law in order to restore faith in the 
Communist Party and to bring the country out of financial ruin. The need for rule of law, 
predictability, and property rights were essential for triggering both domestic and foreign 
investment in the economy.  
With laws created that protected private and intellectual property, people began to 
strive for material wealth and happiness. As predictability began to surface as a result of 
the reinstitution of norms, procedures, and routines in line with socialist free-market 
principles, investors began tapping into China’s large unexploited market. China was able 
to grow at an annual rate of about 10 percent for more than 30 years because of such 
changes and investor confidence in the system. This translated into huge economic 
growth for China through which it would gain advanced technology and managerial 




As the government established a rule-based network respecting private enterprise, 
China had begun to demonstrate traces of a developmental State. On the other hand, as 
with most states in transition, during times of uncertainty and crisis, China has reacted in 
an overly autonomous fashion (where rule of law was ignored), especially in cases that 
were potentially threatening to one-party rule, making China an intermediate according to 
Evans’s state categorization. As described by Evans, the intermediate state possesses both 
autonomy and embeddedness in adequate amounts but at times falls prey to an imbalance 
that can take the form of excessive clientelism or isolated autonomy.
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 One case in particular was the Tiananmen Square Crackdown in 1989, where 
soldiers were ordered to fire on students protesting in the name of modest democratic 
reform.  As many as 2,000 students were killed as a result. Proper procedure was cast 
aside, and the rule of man became the way forward as party elders, who were no longer 
part of the Politburo, including Deng, made the decision to open fire.  
Another example of the state asserting control beyond what it had been authorized 
to do according to rule of law occurred during the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. To 
the disadvantage of entrepreneurs and private businesses, the central government 
instructed banks to pour over $1.5 trillion into SOEs that were on the verge of 
bankruptcy. At the same time, banks were restricted in what they could lend to private 
enterprise. This resulted in many private firms going bankrupt.  Eliminating private firms, 
or forcing them to merge with SOEs, was part of the national strategy to create public 
enterprises capable of competing against the world’s best internationally. Additionally, it 
was politically expedient to allow private firms, rather than SOEs, to go out of business 
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because they employ far fewer people; high levels of unemployment could have posed a 
grave threat to the legitimacy of the party. 
 
ROLES UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE STATE 
 As an intermediate state, China utilized all four policy choices at its disposal. The 
Chinese intermediate state plays the demiurge and custodial roles with respect to the 
launching of its large commercial aircraft. This industry is considered importance for 
national security and for further economic development. Therefore, because of the 
government’s great distrust for the private sector, it restricts it from occupying or 
monopolizing the industry.  
China does through its policies of midwifery and husbandry invite foreign firms 
and their capital to enter joint-ventures with its domestic enterprises to help develop 
aircraft subsystems, parts and components that they can’t produce themselves. In 
exchange for entering joint ventures with Chinese companies and for introducing them to 
state-of-the-art technologies, the government will its foreign partners tax credits, greater 
access to capital, financial incentives and reserve a portion of its large market for the 
venture’s products.   
 
Demand for the C-919 
In line with Porter’s demand variable, China in 2003 committed to the 
development of its indigenous aircraft, mainly for satisfying a domestic demand that is 
expected to amount to 25 percent of the world’s market. This demand grew out of 




market economy, which provided incentive and motivation for private and foreign firms, 
not only to invest in China, but to increase production and to produce better-quality items 
to satisfy customer desires. When businesses prosper, they look to expand, thus hiring 
more people, who will then earn a salary, enabling them to purchase more goods as well, 
which contributes to the overall growth of the economy. In 1978, 401.52 million people 
were employed in China. That number climbed to 774.8 million in 2008, as result of 
Deng’s reforms and “open-door” policy.
549
 In 1985, the average annual disposable 
income in the Beijing was 653.62 Yuan ($222); it climbed to 13, 231 ($1,945) in 2008.
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With a greater number of people now on the employment rolls in China, the market for 
consumer goods and services has increased immensely. The desire for material 
possession and air travel has grown exponentially. As people earn more money, their 
tastes begin to expand, and they desire better-quality items and more luxurious services-- 
3.431 million Chinese traveled by air in 1980, and the number of passengers flying has 
continued to grow since then at an annual rate of 16.5 percent. At this pace, China can 
expect there to be more than 770 million passengers traveling by air domestically by 
2020. The amount of cargo shipped within the country has grown at an annual rate of 
14.5 percent and is expected to reach 12.7 million tons by 2020.
551
  Demand is essential 
                                                          
549
 Ibid., p7. 
 
550




 Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, (Guojia Tongjiju Guomin 
jingji  Zonghe Tongjisi), China Compendium of Statistic 1949-2008, (Xinzhongguo  liushinian 






for business to exploit potential niches and produce advanced products of which enough 
can be sold domestically and internationally to achieve scale economies. 
 
Factor Conditions for the C-919 
The competition in China for receiving a university education has typically been 
fierce. Between 1976 and 2007, over 60 million students took the GaoKao (高考) exam, 
with one-sixth of that number entering college.  However, these statistics have improved 
dramatically in the past few years; in 2007 alone, 10.1 million students took the college 




Along with this increase in the number of students entering college, China has 
also been able to produce 12 times as many engineers than the U.S. annually. Porter’s 
factor condition variable places a lot of emphasis on training engineers and scientists, 
illuminating the idea that they are vital for society because they find innovative ways to 
enhance economic development, especially in the areas of high technology that spill over 
to the military and other sectors of the economy. However, the framework remains 
deficient in explaining what type of engineering education is most conducive to training 
engineers to be creative and innovative. Engineers in China have faced immense troubles 
when it comes to producing state-of-the-art technology, and the state has been obliged to 
rely on foreign enterprises to supply its developmental needs. 
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Students in China are heavily discouraged from exploring their individuality or 
being innovative and creative. Their system overemphasizes the importance of knowing 
knowledge rather than creating knowledge. It prioritizes memorization over reasoning. 
The education is also harmed by forcing students to choose a social-science track or the 
natural-science track on which they will only take classes in that area, from the second 
year of high school all the way to the end of college. The system is anything but 
interdisciplinary in nature, which is important for facilitating the critical and analytical 
thinking needed for enhancing creativity. 
 
COMMERCIAL ESPIONAGE 
Absent from Porter’s framework and equally important for understanding a 
common way in which China has learned to acquire technology is commercial espionage. 
The Chinese government has called upon Chinese nationals, students, and former 
dissidents who have either studied or worked abroad--through bribes or fear--to acquire 
sensitive technology and send it back to China. Government officials also set up front 
companies in the United States under American aliases, so they can acquire sensitive 
technology to send back to China. This has saved the Chinese money and the time it 
would take them to develop such technologies on their own. The nation has developed 
spy rings in which Chinese nationals work in companies like Boeing or Cisco, from 
which stolen technology makes its way into the Chinese military-industrial complex. 
Although no specific evidence exists that the Chinese government has been committing 
acts of espionage to gain technology and information for building its C-919 large 




other sectors of the economy and the military. Commercial espionage poses the single 
greatest threat to U.S. national and economic security. Although it is extremely difficult 
to prevent, considering China’s vast network of spies, the United States has channeled 
money into protecting our nation and economy. 
 
Supporting and Related Industries for the C-919 
Because of China’s backwardness in the production of state-of-the-art 
technologies, the government has been instrumental in helping local enterprises work out 
cooperative arrangements with foreign companies by offering them a piece of their large 
market share in exchange for technology and managerial expertise. China has lured 
foreign manufacturers to long-term cooperative arrangements by guaranteeing a large 
portion of their market as long as those manufacturers are willing to educate local 
companies in how to produce such products and familiarize them with the equipment, 
technology, and management needed to do so. Porter’s model advocates greater 
cooperation with suppliers and related industries where relevant technologies and 
manufacturing processes can be learned.   
Since 2008, the government, the largest shareholder of COMAC, has been 
responsible for enlisting foreign enterprises, and joint-ventures when possible, to service 
the complex parts and components of the plane that China doesn’t possess the ability to 
build on its own.  China hasn’t thus far been able to transition from supplying 
components and parts to supplying major subsystems, some of which include the engine 




lucrative and still dominated by U.S. companies such as Goodrich, GE, and Parker.
553
 As 
stated earlier, Porter’s model doesn’t identify the types of technologies firms will acquire 
from cooperative arrangements. Boeing and Airbus, the current industrial leaders, are 
certainly not willing to give up their competitive advantage, even though they have 
committed to joint ventures with the Chinese; they are willing, however, to educate them 
on some advanced technologies and equipment, and to some degree on how to develop 
such complex systems and products, but they will not be so foolish as to give away 
company secrets or their most advanced and most prominent technologies so as to groom 
a future competitor for their product.  
One notable joint venture that China has been able to capitalize on in technology 
acquisition, production, and aircraft development was with McDonnell Douglas in the 
1990s. MD was on the verge of bankruptcy and believed that gaining access to the 
Chinese market would give it the life support it needed to continue to compete in the 
commercial aircraft industry.  Porter’s model does little to address the role of how 
cultural differences may serve as a roadblock or may even to a nation’s approach to 
learning new technologies, approaches, and procedures. It was extremely difficult at first 
for China and MD to work together due to the vast cultural differences between them, but 
once the Chinese had abandoned their cultural practice of serving the collective before 
the individual, they were able to gain from the partnership. Porter’s model doesn’t 
specifically say so, but it implies that nations seeking a competitive advantage in an 
industry must conform to Western cultural business practices. 
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Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry for the C-919 
Porter’s model advocates allowing firms to establish, structure, and organize 
themselves around the nature of the free market.  COMAC, the limited liability company 
responsible for the development of the C919, was expected to operate and function as if it 
were a legitimate private business.  However,  the status of the Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China is misleading: COMAC is directly responsible to the State 
Council’s State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the 
largest shareholder in the company, owning 31.6 percent of the company, worth $2.7 
billion; the other shareholders include the Shanghai Municipal Government through the 
Guosheng Group, which has a 25-percent stake in the company, amounting to $700 
million, and the AVIC, which has just a little below 25 percent; the three other 
shareholders, each holding a 5-percent ($150 million) share in the company, are the 
Baosteel Group  Corp., the Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), and Sinochem 
Corp.
554
 In fact, the AVIC, Baosteel, Chinalco, and Sinochem Group are all centrally 
owned, so the central government is in fact pulling the strings and making the key 
decisions in COMAC. The central government will channel money toward the project as 
needed and faces no direct competition from other airliners. 
 In accordance with company law, COMAC follows a modern corporation system 
in which it has an association of stockholders, a Board of Supervisors, and a Board of 
Directors. The Board of Supervisors is made up of party members from the central 
government from the Central Military Commission, the CAAC, and the Department of 
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Commerce. This board represents the national interest of the country and can overrule 
any corporate or business-related decisions. What is deemed in the national interest of the 
country trumps any commercial business interest.   
Although this company is considered a limited liability company with a multitude 
of shareholders, the central government holds the majority share and therefore makes all 
decisions regarding the direction and strategy of the company, all the way down to 
management. The central government hand-picked Zhang Qingwei to serve as the 
chairman of the board, and selected candidates for other key management positions as 
well.  
What China hasn’t learned from the Y-10 experience is that individuals need to be 
held accountable for the success or failure of the aircraft’s development Problems can in 
fact emerge that are beyond management’s control because factory workers responsible 
for producing parts for the plane still remain unmotivated. Although it is true that the 
workers will receive an additional bonus should the plane profit, they still know the 
government will set aside a portion of the market for the C919. Therefore, they assume 
that the plane will profit anyhow, and that their bonuses will automatically come without 
having to work extremely hard. Just as during production of the Y-10, it still remains 
difficult to fire unproductive factory workers, as they for the most part they are still 
guaranteed lifetime employment. 
 
COMPETING WITH THE C-919 
With China expected to consume 25 percent of the world’s aircraft large aircraft 




expected to grow even greater--projections argue that, by 2029, the world will require a 
total of 26,000 new passenger and freight planes worth over $1.3 trillion--foreign aircraft 
manufacturers (in Canada, Russia, and possibly Brazil), in addition to China’s COMAC, 
have now committed to production of their own large passenger aircraft in the 150-190 
seat range in pursuit of a share of the pie, which will make will make it far more difficult 
for manufacturers to profit without distinguishing themselves from the competition.
555
 
The central government’s firm control over all aircraft purchases through the CAAC will 
certainly set a portion of the market for the C919 regardless of the plane’s performance 
vis-à-vis the competition.  
Both Airbus and Boeing however have decided to compete in this market by 
producing derivatives of their current 150-190 seat planes: the A320NEO and the B737 
MAX.  A major reason for why Airbus has chosen to reequip its A320 aircraft aside from 
being cash strapped is that it believes the technology for creating an entirely new narrow-
bodied aircraft in the 190 seat range is that the technology will not be ready or perfected 
for at least another two decades; therefore it wouldn’t make sense to develop a new plane. 
Designing another aircraft from scratch would cost somewhere in the ballpark of $7 to 
$10 billion; that is a hefty price to pay when technology is not advanced enough to gain a 
significant competitive advantage over its rivals. Refitting its A320 aircraft will cost 
$1.31 billion dollars and will save airlines hundreds of millions of dollars each year, 
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considering current fuel prices.
556
 Airbus does realize that there will be guaranteed C919 
orders in China, and that it will be competing mainly with Boeing for the share of the 
market that is unreserved. Airbus can also benefit should the C919 delay its launch and 
airlines are in desperate need of aircraft. 
The A320NEO will be equipped with a new engine that will reduce oil 
consumption by nearly 15 percent, placing it on par with, and is expected to debut at the 
same time as, the C919 in 2016.
557
 The A320NEO will also have 95- percent airframe 
commonality with other Airbus airplanes, which will serve as another strong selling point 
for choosing this plane over its competition. It will be able to share and alternate parts 
among Airbus planes in different ranges. Its main competitive advantage, however, lies in 
the reputation and the reliability of its products that have developed over the years, and it 
is confident that its airplane will debut on time.  
  Originally, Boeing believed the best course of action to stay ahead of the 
competition was to produce an entirely new, technologically advanced aircraft, despite 
the great risk involved. If unsuccessful, the company can avoid forfeiting a great deal of 
the market to the competition over the next 10 years by realizing several years into the 
development of a new aircraft, that the project simply isn’t feasible. It can then switch its 
production line toward equipping its B737 with a new engine, to avoid relinquishing as 
much as it can of the market to its competitors. If successful, Boeing will have great 
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potential to consume the lion’s share of the world’s single-aisle market. A new successful 
Boeing aircraft will pose a great risk to Airbus customers, because those who opt to buy 
the A320Neo will have invested billions of dollars in a plane that will be obsolete in just 
a few years. Airbus would then try to seek parity with the new B737. This may in fact 
discourage airlines from buying the A320 NEO. 
However, with the trouble that Boeing had encountered with nearly a three year 
delay in the debut of the B787, it fears that launching a new technologically advanced 
aircraft would be very risky. The Airbus NEO has secured more than a 1,000 orders for 
its plane, thus far.  After conducting market research, Boeing had come to the conclusion, 
that there is an expectation that airlines within this decade will be looking to replace their 
old MD80/90, B737 and A320 planes with newer more-fuel efficient planes as their 
current fleet reaches their 25 year-retirement limit. Some reports indicate that the world-
wide demand for new aircraft in this range is over 7,000.
558
 Boeing stands to lose a lot 
should a new aircraft be delayed. This will leave airlines with no choice other than to 
purchase a more reliable fuel-efficient airplane from another manufacturer. 
 Therefore in August 2011, Boeing decided to launch its B737Max aircraft, which 
is expected to debut in 2017 and to provide a 4% lower fuel burn and 7 % reduction in 
operating costs compared to the AirbusNEO. The engine for this plane will be provided 
by CFM International, a joint venture between General Electric and Snecma. 
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A NEW STRATEGY FOR COMPETING IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION 
A more viable strategy for both Airbus and Boeing--to ensure that aircraft 
manufacturers’ profit and loss is tied to the market economy and not to the massive 
quantities of subsidies channeled into production, launch costs, and or guaranteed 
purchases of homegrown aircraft--will be to work out an agreement in the WTO that puts 
into law restrictions and caps on the amounts of direct and indirect subsidies that can be 
channeled toward aircraft manufacturers. This agreement should also include unfairly 
reserving a portion of a home market for domestically made aircraft. 
A collective body representing the WTO members should monitor and subject 
manufacturers and their respective governments to close scrutiny, and if a nation’s firm is 
found in violation of the agreement, other member governments should disqualify their 
domestic airlines from purchasing the violator’s aircraft. Together the host countries 
involved in the agreement would possess leverage as they would constitute possibly more 
than 60% of the world market share so such restrictions influence a firm’s ability to 
profit. This would clearly set the tone for future aircraft manufacturers who wish to enter 
the fray; should they not comply, punitive measures will be imposed on them. 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON BOEING 
 If such an agreement or a new American industrial policy is not worked out, 
Boeing stands to lose immensely Although the U.S. government placed Boeing in a 
category of too big to fail because it remains the sole commercial aircraft manufacturer in 
the U.S. and is a major supplier of weaponry and weapon systems to the military, the 




business will not be good in the future. The American government will let Boeing 
eliminate jobs so it can cut costs and operate as an efficient business, however it will 
allow everything short of failing; they will bail the company out if the potential for 
bankruptcy exists. 
 As in all profit-seeking entities, when businesses are doing well, they expand and 
increase their number of employees, and when they’re floundering, they downsize, laying 
off workers, which clearly affects state and local economies. For example, during the 
height of the Cold War in 1983, Boeing hired over 50,000 workers in the Puget Sound 
Area of Seattle, Washington.
559
  However, when the Cold War was winding down in the 
early 1990s, President Bush announced a plan to unilaterally reduce the American 
military budget by $50 billion over a 5-year period, resulting in a reduction of the 
American nuclear arsenal and eliminating several categories of weaponry.
560
 These cuts, 
along with the completion of the 747-400 production line, which entailed such startup 
jobs as flight testing, issuing certifications, and production work that usually took five 
people were no longer needed. 
 Also, because of a slowdown in commercial airplane orders as result of a heavy 
competition from the heavily subsidized European Consortium Airbus, Boeing cut more 
than 28,000 jobs in 1995, which amounted to 13 percent of its workforce.
561
 With the 
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 “COMPANY NEWS; AIRCRAFT MAKER SAYS WORK FORCE WAS CUT 13 percent IN 1993,” 






majority of workers earning around $37,400 per year, the local economies in Puget and 
Kansas City were set to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in business revenue. There 
were further cuts in 2001, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, resulting in a 
Boeing loss of 38,180 jobs.
562
  When jobs are lost, engineers are not creating new and 
innovative products that consumers need, want, and desire. This could place Boeing at a 
strategic disadvantage against companies that are heavily subsidized and could retain 
their workforce.  
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON AIRBUS 
 Unlike Boeing, Airbus’s strong unions ensure that, regardless of the nature of the 
economy, its employees remain hired; Airbus maintains such a capability because it is 
heavily subsidized by a consortium of European nations. It particularly dislikes laying off 
workers, because the countries that make up the consortium are socialist in nature; 
however, when business is bad, it has in the past offered incentives to its employees, such 
as favorable early retirement packages, that they would have trouble refusing. During 
troubled economic times, the company has overextended itself, committing to the 
development of aircraft within multiple ranges, thus limiting its leeway to fill a gap in the 
market whenever one appears. Airbus, with the demands of the A350 and A380 
programs, does not possess the manpower or the financial capital at this juncture to 
launch a new narrow-body aircraft if that was what the market demanded. 
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STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES OF THE FRAMEWORK 
After conducting this study, the author began to unravel the usefulness of this 
theoretical framework that combines the work of Peter Evans and Michael Porter. The 
framework’s strengths lie in pinpointing what the state could do to increase the likelihood 
of developing an international competitive industry. We see that certain institutional 
arrangements as articulated by Evans are more conducive to implementing sound policy 
capable of satisfying the important variables Porter suggests are important for developing 
an international competitive industry. Through this framework, we can clearly point to 
the areas in which the state has or has not to the best of its ability put itself in a position 
to compete and sustain an advantage. This framework also can point to the source or the 
reasons for why the state has not been able to satisfy a particular variable. It might be 
that, given the state’s institutional arrangement with society, it is limited in to what types 
of policies it could implement. The problem may not lie in the state-societal 
configuration, and the source of the problem may be the state’s neglect of a certain area. 
Whatever the case, the framework allows us to not only locate the problem but suggest 
how to fix it. 
 This framework is particularly useful for states wishing to develop or strengthen 
their indigenous capabilities, particularly in the high-technology field, which is important 
because of the benefits and spillovers to the overall economy and the military. Success in 
such sectors often translates into major improvements in the overall economy and the 
living standard of the people. Unlike other industries, high technologies are unique in that 
they are normally driven toward a natural monopoly and require the employment of 




However, after utilizing this framework, it is apparent that the framework does 
have inherent weaknesses. Evans’s embedded autonomy model, for example, does not 
clearly specify how much autonomy or societal embeddedness must be present for the 
state to be considered predatory, intermediate, or developmental. This did pose a problem 
for the Chinese cases used in this study, because the evidence of China under Mao being 
predatory, or intermediate under Deng, was more than obvious. In analyzing less-obvious 
cases, it might not be as easy to categorize.  
Secondly, this theoretical framework might be considered limited in its 
explanatory power when it come assessing how to produce a favorable diamond for 
increasing the probability of developing or sustaining a competitive advantage, because 
individual state diamonds do not acknowledge that large portions of a company’s 
operations may lie outside its home country; it is not correct to assume, or suggest, that a 
nation’s competitive advantage rests solely upon the strength of its diamond in its home 
country.
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 This did not pose a problem for the cases used in this study; however, perhaps 
the theoretical framework can be revised to include supranational diamonds. For 
example, when assessing the competitive advantage of the U.S., Mexico, or even Canada, 
it might not be wise to look just at one country in particular, because, due to their close 
proximity to one another, they draw on each other’s resources, factor bases, competition, 
demand, and supporting and related industries, etc.
564
 Firms can rely on the diamonds of 
other nations for their success; this framework fails to take that into consideration.  
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Airbus serves as another litmus test for the framework’s limitations. The 
theoretical framework falls short in its ability to collectively determine a group of States’ 
institutional arrangements with society, enabling us to categorize the member states as a 
developmental, intermediate, or predatory state. It then becomes rather difficult to 
determine the best, or most likely, policy options available for influencing important 
societal variables in the development of an industry.  The theoretical framework, that is, 
lacks the ability to collectively categorize member states as embedded or autonomous, or 
to look at a collective diamond to pinpoint where there are areas for gaining a 
competitive advantage.   
It is possible, however, to identify the largest shareholder of a company--which 
usually is not only devising company strategy and goals, but building the fundamental 
parts and components of the aircraft (engine, aircraft design, propulsion, etc.), which is 
where the competitive advantage traditionally lies. We can classify the State-industry 
arrangement of that member country and then determine from a normative perspective 
how best it can manipulate its societal variable. Nevertheless, the framework has the 
weakness of not being able to draw on the diamonds of its member countries. 
Additionally, Porter’s Diamond Model fails to take in to account alternative ways 
in which a nation might acquire technology, such as through commercial espionage. 
Many countries, such as China, have devoted an exorbitant amount of money to acquiring 
technology through spying. Many other countries, like the United States, have yet to 
figure out a way to combat this espionage without placing limits on foreign nationals’ 
ability to study, work for high technology companies, or open businesses in the United 




way to balance the talent that foreign nationals contribute to American society as a whole 
with a program to battle theft of corporate and/or national secrets.   
Another way in which the framework can be modified is to include a cultural 
variable to better understand why certain countries or firms have had trouble applying, 
and adapting to, techniques learned from joint ventures and their relations with successful 
firms because their unique culture doesn’t adapt easily to the management style, 
processes, and techniques of their more advanced partners.  The variable should also 
include ways and means in which a nation or firm could best incorporate, or adapt to, the 
culture and methods of advanced partners in a joint venture.  
 
THE FRAMEWORK AND HIGH-SPEED RAIL 
It would be interesting to look at the high-speed rail industry through the lens of 
the modified framework. The Chinese were once junior partners with Japan’s Kawasaki 
Heavy Industries, Siemens AG, Alstom SA, and Bombardier, Inc. and are now competing 
with them internationally.
565
  China claims to have a high-speed rail capability that has 
advanced beyond the technological level of the very foreign firms that have served as its 
mentors in the field. The Chinese developed a rail network that extends from Shanghai to 
Hangzhou and has the capacity to sustain cruising speeds of more than 245 mph. The 
fastest European and Japanese trains were clocked at 199 mph. 
The successful strategy China claims to have employed in order to exceed the 
competition was that the central government channeled funds to its State-owned 
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enterprises for obtaining, and learning how to create and use, advanced foreign 
technology. Many companies that have wished to tap into China’s large market have been 
willing to give up large amounts of advanced technology. By handing over such 
technology to the Chinese, they have groomed another competitor in the global 
marketplace. China does acknowledge that its trains have been partially developed with 
foreign technology, but, at the same time, officials from the China South Locomotive and 
Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corp. (CSR) claim that they have further advanced the 
product through their own research and development. The Chinese claim to have made an 
indigenous Chinese product by systematically compiling all of the technologies and 
resources gained from various foreign companies and tweaking them to meet China’s 
needs.
566
 In doing so, they have, they argue, created something original.  
Many Japanese companies, including Kawasaki, have said on the record that 
China did in fact not develop an indigenous model; all it did was reverse-engineer 
existing Japanese trains and sell them overseas, which is in clear violation of the original 
agreement Japan made with China that prevented the latter from selling trains possessing 
Japanese intellectual property abroad. According to Kawasaki, China merely copied the 
Japanese design and used exactly the same technology in its train, changing only the 
exterior paint scheme and interior trims, along with providing a stronger propulsion 
system to reach higher speeds.
567
 Utilizing the refined framework will pinpoint the 
strengths and weaknesses of what the Chinese are doing, and carve a path forward for 
enhanced competitiveness.  
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Starter questions that I asked interviewees in order to open the dialogue 
 
1. What effect did the Cultural Revolution have on the aviation industry and what 
damages were served to other high technology industries in general? 
2. How did Mao’s shutting down of Universities for over a 4 year period factor into 
China’s troubles with developing its high technology sectors? 
3. As relations began to improve with the United States in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s, did the desire for creating an indigenous aircraft decrease? 
4. As confrontation with the United States began to diminish and economic relations 
between the two countries began to grow, did the absence of powerful enemy, 
diminish the need for creating an airliner that can contribute to its air defenses? 
5. What role did Nixon’s historic visit to China have on the government’s decision 
to not pursue the manufacturing of an indigenous airliner? 
6. Did the availability of Boeing aircraft for purchase factor in to not pursuing the 
building of an indigenous aircraft?  
7. Was it realized that it was far cheaper to buy planes than produce an indigenous 
aircraft when there was no immediate threat of war?  
8.  What goes into the process of reverse engineering an airplane? How difficult is 
it? What problems did the Chinese encounter when trying to copy Soviet and 
American aircraft? 
9. What has China learned from copying Soviet Aircraft (Yun 5, 8, 12 etc.) and what 
of that has been incorporated into the ARJ-21 and COMAC 919? 
10. What role did the Tiananmen Square Massacre and its aftermath have on China 
deciding to once again work on building an indigenous aircraft? 
11. What new technologies was pertinent to China’s development of an indigenous 
aircraft but was off limits as a result of Tiananmen Square? 
12. As relations with the United States began to improve several years later, how did 
the joint ventures that the Chinese government set up with Boeing, Airbus and 
McDonnell Douglas help it to acquire and learn about state-of-the- art 
technologies needed for aircraft development? 
13.  What does and how does China plan on overcoming its inability to develop 
engines for aircraft? 
14. What strategies has China employed to continue to gain state-of-the-art 
technologies from foreign manufacturers? What strategies has the government 
employed to produce state-of-the-art technologies on its own? 
15. How did China assess the need for aircraft development following the 1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis? 





17. Why did the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAI) and the Aviation Industries of 
China (AVIC) have trouble meeting the FAA standards for certification of its 
copied planes? 
18. Why did the AVIC originally doubt that China’s building of a large passenger 
aircraft could ever meet FAA standards? Has it changed its views since and if yes, 
why? 
19.  Why was the Yun 12 able to get this certification and others were not? 
20. What is China doing to make sure that that its indigenous aircraft will be able to 
get this certification? 
21. Has China employed any former scientists or engineers that have previously 
worked for Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas? How have they contributed 
to China’s production of its indigenous aircraft?  
22.  Why will domestic airliners purchase China’s indigenous large commercial 
aircraft (COMAC 919) 
23. How does the COMAC 919, distinguish itself from its competitors? 
24. What features and advanced technologies does the COMAC 919 possesses that its 
competitors do not have? 
25. Is there any domestic and international demand for these innovative technologies? 
What is China’s marketing strategy to entice domestic and international airlines to 
buy the COMAC 919? 
26. How did China come up with the innovative technologies for their aircraft? 
27. Why will American airlines purchase this plane? 
























Units of Yuan 
Year 
Per Capita Annual Income and 
Expenditures of Urban Household 
Per Capita Annual Income and 



















Index (%) Income Income  (%) 
1978 315.00  274.00 163.00 59.5 104.71  81.70   
1979 361.04 114.3 302.98 177.21 58.5 133.56 127.6  67.32 60.7 
1980 413.80 108.1 335.02 192.66 57.5 160.78 120.5 135.51 78.49 57.9 
1981 436.90 103.1 363.23 205.18 56.5 215.57 133.4 165.57 89.08 53.8 
1982 462.24 103.9 382.47 214.17 56.0 216.74 99.7 177.90 101.18 56.9 
1983 483.21 101.6 405.00 232.07 57.3 272.00 124.5 196.35 113.71 57.9 
1984 537.28 108.8 431.68 244.37 56.6 301.17 110.3 219.64 122.46 55.8 
1985 653.62 114.2 556.72 277.74 49.9 328.78 107.0 260.19 145.83 56.0 
1986 790.04 113.2 653.83 333.59 51.0 333.64 99.7 292.48 159.88 54.7 
1987 893.28 104.9 711.27 379.57 53.4 377.72 110.1 309.90 164.03 52.9 
1988 946.10 87.2 896.55 465.99 52.0 401.32 98.2 346.73 179.42 51.7 
1989 1,111.46 102.2 963.97 533.19 55.3 457.06 102.5 390.05 199.99 51.3 
1990 1,267.73 113.5 1,067.67 585.27 54.8 526.95 105.5 437.73 240.93 55.0 
1991 1,384.81 103.9 1,199.95 644.26 53.7 539.29 102.3 454.68 242.83 53.4 
1992 1,608.03 107.8 1,342.58 716.99 53.4 588.48 104.9 472.61 264.02 55.9 
1993 1,962.75 110.4 1,609.26 798.78 49.6 695.85 109.0 564.93 334.52 59.2 
1994 2,618.55 104.7 2,155.15 1,074.18 49.8 909.81 103.4 731.78 426.17 58.2 
1995 3,299.46 107.8 2,673.95 1,338.93 50.1 1,231.97 109.5 929.39 544.26 58.6 
1996 3,755.44 103.9 3,009.35 1,439.32 47.8 1,579.19 113.8 1,206.43 670.89 55.6 
1997 4,093.62 106.4 3,378.02 1,506.25 44.6 1,733.89 107.4 1,270.52 693.09 54.6 
1998 4,219.42 105.3 3,415.65 1,454.99 42.6 1,864.05 106.5 1,240.30 700.78 56.5 
1999 4,532.36 111.2 3,497.53 1,427.65 40.8 1,948.36 106.4 1,163.98 617.46 53.0 
2000 4,766.26 106.1 3,830.71 1,386.76 36.2 1,985.82 103.9 1,315.83 654.13 49.7 
2001 5,267.42 108.8 4,110.17 1,424.90 34.7 2,097.86 104.9 1,375.60 668.77 48.6 
2002 6,245.40 114.2 4,504.68 1,517.04 33.7 2,215.74 105.1 1,451.51 697.02 48.0 
2003 6,926.12 109.0 4,941.60 1,662.30 33.6 2,235.68 99.6 1,508.67 726.57 48.2 
2004 7,704.90 105.5 5,294.19 1,855.44 35.0 2,553.15 108.1 1,664.09 808.27 48.6 
2005 8,667.97 110.2 6,038.02 2,067.51 34.2 2,870.58 107.5 1,891.57 858.97 45.4 
2006 9,810.26 111.9 6,685.18 2,215.32 33.1 3,261.03 112.1 2,229.28 911.48 40.9 
2007 11,477.05 111.0 7,826.72 2,707.44 34.6 3,851.60 112.2 2,676.41 1,017.43 38.0 
2008 13,231.11 108.3 8,837.46 3,079.82 34.8 4,454.24 107.2 3,044.21 1,165.81 38.3 
a) Data on disposable income of urban household are calculated on basis of income of living in 1978-1991. 








Appendix B-2: Passenger Traffic by Mode of Transport (1,000,000 persons and 
percentage of total).  
 
Source: Jiacheng, Zheng, Statistical Yearbook of China, (Zhongguo Tonji Nianjian), 







Year Total Railway (%) Highway (%) Water (%) 
Civil 
Aviation (%) 
1952 245.18 163.5 66.7 45.6 18.5 36 14.7 0.02 0 
1957 638.21 312.6 48.9 237.7 37.2 87.8 13.7 0.04 0.01 
1962 122.54 750 61.4 307.4 25.1 163.9 13.4 0.17 0.01 
1965 963.34 412.5 42.8 436.9 45.3 113.7 11.8 0.27 0.02 
1970 1,300.56 524.6 40.3 618.1 47.5 157.6 12.1 0.22 0.01 
1975 1,929.69 704.6 36.5 1,013.50 52.5 210.5 10.8 1.39 0.07 
1978 2,539.63 814.9 32 1,492.30 58.7 230.4 9 2.31 0.09 
1980 3,417.85 922.1 26.9 2,228.00 65.1 264.4 7.7 3.43 0.1 
1985 6,202.06 1,121.10 18 4,764.90 76.8 308.6 4.9 7.47 0.12 
1988 8,095.92 1,226.40 15.1 6,504.70 80.3 350.3 4.3 14.4 0.17 
1990 7,726.82 957.1 12.4 6,480.80 83.8 272.2 3.5 16.6 0.21 
1992 8,608.55 996.9 11.5 7,317.70 85 265 3 28.8 0.33 
1994 10,928.83 1,087.40 9.9 9,539.40 87.2 261.6 2.3 40.3 0.36 
1996 12,447.22 941.5 7.5 11,221.10 90.1 228.9 1.8 55.5 0.44 






















































































































































































































































































































































Note: data is calculated by the current price    
Appendix B-3: National Income 
Source: Jiacheng, Zheng, Statistical Yearbook of China, (Zhongguo Tonji Nianjian), 
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1999), (Beijing Zhonggup Tonji Nianjian 





                        APPENDIX B-4                        
     
    
 



























1950 1,086 155 6,345 1.04 978 767 82 157 69.5 
1951   294 13,013 2.39 2,261 1,670 168 349 73.5 
1952 2,242 357 14,474 2.22 2,409 2,047 243 435 69.8 
1953 3,021 469 18,812 2.84 3,322 3,608 447 712 79.9 
1954 4,077 636 25,495 4.21 5,107 4,734 560 969 79.7 
1955 5,687 769 31,195 4.86 5,685 4,711 514 1,012 72.5 
1956 7,816 1,066 41,302 8.84 10,352 7,925 826 1,733 80.8 
1957 7,076 990 36,084 6.85 7,987 7,976 825 1,534 76.5 
1958 12,369 1,273 46,696 12.35 11,881 15,099 1,331 2,290 81.1 
1959 18,264 1,677 62,317 15.96 14,264 25,659 2,233 3,393 86.4 
1960 21,414 1,815 69,657 20.73 16,188 31,788 2,649 4,045 87.7 
1961 21,740 1,749 67,903 20.2 13,805 29,255 2,398 3,586 85.5 
1962 16,606 1,309 50,673 16.88 11,724 18,469 1,544 2,561 81.2 
1963 17,645 1,462 54,326 17.6 14,011 20,700 1,720 2,935 78.6 
1964 19,019 1,626 57,608 23.58 19,948 22,458 1,957 3,672 67.9 
1965 20,287 1,776 61,221 27.21 24,835 27,163 2,510 4,662 73.4 
1966 19,858 1,798 61,061 26.29 21,889 33,261 3,237 4,965 71.9 
1967 21,462 1,888 64,041 30.56 24,357 38,511 3,802 5,568 74.3 
1968 16,741 1,617 52,528 24.97 20,657 30,383 3,167 4,664 71.8 
     1969 16,788 1,580 50,637 21.64 17,132 32,745 3,275 4,528 63.9 
1970 16,890 1,619 52,638 21.73 17,924 36,891 3,520 4,822 63.3 
1971 18,950 1,743 56,077 33.63 29,520 33,171 3,206 5,373 68 
1972 19,120 1,849 58,138 46.48 41,918 29,633 2,944 6,089 71.1 
1973 20,546 2,009 59,176 60.01 57,275 28,149 3,004 7,228 71.6 
1974 26,150 2,728 69,624 94.19 93,191 35,307 4,180 11,062 56.8 
1975 32,535 3,550 85,351 138.99 153,854 46,556 6,016 17,181 58.9 
1976 35,504 3,714 87,622 146.31 157,441 53,179 7,255 18,681 58.9 
1977 38,068 3,765 87,837 164.57 183,449 53,019 7,592 20,801 63.9 
1978 46,776 4,829 108,790 230.91 279,191 63,816 9,705 219,866 66.4 
1979 5,770 5,943 127,130 297.98 349,927 79,873 12,341 375,36 64 
1980 60,676 6,442 131,483 343.12 395,552 88,866 14,060 429,35 63 
1981 62,907 6,880 130,954 401.29 501,602 94,206 16,966 53,583 63.1 
1982 67,433 7,669 142,573 445.23 595,053 101,675 19,809 63,249 64.4 





Appendix B-4: (Main index of air transport from 1950-2003) 
 
Source: Planning & Development Department of Civil Aviation Administration, 
(Zhongguo Minyong Hangkong Zongju Guihua Fazhan Si), (Statistical Data on Civil 


































thousand (tons) (kilometers) 
1984 69,876 8,764 151,146 554.17 831,576 1,850,439 31,086 92,249 66.8 
1985 85,030 11,119 185,310 746.79 1,157,163 195,059 41,513 127,102 68.2 
1986 102,907 13,636 219,641 996.41 1,460,028 224,341 48,077 154,801 64.5 
1987 130,545 17,075 278,745 1,246.57 1,860,634 292,063 65,236 202,833 66.1 
1988 139,303 18,877 309,207 1,442.47 2,169,087 328,052 73,081 231,212 67.2 
1989 136,267 18,568 302,902 1,283.06 1,867,691 309,698 69,341 205,602 59.5 
1990 167,190 21,962 357,345 1,659.61 2,304,797 369,722 81,824 249,951 58.9 
1991 204,895 26,263 431,780 2,178.12 3,013,185 451,985 100,954 320,663 63.8 
1992 236,975 31,908 496,369 2,886.38 4,061,204 575,269 134,240 428,456 64.2 
1993 287,228 39,797 603,097 3,383.15 4,776,045 693,935 166,139 511,820 58.4 
1994 356,798 47,464 694,702 4,039.39 5,515,802 829,434 185,766 584,122 56.8 
1995 437,877 56,232 826,373 5,117.13 6,813,036 1,011,145 222,981 714,385 58.8 
1996 486,995 63,768 1,032,104 5,555.39 7,478,419 1,149,715 249,325 806,078 59.2 
1997 513,164 68,983 1,102,041 5,629.66 7,735,168 1,246,590 291,024 866,771 57.1 
1998 566,817 78,095 1,241,734 5,754.82 8,002,444 1,400,556 334,505 929,736 53.3 
1999 598,932 83,879 1,327,894 6,093.81 8,572,818 1,704,296 423,427 1,061,127 55.6 
2000 631,017 92,439 1,443,387 6,721.66 9,705,437 1,967,123 502,683 1,225,007 57.3 
2001 707,272 104,950 1,639,940 7,524.28 10,913,539 1,709,814 431,750 1,411,918 58.5 
2002 792,523 117,816 1,835,564 8,594.17 12,687,022 2,020,620 515,515 1,649,267 60.7 








































-tion 154,612 27,555 10,147 … 11,849 20,818 15,794 9,929 17,698 37,682 594 254 
1949 116,504 30,320 9,820 541 15,234 12,039 11,829 6,984 19,362 7,338 282 275 
1950 137,470 38,462 11,435 1,833 17,414 13,312 10,147 9,845 24,084 6,984 297 365 
1951 153,402 48,517 9,564 2,436 21,356 18,225 11,936 7,801 25,300 4,225 180 386 
1952 191,147 66,583 13,262 2,209 24,752 31,551 13,511 9,563 21,974 3,830 325 358 
                        
 
1953 212,181 79,975 12,852 2,567 29,025 39,958 14,246 12,382 13,472 3,908 1,096 270 
1954 252,978 94,991 12,805 3,090 33,919 53,112 18,346 17,096 11,153 4,017 1,900 254 
1955 287,653 109,598 17,264 4,002 36,472 60,657 17,950 19,994 11,395 4,801 2,283 223 
1956 403,176 149,360 30,718 5,755 45,902 98,821 22,468 24,930 12,803 7,108 2,699 261 
1957 441,181 163,026 33,823 6,065 49,107 114,795 19,643 28,660 12,048 8,245 3,252 251 
                        
 
1958 659,627 257,277 58,192 9,702 77,079 157,278 25,965 41,123 14,322 7,114 7,278 421 
1959 811,947 325,556 67,445 12,484 93,680 192,285 31,340 58,106 11,881 5,674 8,023 547 
1960 961,623 388,769 80,402 14,839 116,925 204,498 33,905 83,608 14.297 5,271 9,086 1,005 
1961 947,166 371,560 82,932 15,873 120,410 186,841 33,430 97,194 15,026 6,126 9,029 874 
1962 829,699 345,247 66,863 13,862 108,470 137,561 40,098 88,433 12,096 3,796 6,334 693 
                        
 
1963 750,118 319,524 60,531 12,673 96,140 114,296 39,548 79,522 13,388 3,571 5,329 555 
1964 85,314 296,831 55,603 10,352 85,195 97,462 41,205 71,164 14,540 3,725 4,561 4,567 
1965 674,436 295,273 53,447 9,793 82,861 94,268 46,038 62,232 18,118 4,144 4,026 423 
1966 533,766 233,750 43,008 8,134 64,129 72,003 39,017 48,218 15,324 3,527 3,382 32 
1967 408,930 187,679 31,552 6,188 50,648 48,776 28,482 37,165 10,992 2,643 2,395 24 
1968 258,736 127,845 18,509 3,697 32,065 25,078 16,791 24,728 5,863 1,431 1,282 14 
1969 108,617 61,480 5,654 935 17,874 2,516 6,217 12,507 647 123 一 6 
1970 47,815 11,623 1,090 330 13,235 9,140 7,240 4,357 90 一 一 7 
                        
 
1971 83,400 23,700 4,850 670 18,060 16,840 10,610 6,420 220 80 1,000 9 
1972 193,719 69,918 11,372 1,601 38,340 33,557 19,819 15,002 1,134 一 1,656 13 
1973 313,645 118,396 20,514 1,213 57,203 56,365 28,412 22,019 2,836 36 4,016 26 
1974 429,981 168,348 25,246 3,824 73,226 78,544 36,111 30,055 5,340 329 5,646 33 
1975 500,993 186,298 36,137 6,085 86,336 97,362 37,115 33,888 7,092 269 6,880 35 
                        
 
1976 564,715 198,079 50,529 8,612 98,381 109,731 42,879 39,285 6,569 410 5,843 43 
1977 625,319 209,004 53,631 7,194 93,822 165,105 35,038 41,817 7,992 576 6,357 47 
1978 856,322 287,648 53,712 7,915 112,990 249,940 46,153 64,170 18,190 1,299 8,643 56 
1979 1,019,950 345,430 58,399 10,997 127,400 311,168 57,244 70,036 21,597 3,315 9,048 53 
1980 1,143,712 383,520 70,494 11,681 139,569 338,197 58,054 83,651 37,082 6,029 9,412 65 




Appendix: B-5: Undergraduate Students Enrollment 
 
Source: China Education Yearbook Editorial Department  (Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian 
Bian Ji Bu ), China Education Yearbook (1949-1981), Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian( 
1949-1981), (Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1984), (Zhong Guo Da Bai Ke 






Units of 10,000 










liberation 28.93 66.4 2,368.30 … 118.5 
            
1949 34.68 61 2,439.10 680 64.6 
1950 38.36 73.9 2,892.40 696.6 78.3 
1951 50.11 111.8 4,315.40 1,086.20 116.6 
1952 52.7 126.3 5,110.00 1,149.30 149 
            
1953 51.21 132.1 5,166.40 819.5 293.5 
1954 50.61 131.6 5,121.80 1,054.50 332.5 
1955 50.41 133.8 5,312.60 1,182.00 322.9 
1956 52.9 148 6,346.60 1,592.30 405.1 
1957 54.73 156.7 6,428.30 1,249.20 498 
            
1958 77.68 201.9 8,640.30 3,000.50 606.3 
1959 73.74 201.9 8,640.30 3,000.50 606.3 
1960 72.65 … 9,379.10 2,494.30 734 
1961 64.52 204.8 7,578.60 1,647.10 580.8 
1962 66.83 199.5 6,923.90 1,586.30 559 
            
1963 70.8 207.7 7,157.50 1,698.20 476.8 
1964 106.6 267 9,294.50 2,968.90 567.4 
1965 168.19 341.6 11,620.90 3,296.00 667.6 
            
1966 100.7 … 10,341.70 1,879.20 900.5 
1967 96.42 … 10,244.30 1,402.50 899.5 
1968 94.06 … 10,036.30 1,753.20 1,489.50 
1969 91.57 … 10,066.80 2,205.70 1,489.50 
1970 96.11 … 10,528.00 2,831.80 1,652.50 
            
1971 96.85 … 11,211.20 3,387.50 1,376.00 
1972 100.92 … 12,549.20 3,603.60 1,414.90 
1973 103.17 … 13,570.40 3,369.30 1,349.00 
1974 105.33 413.9 14,481.40 3,249.50 1,521.00 
1975 109.33 433.1 15,094.10 3,352.10 1,999.40 
            
1976 104.43 439 15,005.50 3,161.10 2,489.50 
1977 98.23 427 14,617.60 3,111.50 2,573.90 
1978 94.93 423.7 14,624.00 3,315.40 2,287.90 
1979 92.35 427.5 14,662.90 3,101.70 2,087.90 
1980 91.73 427.9 14,627.00 2,942.30 2,053.30 
            






Appendix: B-6: Primary School Education: Number of students, classes and schools 
 
Source: China Education Yearbook Editorial Department, (Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian 
Bian Ji Bu ), China Education Yearbook (1949-1981), Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian( 
1949-1981), (Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1984), ( Zhong Guo Da Bai Ke 


















































Number of Students Students Enrollment Number of Graduates 
Total High School 
Middle 
School High School 
Middle 







liberation 149.59 31.79 117.8 … … … … 
1949 103．90 20．72 83．18 7.1 34.1 6.1 21.9 
1950 130.49 23.8 106.69 10.8 50.1 6.1 21.9 
1951 156.81 18.44 138.37 9.1 80.6 5.9 22.5 
1952 249.01 26.02 222.99 14.1 124.2 3.6 18.5 
                
1953 293.26 36 257.26 16.1 81.8 5.6 39.8 
1954 358.67 47.8 310.87 19.5 123.6 6.8 57.6 
1955 389.96 57.98 331.98 22.1 128.2 9.9 87 
1956 516.47 78.41 438.06 37.4 196.9 15.4 78.5 
1957 628.13 90.43 437.7 32.3 217 18.7 111.2 
                
1958 852.02 117.88 734.14 56.2 378.3 19.7 111.6 
1959 917.87 143.57 774.3 65.6 318.3 29.9 149.1 
1960 1,026.01 167.49 858.52 67.8 364.8 28.8 142.2 
1961 851.76 153.3 689.46 44.7 221.8 37.9 189.2 
1962 752.8 133.91 618.89 41.7 238.3 44.1 158.4 
                
1963 761.61 123.53 638.03 43.4 263.5 43.3 152.3 
1964 854.03 124.68 729.35 43.8 286.6 36.7 138.6 
1965 933.79 130.82 802.97 45.9 299.8 36 173.8 
                
1966 1,249.80 137.28 1,112.52 20.7 272.7 28 162 
1967 1,223.70 126.46 1,097.24 13.6 198.3 26.8 186.4 
1968 1,392.26 140.79 1,251.47 63 648.5 79.4 519 
1969 2,021.49 189.14 1,832.35 103.6 1,023.40 38 361.4 
1970 2,641.85 349.7 2,292.15 239 1,176.30 67.6 618.9 
                
1971 3,127.61 558.69 2,568.92 321.3 1,234.90 100.4 835 
1972 3,582.44 858.03 2,724.41 479 1,247.10 215.9 1,035.50 
1973 3,446.43 923.28 2,523.15 452 1,139.00 349.4 1,129.40 
1974 3,650.36 1,002.74 2,647.62 541.1 1,345.10 417.9 1,060.60 
1975 4,466.11 1,163.68 3,302.43 633.1 1,810.50 447 1,047.70 
                
1976 5,836.58 1,483.64 4,352.94 861.1 2,344.30 517.2 1,206.00 
1977 6,779.90 1,800.01 4,979.89 993.1 2,367.70 585.8 1,558.60 
1978 6,548.25 1,553.08 4,995.17 692.9 2,006.00 682.7 1,692.60 
1979 5,904.96 1,291.67 4,612.99 614.1 1,727.80 726.5 1,657.90 
1980 5,508.08 969.79 4,538.29 383.4 1,550.90 616.2 964.8 
                





Appendix B-7: Number of students, student enrollment and number of graduates in High 
School and Middle School from 1949 to 1981. 
 
Source: China Education Yearbook Editorial Department  (Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian 
Bian Ji Bu ) China Education Yearbook (1949-1981), Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian( 
1949-1981), (Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1984),  ( Zhong Guo Da Bai Ke 







































































Total 6,402,587 3,478,501 1,387,228 650,890 947,580 382,526 15,793 42,333 52,151 2,924,086 
                        
1949 71,769 23,769 6,327 6,718 430 3,803 5,769 ---- …… 722 48,000 
1950 74,826 21,972 5,513 4,397 331 5,834 5,493 —— 66 338 52,854 
1951 56,905 22,222 4,619 2,702 203 9,589 4,929 —— 60 120 34,683 
1952 68,146 40,758 9,498 4,361 347 15,840 10,535 —— 96 81 27,388 
                        
1953 118,154 58,138 17,025 9,651 869 20,020 10,357 —— 169 47 60,016 
1954 169,503 71,717 23,377 13,038 2,208 19,460 13,483 84 67 —— 97,786 
1955 235,142 96,796 40,768 20,422 3,067 23,192 9,253 37 57 —— 138,346 
1956 173,595 74,734 44,983 7,618 2,605 10,386 8,723 —— 419 —— 98,861 
1957 146,100 95,707 50,753 12,258 2,512 22,984 6,247 681 272 —— 50,393 
                        
1958 190,960 101,292 50,711 21,027 2,609 20,008 5,520 927 490 —— 89,668 
1959 288,947 170,837 80,528 43,504 5,142 30,147 7,167 1, 871 1,601 877 118,110 
1960 267,852 163,111 81,743 33,859 7,345 32,601 1,870 1,462 1,673 2,558 104,741 
1961 339,508 215,970 106,515 53,996 6,233 42,525 2,494 1,522 2,003 691 123,529 
1962 304,895 159,100 72,361 29,149 3,786 44,264 5,524 1,540 2,033 443 145,795 
                        
1963 196,089 107,058 49,092 14,262 2,073 32,660 6,582 540 1,656 193 89,031 
1964 164,699 102,967 53,011 14,569 2,295 23,926 7,147 428 1,591 —— 61,732 
1965 91,388 73,359 40,750 6,409 1,376 12,927 8,835 174 2,283 605 18,029 
                        
1966 118,986 80,393 23,545 13,334 2,166 20,218 16,937 86 3,061 1,046 38,593 
1967 170,329 118,138 44,425 17,380 2,657 31,374 18,111 188 2,769 1,277 52,191 
1968 197,431 135,201 60,675 13,382 1,916 35,651 20,036 266 2,469 806 62,230 
1969 102,845 81,841 53,827 8,399 1,841 9,023 5,236 447 2,614 454 21,004 
1970 28,131 16,815 3,126 3,908 782 4,690 2,345 156 1,652 156 11,316 
                        
1971 88,970 37,960 6,820 12,640 9,680 …… … ……. 8,820 51,010 
1972 94,935 36,210 14,113 4,221 10,094 …… …… ……. 7,782 58,725 
1973 122,067 38,031 11,109 3,348 19,737 3,428 …… ……. 409 84,036 
1974 166,265 78,315 21,984 7,720 40,788 6,202 …… 786 835 87,950 
1975 247,709 123,328 39,606 18,548 46,133 15,524 405 1,369 1,738 124,381 
                      
1976 338,629 190,213 62,341 31,865 68,361 22,331 1,255 1,675 2,403 148,398 
1977 339,706 178,678 56,562 28,067 65,485 24,737 785 1,489 1,553 161,028 
1978 231,990 119,335 31,294 27,055 43,884 13,924 248 2,221 709 112,655 
1979 180,859 78,518 24,175 11,397 1,572 25,220 12,924 387 1,912 931 102,341 




                        
1981 604,920 364,804 138,283 58,803 6,198 93,548 53,803 1,298 3,698 9,173 240,116 
 
Appendix B-8: Number of Graduates in Secondary Vocational School from 1949 to 
1981. 
 
Source: China Education Yearbook Editorial Department,  (Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian 
Bian Ji Bu ), China Education Yearbook (1949-1981), Zhong Guo Jiao Yu Nian Jian( 
1949-1981), (Encyclopedia of China Publishing House), (Zhong Guo Da Bai Ke Quan 































B-1                                                                                                  Joint Venture Suppliers: 
Foreign Company Domestic Company To supply 
Parker 
AVIC Electromechanical 
Systems (AVIC EM) 
Fuel, inverting, and hydraulic systems 
Goodrich 
Jiangsu Tongming Auto Lamp 
Co.,Ltd 
External lighting system 
Honeywell 
AVIC Harbin Dongan Engine 




Systems (AVIC EM) 
Air management systems 
GE AVIC 
Open-architecture, integrated modular 
avionics core processing system, 
flight deck large-area display system, 
on-board maintenance system and the 
flight recording system 
Eaton Corporation 
Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing 
Co., Ltd. 
Fuel and hydraulic conveyance 
systems 
Rockwell Collins 
AVIC's Shanghai Aero 
Measurement-Controlling 
Research Institute 
In-flight entertainment system, cabin 
core system 
Thales 







AVIC's Flight Automatic Control 
Research Institute 
Fly-by-wire flight control system 
Liebherr 




Hunan Boyun New Materials 
Co., Changsha Xinhang Wheel 
and Brake 
Wheel and brake system 
Rockwell Collins 
AVIC's China Leihua Electronic 
Technology Research Institute 
Communication, navigation and 
surveillance systems 
Honeywell 
AVIC Chengdu CAIC 
Electronics Co. 
Inertial reference and air data systems 
Parker 
AVIC's Flight Automatic Control 
Research Institute 
Flight control actuation 
Moog AVIC Qingan Group Co. High Lift System 
Liebherr AVIC Jincheng Co. Environment Control System 
Parker AVIC Jincheng Co. Hydraulics system, fuel tank systems 
Honeywell AVIC Dongan Auxiliary power unit 
Hamilton Sundstrand's 
Kidde Unit 
AVIC Tianjin Aviation Electro-
Mechanical Co. 
Integrated fire and overheat 
protection systems 
FACC Danyang Xin Mei Long 
Interiors: ceiling panels, luggage 
compartments, windows, lavatories 






Systems (AVIC EM) 
Electric power system 
Goodrich 
Xi’an Aircraft International 
Corporation (XAIC) 
Landing gear and engine nacelle 
components 
 
B-2                                                                                                           Foreign Suppliers: 
Company Name To Supply 
CFM [Joint Venture by Snecma (SAFRAN Group), 
and GE] 
 Engine: LEAP-X1C 
 
B-3                                                                                                         Domestic Suppliers: 
Company Name To Supply 
Xizi UHC Not air-tight door, APU Door 
Wuhan Hangda Aero Science & Technology 
Development Co. 
Water systems 
The Research Institute for Special Structures of 
Aeronautical Composite (RISAC) AVIC 
Radome 
AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co. Prow 
AVIC HONGDU Aviation Industry Group Fore fuselage, Mid-after fuselage 
Xi’an Aircraft Industry (Group) Co. Fuselage (including center wing), outer 




aileron and spoiler 
AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Co. after fuselage, tail cone, vertical tail, engine hanger 
and APU door 
AVIC Changhe Aircraft Industries Group Co. leading edge slot and trailing edge flap 
AVIC HAIG vertical tail, front landing gear door, main landing 
gear door and wing fuselage fillets 
Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co. Mid fuselage-center wing 
Aerospace Research Institute of Materials & 
Processing Technology (ARIMT) 
tail cone, aileron and spoiler 
 
